

# THE ANDOVER REVIEW

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THE  
ANDOVER REVIEW:  
*A RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL MONTHLY.*

VOL. XII.—DECEMBER, 1889.—No. LXXII.

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THE OLD PESSIMISM AND THE NEW.

THE publication of the recent work of Sir Monier Monier-Williams on Buddhism may remind one of the influx of Oriental ideas in various forms to be observed of late in Western thought. Signs of such movement are common enough just now, when many are turning in expectance, as in certain past ages mankind has turned, to the far East and its occult science; while recondite philosophies and esoteric theosophies are popularized, and adepts initiate eager disciples into the obscure terminology, mystic lore, and magic virtue of this and that imported cult. There is evidence besides in other and more remarkable phases of the intellectual history of our century. Conspicuous amidst this general tendency is the renaissance, in German philosophy, of Buddhism. Not unworthy of note is this revival of the essential principles of a system which had its origin under conditions so remote.

It was in the fifth century before the Christian era that Buddhism arose, as a humanitarian protest and reaction against Brāhmanism. It was a not unnatural development of the latter system in its philosophical stage. In the Upanishads, the sacred books of that phase of Brāhmanism, are found the Pantheistic conceptions of one universal and impersonal Spirit, man's personal individuality a delusion entailing misery, and deliverance therefrom in recognition of the delusion, and in final reabsorption in the Universal Spirit, as the river loses itself in the ocean. Buddhism, in its long history and wide extension, developed into

varying and contradictory forms. At its origin, however, it was atheistic and nihilistic. It evaporated into naught that conception of the Universal Spirit or Brahman, and correspondingly transformed the doctrine of reunion with the One Spirit into negation and extinction, in its Nirvāna and Pari-nirvāna. A further modification was that the way of knowledge, so barred by the caste restrictions of the older system, was in the younger system opened to all. No one was to be shut out from enlightenment. The Buddha founded a universal brotherhood of equality.

His way of knowledge had its point of departure in a main doctrine of the older system, namely, that life was fast bound in misery, being only a link in a series of existences whereby sin continued itself in woe. All Indian philosophy had, for its aim, deliverance from the horrors of the weary round of metempsychosis, involving the perpetuation of the misery of existence. Buddhism was essentially little else than Brāhmanism divested of its transcendentalism, broadened in its adaptation to mankind, and endowed with the potent spell of a central and most attractive personality. That which the older system, after laborious theorizing, had arrived at, Buddhism made its starting-point, namely, the illusion and evil of existence. The teaching of the Buddha had regard to the pain of life, its source, its cessation, and the means thereof. His "four noble truths," the ground of his whole doctrine, are stated by Sir Monier Monier-Williams substantially thus: (1.) Existence in any form, whether on earth or in heavenly spheres, necessarily involves pain and suffering. (2.) All suffering is caused by lust, craving, or desire, of three kinds, for sensual pleasure, for wealth, and for existence. (3.) Cessation of suffering is simultaneous with extinction of lust, craving, and desire. (4.) The way whereby to attain extinction of desire and cessation of suffering.<sup>1</sup>

From the evil of existence, Brāhmanism sought deliverance through the soul's reunion with divinity in the Universal Spirit which was its source. Buddhism, expecting refuge only in negation and non-existence, was thorough and utter pessimism, remediless and hopeless.

This root of bitterness, to be found at the base of both Brāhmanism and Buddhism, and well-nigh constituting the very essence of the latter, bears its dark flower for the early portion of this century in the genius of Leopardi. This poet of pessimism, who wrote the melancholy lines —

<sup>1</sup> *Buddhism*, p. 43.

"Mai non veder la luce  
Era, credo, il miglior :"<sup>1</sup> —

sings to his own weary heart, —

"Assai  
Palpitasti, non val cosa nessuna  
I moti tuoi, nè di sospiri è degna  
La terra. Amaro e noia  
La vita, altro mai nulla."<sup>2</sup>

And from that heart of poet, with no elaborate theory about source or outcome of life's trouble, is wrung the bitter cry : —

"Nostra vita a che val ? Solo a spregiarla !"<sup>3</sup>

The same noxious root bore its fruit in an imposing system of pessimistic philosophy. In the same year which saw Leopardi turn from Christian faith to the creed of despair was published the great work of Schopenhauer. Thus, at that time unknown to each other, they were both reviving the hopelessness of ancient Asia. In the later appendix to his chief work Schopenhauer asserts that, at the time of its appearance, he knew little of Buddhism, and was not under its influence. It may be noted, however, that in the first volume<sup>4</sup> he had said, "Indian philosophy streams back to Europe, and will produce a fundamental change in our knowledge and thought." Certain it is that this philosophy of modern Germany is, to a large extent, a renaissance of the principles of Buddhism.

It is to be observed that the personal element in the two systems respectively presents a striking contrast. German Pessimism has not its gentle Prince Gautama, lover and deliverer of mankind, and Buddhism had no Schopenhauer, scorner of women and hater of men. The personality, however, of the reviver of philosophic pessimism is not to be ignored in considering his thought. There is no more original and striking figure in nineteenth century literature, from the time when, at Jena, the girls laughing at the saturnine youth were rebuked by Goethe with the prediction, "In time he will grow over all our heads," to those later days when the "Sage of Frankfort" was like a second Dr. Johnson, with Frauenstädt as his Boswell, amidst a circle of almost adoring admirers.

<sup>1</sup> Better I believe it were  
Never to see the light.

<sup>2</sup> Enough hast thou throbb'd, nothing is worth  
Thine agitations, nor earth deserving of sighs.  
Bitterness and vexation is life, nor ever aught besides.

<sup>3</sup> Our life is worth — what ? Save to be despised !

<sup>4</sup> Page 461.

Arthur Schopenhauer was born February 22, 1788, in Dantzig. He was nurtured in wealth, and traveled early and extensively. Having tried, at Hamburg, business life to his great disgust, he resumed his studies, entering the University of Göttingen, and later that of Berlin, taking the degree of Ph. D. at Jena at the age of twenty-five, when he presented an original and masterly thesis on "The Fourfold Root of the Sufficient Reason." Meanwhile, at the age of seventeen, he had lost his father. To him he always ascribed the credit of all that he was, while through him were probably inherited certain morbid tendencies of mind. Between himself and his mother, who was a popular romance writer, and a friend of Goethe's, there was no sympathy whatsoever. She writes him from Weimar: "I could tell you things that would make your hair stand on end, but I refrain, for I know how you love to brood over human misery in any case." Later she refused to have him live with her. "Your laments over the stupid world and human misery give me bad nights and unpleasant dreams." Receiving his Doctor's thesis, already mentioned, which he had filially dedicated to her, she said, "The Fourfold Root. Ah! a book for apothecaries!" His relations to his mother serve to reveal his character and disposition thus early, and also largely account, in the glimpses afforded of her, for his bitterness toward women. Indeed, with such a mother, it could not be said of him that

"faith in womankind  
Beats with his blood, and trust in all things high  
Comes easy to him."

At Dresden he composed his great work, "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," The World as Will and Idea, which was published in 1818, and was at the time, and for many years, a dead failure. There was no second edition until 1844, nor a third one until 1859, and this in a land where the press was teeming with philosophical treatises. After travel and study in Italy, he spent two years in Berlin, where he was unsuccessful in his attempt to obtain pupils. Here he had an unfortunate encounter with a friend of his landlady. For injuries sustained at his hands she recovered damages in the shape of a life annuity, a burden which rested on him for over twenty years. At last on her death certificate he was able to write, "*Obit anus, abit onus.*" At Frankfort, whither he removed from Berlin, he lived many years, and died in 1860. The evening of his life was brightened by the late splendor of his fame. It was an article in the "Westminster Review,"

in 1853, that first called attention to him as one of the thinkers of the world, and he was introduced to public favor by Frauenstädt in 1854.

Notwithstanding this delay of nearly forty years in the world's recognition of him, Schopenhauer had decidedly literary and æsthetic genius. His style is not only brilliant and vividly picturesque, but is characterized by incisive force, and by a frequent play of wit. La Rochefoucauld was not more cynical, nor Swift more caustic. His thought is original and suggestive. His reflections upon art have undeniable interest and value. He was the father of the modern philosophy of music, and under his influence has been composed the greatest music of this century. If his philosophy was late in attracting attention, its influence is wide and extending to-day. Once it was unregarded, a cloud, no larger than a man's hand, rising out of the sea of speculation. Later it gathered volume and blackness, until it has darkened much of German thought, and threatens a cyclone in the nihilism of Russia. Now, portentous anywhere, it appears in our sky. Schopenhauer's chief work was published in English in 1883, a translation of his essays having appeared in America in 1881. His writings are finding here circulation, interpreters, and disciples.

In considering his system, it is foreign to our purpose to discuss Schopenhauer's modifications of the position of Kant. The latter's critical writings are pronounced "the most important phenomenon that has appeared in philosophy for two thousand years." Their effect on a receptive mind having been compared to that of the operation for cataract on a blind man, Schopenhauer declares it to be his own purpose to "put into the hands of those upon whom that operation has been successfully performed, a pair of spectacles suitable to eyes that have recovered their sight." He follows Kant's subjective idealism, and opens his great work with the words, "The world is my idea." What one knows is not a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth. He knows the world only as an object of perception. The world he knows is thus phenomenal, and has merely a relative existence. Science is only systematized knowledge under the guidance of the principle of sufficient reason, the principle, that is, of the connection of things and relativity of knowledge, under the forms of time and space and causality. To that principle the world as idea is subject. We know only the relations of things to each other. It is as if we knew that a large company

were all cousins to one another, but did not know who each one himself really was. Beneath all that appears there is the real, the thing-in-itself. And what this is, Schopenhauer in his Second Book proceeds to discover by an original method. Man is not satisfied thus to discern the mere outer relationship of things as they appear. He seeks admission to the inner significance and essence of things as they are, and the key thereto he finds in his own body. His body is not only known as an object among other objects; it is, moreover, directly felt to be the immediate manifestation of the will, which reveals itself through the voluntary movements of the body, so that its action is the will passing into perception, and, while the body is the outward manifestation of the will, the will is the inward and essential principle of the body. Then will, thus intimately known as the real inner nature of his phenomenal being, is recognized also as underlying all vital actions and the phenomena of instinct, and the name is further extended to all forms of force. Thus, reasoning from the near and familiar to the unknown, he finds Will to be the inner nature of everything in the world, the thing-in-itself, the kernel and essence of the world. A natural cause only gives occasion for the manifestation of the one Will, which is the power of the world, and the essential reality of all things. That lies outside the limiting province of the principle of sufficient reason. It is itself free from all multiplicity; while its manifestations in time and space are innumerable, like the multiplication of one picture through many facets of a glass. It is separate from any consciousness or intelligence. In its lowest grades of manifestation, this Universal Will appears as obscure, blind, unconscious striving. Thus working in the dark, at last, in the formation of the brain, it kindles for itself the light of intellect. By this enlightenment, however, the hitherto infallible certainty of the Will is interrupted. Unerring instinct now gives place to deliberation, which is liable to error. The intellect is in subordination to the Will, whose true nature is the perpetual restlessness of continual flux and endless striving.

Knowledge can, however, in certain individuals, and for certain blissful hours, throw off this bondage. Such transitory consolation may be found in the æsthetic contemplation of the beautiful, whether in art, or in nature, whereby the mind rises out of the incessant stream of willing into the purely and eternally ideal, and is a clear and untroubled mirror of the world. This æsthetic contemplation of the beautiful and the sublime, Schopenhauer treats

of in his Third Book, where, with brilliant originality, he combines Kant's Thing-in-itself and Plato's Idea. Moreover, according to his ethics, as unfolded in his Fourth Book, knowledge may react upon the will, and secure complete deliverance from its misery of continual striving.

This ingenious system presents a striking correspondence to many of the features of Buddhism. A primary note of likeness is the denial of personality, whether human or divine. Gautama admitted no notion of an incorporeal spirit. There was, so far as man's knowledge could go, no god higher than the perfectly enlightened man. "As to the question, from whom? or whence? or how? came the original force or impetus that started the first movement, the Buddha hazarded no opinion. . . . He saw nothing but countless cycles of causes and effects, and never undertook to explain the first cause which set the first wheel in motion."<sup>1</sup> Having rejected, as beyond cognizance, the Supreme Being of Brāhmanism, Buddhism had not even so much acknowledgment of human personality as the older system had. What was there metempsychosis is here rather a continuous metamorphosis. Consciousness, with the other constituent elements of being, is dissolved at death. But the moral result of the life, the act-force (Karma), passes on into a new form. Thus, although existence was perpetuated or renewed through successive forms of being, there was not, in the absence of continued consciousness, any true personal identity. If there was no self-consciousness, there was no true self. Indeed, belief in the existence of a personal self or ego was the first of the ten fetters that must be got rid of.<sup>2</sup>

If we turn now to the German philosopher, we find him far from theism. In the very spirit of Buddhism he writes: "My philosophy, at least, does not by any means seek to know *whence* or *wherefore* the world exists, but merely *what* the world is."<sup>3</sup> God is the creation of man's fancy, acting upon his sense of need and dependence, and he quotes the old saying, "Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor." What he objects to in Pantheism is its *theistic* element. Nor does he grant any human personality. The individual person is a manifestation of will, not real, but phenomenal. Persons are mere puppets of the world magician, waves rising and subsiding in the ocean, bubbles to be dissolved in the encasing air.

Buddhism made the first cause of the misery of life to be ignorance, namely, not to know that life is merely a link in a passing

<sup>1</sup> Sir Monier Monier-Williams, *Buddhism*, p. 119.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 127.

<sup>3</sup> *The World*, etc., vol. i. p. 108.



series ; not a permanent good, but an evanescent and illusory appearance and an evil mockery. With Schopenhauer it is the beginning of philosophic wisdom to recognize that all phenomenal existence is an illusion, the world about us an evanescent appearance, our sense of self a delusion, and life a dream. What we call dreams are distinguished from real life by the fact that they do not fit into its continuity. Life he compares to the systematic reading of a book, while dreaming is the reading of a page here and there without method or connection. But life and dreams are leaves of the same book, and life is one long dream.<sup>1</sup> Again and again he refers to the doctrine of the Hindu Vedas and Purānas regarding the work of Mâyâ. This made the world only a summoned enchantment, an inconstant appearance without true being, a veil enveloping human consciousness, allowing it to see not the reality, the thing-in-itself, but the phenomenon in time and space, and in the other forms of the principle of sufficient reason. For the wise man, this veil of Mâyâ becomes transparent, and the illusion of the phenomenal is dispelled.

Buddhism, emphasizing the connection between sorrow and the indulgence of desires that ought to be suppressed, made the second great cause of the world's misery to be *tanhâ*, the thirst of craving or desire. The German philosopher, from his doctrine of will, and his identification of will with desire, so that it may be compared to an unquenchable thirst, derives a pessimism more acrid than ever embittered the soul of dreamy Asiatic. The essence of being is will. "But the basis of all willing is need, deficiency, and thus pain. Consequently, the nature of brutes and man is subject to pain originally and through its very being. If, on the other hand, it lacks objects of desire, because it is at once deprived of them by a too easy satisfaction, a terrible void and ennui comes over it, that is, its being, and existence itself, becomes an unbearable burden to it. Thus its life swings like a pendulum backwards and forwards between pain and ennui."<sup>2</sup> The people are tormented by want, and the world of fashion by ennui, card-playing being peculiarly an index of the misery of humanity. The will is one continuous striving, always in conflict, and therefore always in suffering. As there is no final end of the striving, there can be no measure or end of the suffering, which is thus essential to life and inseparable from it. He holds that happiness is never really anything more than negative ; that, being only relief from pain, it cannot

<sup>1</sup> *The World*, etc., i. p. 22.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* i. p. 402.

be positive; that the chief good things of life, as, for example, health, youth, and freedom, we do not appreciate as long as we possess them, but only after we have lost them; and that only pain is positive. Thus the essence of life, the Will, existence itself, is a constant sorrow and misery. Such are the counts of the indictment which Schopenhauer brings against existence, as partly pitiable, partly terrible, and altogether desperately hopeless, and against the world, as the worst that could possibly be. His theory of the malignant persistence of the will-to-live, ever renewing itself in the pain and suffering of the manifold forms of life, resolves itself into the Buddhist doctrine of the misery involved in the desire for existence, "the aching craze to live."

A further resemblance is to be found in ethical teachings. In the ethics of Buddhism we find, as we might expect, a chief prominence given to compassion for all who suffer. It was out of pity, and the desire to deliver from their misery living beings of every order, that Gautama had voluntarily endured those many births in different forms of existence, and those repeated sacrifices of self. And his follower was exhorted to further his own deliverance from the bondage of continued individuality by sympathetic regard for others, and by making their sufferings his own. He must not harm any living thing, because he himself might one day be born again like the being he had injured, and in his turn suffer the same injury. Very like the spirit of that ancient code of ethics is Schopenhauer's moral teaching. Do not injure your fellow-man, who is in reality not a separate individual, but one with you, a manifestation of the same will. It is simply self injury. His ethics he founds upon his doctrine that the principle of individuality belongs only to the phenomenal and not to the real. The distinction between him who wrongs and him who is wronged is only apparent and not real. The essential reality is the Will living in both, which thus buries its teeth in its own flesh. He who inflicts the injury and he who suffers it are one. The egoism, which gives rise to selfish hatred and wickedness, means simply that the mind is fettered by that delusion of the principle of individuality. Virtue means, to recognize the real identity of all beings. He quotes the ancient Asiatic formula pronounced over all the beings in the world, living and lifeless, *tat twam asi*, "This thou art." This identity of self with all was, for the people, embodied by Brāhmanism in the myth of the transmigration of souls, and the same principle appears again in Buddhism, where metempsychosis is modified into a series of

renewals by a kind of palingenesis. This doctrine of metempsychosis, remarks Schopenhauer, "deviates from the truth merely through the circumstance that it transfers to the future what already is now. It makes my true inner nature exist in others only after my death, while, according to the truth, it already lives in them now."<sup>1</sup> Thus he makes the basis of justice and benevolence to be sympathy, which penetrates the delusive principle of individuality. All pure love is sympathy. Weeping he explains as arising from sympathy with our own selves, identifying self with the suffering. On pity rests every true virtue, and compassion is the ground of morality.

The penetration of that veil of *Mâyâ*, the principle of individuality, may go still further, and lead on into Schopenhauer's Way of Salvation. While egoistic knowledge, that is, of particular individuality, constantly gives motives of volition, on the other hand the knowledge of the whole, of the thing-in-itself, may become a quieter of all and every volition. The will now turns away from life. Man attains to the state of voluntary renunciation, resignation, true indifference, and perfect will-lessness. I might compare it to that equatorial tract of ocean which sailors call the Doldrums, where they drift in dead calm without a wind to move them. Upon this condition of spirit, which is essentially the same as the Quietism of Madame Guion and others, Schopenhauer delights to dwell, although in his own character he never attained to it. In his language, it is the transition from virtue to asceticism. There arises within the man a horror of the nature, of which his own phenomenal existence is an expression, the will to live, the kernel and essence of that world which is recognized as full of misery. Himself essentially nothing else than a manifestation of will, he ceases to will anything. Complete continence is the first step in this denial of the will to live. If thus the human race were to die out, then the inferior manifestations of the Will, in the rest of the world, would also vanish, as the twilight passes after the light of day. Voluntary poverty, fasting, torture of the body, are other means of breaking down the will, until death completes the deliverance. Thus the inner nature of holiness is denial of the will to live. One may be brought to the conviction of it either by observation of the sufferings of the world, or by the felt experience of suffering. Illustrations are found in the stories of Raymond Lully, and the Abbé Rancé, reformer of the order of Trappists. Even in the lap of Protest-

<sup>1</sup> *The World*, etc., iii. p. 418.

antism are found illustrations of this asceticism, in the American Shakers, who are compared to the ancient Essenes. This denial of the will to live is not fulfilled in suicide, which really is a strong assertion of will. Just because the suicide cannot give up willing, he gives up living. Schopenhauer is inclined, however, to approve suicide by slow starvation, and thinks that the absolute denial of will may reach the point at which the will shall be wanting to take necessary nourishment, and the completely resigned ascetic cease to live because he has altogether ceased to will. Thus death is the final goal, beyond is nothingness, and holiness means not to care. Here Schopenhauer lapses into pure Buddhism. This doctrine of the denial of the will-to-live, this will-lessness, which desires nothing and hopes nothing, and aspires to nothingness as the welcome dénouement of the miserable drama of existence, is simply a revival of the Buddhist doctrine of Nirvāna.

This is a much controverted term. It should be observed that it was a current expression adopted from Brāhmaṇism, and it is elastic and changeable in its meaning, as are the two systems wherein it occurs. It were not strange if, with masses of mankind, the vague and empty outline of Nirvāna came at length to be filled in with the beauty of an Elysian field or the gross attractions of a Mohammedan Paradise, or otherwise modified. Originally, however, the word means "the state of a blown-out flame," and refers to the extinction of the three fires of lust, ill-will, and delusion, and a release from all consequent ignorance and pain. Equivalent to Arahattam, sainthood, the more common word in the Pāli texts, it denoted the state reached by Gautama at the moment when, under the Bodhi-tree, he attained the perfect enlightenment of Buddhahood. It was not annihilation. It was not death, for forty-five years later came to the Buddha his Parinirvāna, when he passed away. That was the final close of the series of bodily organizations the cessation of re-births. Placed together, the two terms seem to explain themselves. Nirvāna is the extinction of the fire of desire, passion, and will. Parinirvāna is the extinction of the flame of existence. Schopenhauer's denial of the will, where desire has died, and not a hope survives, is precisely the Nirvāna of primitive Buddhism.

Thus does his system reproduce Oriental thought in the more precise terms of Western philosophy. We find here Sākya-muni in company with Plato and Kant. With them we roam through

an interesting but withal weird and repelling region. We seem to traverse a mighty forest, with its inviting glades and alluring vistas, its flowers in wasteful luxuriance of beauty and its towering growths of baleful shade, its fantastic shapes and grotesque monstrosities, its vast, noxious morasses, its dark, forbidding pools, its glooms, its miasmas. The characteristics of the personality whence this philosophy proceeded possessed some unusual significance. There was not only much egotism there, a cold, hard self-sufficiency, devoid alike of the sympathy with humanity which he inculcated, and the reverence toward God which he repudiated; but, moreover, in the personal make-up may be detected, running through it all, a thread of special singularity, into which entered at least two strands, a somewhat unhealthy mental tendency inherited through the father, and, largely on the mother's account, a certain unnatural disposition toward women, in spite of undenied susceptibility in this regard. Hence may have been derived a morbid over-sensitiveness and perversion of healthy sentiment regarding the relations of sex and the propagation of life, which would seem to have infected his philosophy and seriously affected his whole estimate of existence. Into his very characteristic metaphysico-physiological dissection of love we will not enter.

It is not possible here fully to consider the fallacies and contradictions observable in his system as a whole. A primary error underlies two prominent characteristics of the theory, the separation between will and intellect, and the derivative and subordinate position assigned to intellect. It is in vain that he seeks the solution of the world's enigma in will-power alone. There cannot be will in general that wills nothing in particular. And whatsoever is willed must be present in idea, for, if otherwise present, it would not be willed. Some cognition or idea must accompany will. He here comes short of a much earlier thinker, whom he more than once alludes to, that martyr of Italian philosophy to whom a statue was recently erected at Rome under remarkable circumstances. Schopenhauer might have learned wisdom from Giordano Bruno, and his "*intelligentia divina*," his recognition of purpose as the immanent life of the universe. It must be reserved for another paper to consider how Schopenhauer's system has here been modified by Von Hartmann, who introduces intellect as a constituent, together with will, of his infallible "Unconscious." Indeed, Schopenhauer does not at all prove, but simply assumes, his fundamental position that the body is a direct

objectification of will. It is an assertion which cannot be proved, in view of the limited control of the will over the body.

An important tributary to his pessimism is the doctrine of a mere puppet personality. This doctrine, which holds that the person belongs to the phenomenal, and that exemption from the sufferings of others is only in appearance, so that "according to the true nature of things every one has all the sufferings of the world as his own," is not in harmony with experience. In actual fact the whole world does not suffer in us; we suffer as individuals. Again, regarding the seat of the personality, the will, Schopenhauer's identification of will with desire is by no means accurate. Desire and will are distinct from each other. They may be in direct opposition, and each may master the other. It is far from adequate to describe will as implying the wretchedness of want. It might more truly be said to mean energy. And therein is joy. In healthy effort there is pleasure, as in all due exercise of function. The "*Journal Intime*" of Amiel bears pathetic testimony to the joyousness of will. "The Buddhist tendency in me blunts the faculty of free self-government and weakens the power of action. . . . I hold my own personality, my own aptitudes, my own aspirations too cheap. . . . In a word, I bear within me a perpetual self-detractor, and this is what takes all spring out of my life."<sup>1</sup> Even in the stress of stern conflict one may still drink delight of battle. It is evident that Schopenhauer, in his own personality, lacked that element of will which goes to make up courage. Physically he was without doubt a coward, in mortal dread of robbers, and of the contagion of disease. And it is probable he had not that stout heart and steadfast will which enter into moral courage, and enable a man to contend in evil days and never yield; as Browning puts it, —

"still struggling to effect  
My warfare; happy that I can  
Be crossed and thwarted as a man."

Indeed, while Schopenhauer made everything of will in general, he denied all freedom to the human will. It was powerless to control or modify the inevitable tendencies in the man. There was possible no improvement or progress of character, no joyous sense of moral growth and advance toward perfection. Little wonder, then, at the depressing principles thereupon ensuing, which all tended to lower and deaden the faculties of being. His doctrine plainly meant intellectual and spiritual suicide. And, although he

<sup>1</sup> Page 122.



disavowed the inculcation of literal suicide, yet self-murder is the practical outcome of his system, and according to its principles the shortest route out of misery. Indeed, his ascetic starvation is, notwithstanding all he may say to the contrary, simply a slow process of suicide. From the standpoint of his own theory, however, his denial of the will-to-live is involved in contradictions. How can a man annul his own individual will, when it is but a manifestation in him of that only and mighty Will? And if he could, how would his doing so at all affect the whole Will, which is continually rushing into life anew?

Schopenhauer's doctrine that happiness is only negative, so that there is no such thing as positive satisfaction, is an error which may be refuted by appeal to fact. There is pleasure which does not mean removal of pain, but arises directly. We might with as much truth say, with Leibnitz, that it is pain which is negative. Pleasure and pain are simply positive and negative to each other, like any other opposite poles. All assertions, also, of the preponderance of pain over pleasure can be as readily denied as made.

It is, however, upon higher ground that our strongest defense against Pessimism is to be made. The value of life is not to be reckoned in terms merely of pleasure and pain. Those terms cannot be satisfactorily computed. Nor are they the chief factors that enter into the problem. The question of the worth of life constitutes not primarily an æsthetic but an ethical problem. It is to be settled by appeal to truth of the moral order. It is there that, notwithstanding all the pain and sorrow the pessimist may adduce, we nevertheless may learn that life is solemn indeed, but if solemn also sacred, and because sacred therefore precious. The principles we have found to be common to the old pessimism and the new we may state in inverse order thus: (1.) Denial of will. (2.) Sympathy the ethical principle. (3.) The misery of will as desire. (4.) Knowledge of the illusion. (5.) No personality. (6.) No God. Over against those negations we may set, each against each, these positive truths, linked in a chain of sequence: (1.) A worthy end for the will. (2.) That worthy end found in right for its own sake. (3.) The joy of will as effort toward that end. (4.) Beneath all changing phenomena, great facts which give to the entire process worth and significance, namely, (5) Human personality, and (6) God. Or, in other words, our own personal life which may conform itself to goodness as its ideal, and a living Being who in perfection is all that we can aspire to be.



Thus moral energy may save us from any nightmare fancies of a blindly malignant will, working out its curse through all. Loyal faith in right and duty finds, as Amiel even in his lonely darkness found, "the holy will which is at the root of nature and destiny,"<sup>1</sup> and comes at length into the truth that Dante sang in his great line: —

"In la sua volontade è nostra pace."

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### HOLMAN HUNT AND THE PRE-RAPHAELITES.

FEW "movements" in this age of "movements" have had a more interesting history than that of the modern Pre-Raphaelite School of Painting, so closely associated with the noble and serious life, high aims, and earnest purpose of Holman Hunt. Few lives and movements, moreover, have been more persistently misunderstood, more flagrantly misrepresented. All Mr. Ruskin's genius and influence have not, even yet, succeeded in winning for this school a thoroughly fair recognition, — possibly because the issue between it and its opponents is not yet, and may never be, a dead issue. But, however this may be, the story of the movement, from its first beginning, must always possess a special interest for every thoughtful lover of Art; particularly when told, as it has been told, truly and simply, by one so well qualified to tell it as the veteran leader himself.

About forty years ago, when the spirit of a political and intellectual unrest was actively at work in overturning old forms of government as well as of belief, three young painters, of earnest nature and profound insight, though of widely different types of genius, were united in a fellow feeling of rebellion against the traditional conventionality which, as they believed, had produced the general decline of English Art. A slavish imitation of Raffaele and his followers had well-nigh killed out originality. Art had become a conventional imitation of Art, instead of drawing perpetual freshness from her great model, Nature. She was, consequently, growing more and more blindly conventional, more and more servile in adhering to old established forms and standards. While feeling this profound dissatisfaction with the principles

<sup>1</sup> *Journal*, p. 210.

and practice of their contemporaries, these three young men were vaguely seeking, as one of them expressed it, "for some sure ground, some starting-point for our art, which would be secure, if it were ever so humble." Just at this critical moment in their career they hit upon an old book of engravings of the frescoes in the Campo Santo at Pisa by the early painters who preceded Raffaello. Here, to their unbounded delight, they found, or thought they found, "that freedom from corruption, pride, and disease, for which they sought." "Here there was, at least, no trace of decline, no conventionality, no arrogance. Whatever the imperfection, the whole spirit of the art was simple and sincere, — was, as Ruskin afterwards said, eternally and unalterably true." "Think," Hunt goes on to say, "what a revelation it was to find such work at such a moment, and to recognize with the triple enthusiasm of our three spirits!"

In order to understand how this should have been felt by them as a revelation, we should have to try to divest ourselves of ideas which have become inextricably interwoven with our modern thought, and which are not the least valuable portion of our heritage from the past. That *truthfulness* in Art which Mr. Ruskin's writings have made a note so familiar to modern ears was then, in form at least, new to the world of Art. But, to these young men, the new light on their path became a guiding star. *Truth* — fresh from the source of nature itself, in the place of dead conventionality and traditional imitation — was the principle that fired their youthful enthusiasm, and by which they resolved to stand or fall. And their steady and unwavering devotion to this principle, combined with the leavening force of Mr. Ruskin's teaching, have changed the whole temper and ideals of modern English Art. So thoroughly conscientious were they, was Holman Hunt at least, that he would not only have utterly disdained to evolve the proverbial "camel" out of his "own consciousness," but would also have refused to copy the camel of another painter, or even to draw the camel in the "Zoo," but would paint the camel as he stands in his native desert, or not at all. The influence of the new impulse they thus gave to Art, we may feel in every illustrated book and paper. Let any one exhume out of the fossilized remains of past ages one of the children's books published a generation ago, now happily an extinct species; let him notice the painfully stiff and wooden figures, the flat and impossible landscapes, and compare these with the real trees and flowers, the real children and men and women that adorn

even the nursery rhymes and primers of this happier age. This change is, in no small measure, due to the conjoint influence of Mr. Ruskin and the long-despised "Pre-Raphaelites," who did for painting what Burns did for poetry,—sent it back to the fresh, pure well-spring of nature, from which alone it can derive an ever fresh, perennial life. The three comrades who initiated this return were Holman Hunt, Dante Gabriel Rossetti, and John Millais, names which are now household words. Rossetti, whom most of us know rather as poet than as painter, had the most distinctly poetical style, subtle and fanciful indeed to an extreme. But as *he* certainly was no mere realist, neither did the other two profess to be mere copyists of nature. Art, of course, must always be much more than that. While seeking ruth to nature, down to the smallest detail, they sought to catch the ideal beauty, through the interpretation of which the true artist's mission is to "make a spectator feel how much more beautiful the world is than she seemed before."

The story of their brave fight for these principles — waged against opposition so bitter that it sometimes amounted to persecution — has been fully told by their veteran leader in his retrospective exposition of the views and aims which inspired them. It is closely interwoven, too, with the story of Holman Hunt's own career, which we happily thus get at first hand, without the intervention of a biographer. Here, at least, we can be sure of the authentic portraiture of an interesting life.

Holman Hunt shared the fate of many another embryo artist, in receiving no encouragement at home in his early predilection for artistic pursuits. His father, in common with the respectable British public of that period, believed that "Art was little better than loafing;" and, in order to turn the boy's thoughts into a more useful channel, he sent him, betimes, to learn business in the city. Here, shut up in a little room that looked out on three black walls, and employed all day in making entries in a ledger, the boy seemed far enough from realizing his artistic dreams. Yet, though his education was thus cut short, so far as school was concerned, the eager lad found at this office good literary pasture on which he could browse to his heart's content. His master was a man of scholarly tastes, and young Hunt used to read Homer and Plutarch and Shakespeare, in the intervals of office work, with a hunger unknown to boys who read them as task work; while he indulged in wistful day-dreams of the *Ægean* and the *Troad*, of Athens and Rome, Venice and Verona. His

natural bent for the pictorial art was too strong for repression; and even here, in the dull and dingy office, he tried his hand at designing. It was one of his amusements to draw flies on the ground glass of the window pane, with as much success as the old Greek painter, in making them seem real to his employer. Happily, this gentleman had himself some love for art, and young Hunt eventually received permission to spend his own earnings in taking lessons from a city portrait painter. He worked away, *con amore*, until his success in a life-like portrait of an old orange-woman gave him courage to declare to his father that he would be an artist, and nothing but an artist! The father yielded so far as to permit him to try his own way at his own risk.

There did not then exist the well-appointed art schools and other facilities for art study which abound to train the budding artist of to-day. Holman Hunt had, however, the British Museum close at hand, and here he drew faithfully two days in each week, while the other three days were spent in earning his own expenses by painting portraits, copying pictures, or doing anything else that happened to come in his way. He did not, as many a *dilettante* youth would have done, disdain even such humble employment as that of altering faces and draperies of portraits so as to suit the tastes of their originals. One of the commissions at this time executed by the future painter of the "Shadow of the Cross" and the "Light of the World" was that of remodeling an old portrait by altering the expression, and changing the color of the coat; all which, with characteristic thoroughness, he faithfully performed, and was duly paid accordingly. He failed, however, in his first two attempts to enter the Academy, and his father, whose patience would hold out no longer, declared that if he could not succeed on the third trial, he must return to "the city"! Persuasion won the day, however. At seventeen his first drawing was accepted, and he at last attained the object of his ambition.

And now having fairly started on his chosen career, with artistic intelligence and discrimination developed, to which of the great painters of the day should the enthusiastic young student look for the model he should set before him? This important aid to a learner was not so easily found by one whose aspirations already surpassed those of his compeers. The last painter who had attempted to lead a school had been poor, ambitious, visionary Haydon, — a man who might have done great things had he gone to work on a truer principle, but who had just ended his tragic

career of struggle and disappointment by an equally tragic suicide. Etty, after twenty years of failure and heroic effort, had become "the rage," but his exaggerated melodramatic style repelled Hunt, who speaks of him as "painting classic subjects with the taste of a Parisian paper-hanger." Landseer he admired for point and poetry of design, but he disliked what he calls "the pomatum-y texture of his painting, the absence of firm bone beneath his skins, and the gentle melting away of every form into shapeless cloud." Turner, as he tersely expresses it, "was rapidly disappearing in a gorgeous sunset." Mulready seemed a safe guide, so far as his painstaking and studious tendencies were concerned, but his drawing was without any bold line, and he was injured by his taste for prettiness. Maclise, Leslie, Hollands, Dyce, — all had their admirable qualities, but each had for Hunt some drawback, when regarded in the light of a master to be followed; while the younger painters, along with perhaps a "fatal facility," gave evidence of their lack of a leader by their "diversity," which seems to have been at least one advantage arising from their lack of leadership. Of course, the Greeks and Raffaele were perpetually quoted, but the admiration expressed seemed to him hollow and indiscriminating. For there seemed to be no conception of the great interval which, to his eye, separated Raffaele from such painters as Guido, Murillo, and others, grouped under the general name of the "old masters." It is not surprising that a student so advanced in his ideas, and so hard to satisfy, should not have found much satisfaction in discussion with his fellows, and should have been often misunderstood.

But the history of this critical period of his art studies is best conveyed in his own words: —

"The majority of my compeers and immediate elders were worshippers of Etty, and inquired not at all of the beginning of his greatness, but strove to display at least equal mastery in execution to that which he had. Some followed other masters, but it amused me to observe that all alike adduced the Greeks and Raffaele as the prophets to sanctify their courses, and all took fire at the suggestion that the solid ground beneath their feet was the only foundation on which the greatest could stand. There was no discrimination then with artists, more than with the public, that Guido, Parmegiano, and Le Brun, Murillo, Sasso Ferato, and such crew, were birds of a different feather from their great idols, so that the name of the princely Urbinite was made to cover all conventional Art. We knew less of Michael Angelo in England

then, with the Sistine Chapel and the Medici tombs unphotographed; and Tintoretto was not known in his might at all. In the painting schools sober discussion seemed very unprofitable. When I put down my brush, which was not often, I preferred to joke, and I accepted the railing description of 'flat blasphemy,' until my outspoken denunciation of the gods became a password, though the students had no great faith in my sincerity. How could it be credited that one was in earnest in saying that Murillo's large 'Holy Family' in the National Gallery was rubbish?"

But if he felt that he "had to be his own master," he could at least assimilate any bits of instruction that came in his way. He thus describes the "first bit of genuine instruction" which he received, and which determined the whole course of his artistic life.

"While engaged in copying the 'Blind Fiddler,' a visitor, looking over me, said that Wilkie painted it without any dead coloring, but finished each bit as fresco was done." This was a revelation to him, and as he traced the purity of work of the early painters to their drilling in the exact manipulation needed in fresco painting, he tried to put aside the "loose, irresponsible painting" of the time, and to adapt himself to a style which allowed no excuse for a false touch. More and more there grew in him this love of "clean work," and clear forms and tints, as he saw it in these Francias and other Pre-Raphaelites. He desired to submit himself to the training of patient self-restraint "imposed by masters who had never indulged their hands in uncertainty and dash" on pupils who had "delighted in the devotion of humility till far on in their maturity!" Such a training he felt the more necessary for himself, as he was naturally "slovenly and impatient of results." Any idea of founding a school was most remote from his thoughts. He was simply feeling his way to the course that he felt most profitable for himself, although the study of certain paintings early forced on him the conviction that "in Art, as in other pursuits, it is a loss in the end both for schools and individuals to begin as masters."

But like draws to like. Millais and Rossetti were both students at the Academy, and it was not long before Hunt and Millais became close friends. Each cordially admired the other's work, and Millais introduced Hunt to his parents as "the student who drew so well." Hunt's picture from Keats—the "Eve of St. Agnes"—was partially painted in Millais's studio, and its appearance at the exhibition of the Academy brought Rossetti to



his side in enthusiastic admiration, — this picture being thus the means of drawing together the three leaders of the Pre-Raphaelite school.

Their "Brotherhood" was an after-thought, called into being by the developing genius and advancing aims of its members. Shortly before Hunt had begun the "Eve of St. Agnes," his earnest mind, just then in a state of eager receptivity, had come under the strong and congenial influence of a teacher who was to be, in a great degree, the inspiration, as well as the powerful ally, of the new school of Art. Ruskin's "Modern Painters" fell into his hands, and one may imagine the delight and enthusiasm with which the earnest young art student absorbed the teaching that fell, like good seed, into a soil so well fitted to receive it, and to bring forth an abundant harvest. This book revealed to him, too, for the first time, the truth, that the modern intellect was not, as he had rashly supposed, dead to all possibility of awakening a genuine passion for Art, and that it was not useless to look for any generous enthusiasm for it in the nineteenth century. The influence of this thought and the inspiration of such teaching remained with him long after he was obliged to return the book, — before, as he says, he had "got half the good there was in it." It is one of the pathetic incidents common in the lives of men of genius, that the future leader of a new school of Art — the reader who, as he said, felt more strongly than any one else could have done, "that it was written expressly for him" — should have been obliged to borrow this book from lack of ability to buy it, and should have had to sit up nearly all night, in order to finish it before returning it.

The companionship of the three young men proved a source of stimulus and strength to them all, — the strong points of each supplementing the weaker points of the others. It was just then, while still dissatisfied with existing standards and models, and looking for some sure ground to be a starting-point for their still vague aspirations towards reform, that they found, one evening, at the house of Millais, the book of engravings of the frescoes in the Campo Santo at Pisa, which, to their delight, furnished an actual embodiment of those principles of simplicity and sincerity towards which they had been feeling their way. Like "a flash of lightning" the truth of these principles appealed to each of the three spirits "with the force of a revelation," and, from that moment, they were pledged, as a "Brotherhood," to devote their lives to the revival of the simple sincerity which had been most



characteristic of the earliest painters. "Neither then, nor afterwards," says Hunt, "did they affirm that there was not much healthy and good art after the time of Raffaele, but only that after that time there could be traced a gradual degeneracy." To restore to its first purity, by a patient and careful return to the study of nature, was the task which these three enthusiasts now undertook. Their association was termed a "Brotherhood," and the prefix "Pre-Raphaelite" — originally applied in contempt by their enemies — was finally adopted as its distinctive name. This name was not, however, for the public, the initials "P. R. B." in their paintings being the sole visible sign of their union. "It was only in a little spirit of fun," says Hunt, "that we thus agreed that Raffaele, the Prince of Painters, was the inspiring influence of the art of the day, for we saw that the practice of contemporary painters was as different from that of the master whose example we quoted, as established interest or indifference had ever made the conduct of disciples."

The three young men thus united in a common aim and purpose were of widely differing character and genius. Hunt was the leading spirit, and may be called the conscience of the trio. Rossetti was the poet, while Millais, in the words of his friend, "showed a rare combination of extraordinary artistic faculty with sterling English common sense." Rossetti, as described by Hunt, was a young man of singularly marked and pronounced type of genius. Impulsive, passionate, impatient, yet refined and dreamy, he seemed "of imagination all compact," full of poetic fire, of generous, quick enthusiasm, with a spirit that, though subtle, was intense in all its beliefs and emotions, and made him eager to proselytize even, as Hunt says, to an absurd degree. He was singularly narrow, as well as intense, in his sympathies. He had devoted himself almost exclusively to the study of poetry, yet for such a poet as Homer he cared but little. Passionately enthusiastic as he was for painting, he had little admiration for the kindred art of sculpture, while we have Holman Hunt's word for the fact, otherwise scarcely credible, that "music he regarded as positively offensive." Much as he loved nature, his love did not go deeper than the outward aspect. The truth of science was distasteful to him. He was romantically attached to the old order of things, and to old ways of looking at things, and cared no more to have these disturbed by "the widening thoughts of men" than he would have cared to have a picturesque mass of ivy displaced from a mouldering old wall. "What could it matter," he

said, "whether the earth moved round the sun, or the sun traveled round the earth?" Naturally, therefore, he cared but little for that truth of detail for which Hunt cared so much, — thought "that attention to chronological costume, to the types of the different races of men, to climatic features or influences, were of no value in a painter's work, and that, therefore, Oriental proprieties in the treatment of Scriptural subjects were calculated to destroy the poetic nature of a design." With Hunt's idea, which he afterwards carried out, of making a pilgrimage to Jerusalem in order to paint sacred subjects with greater truth, Rossetti did not much sympathize. Yet, though he had so much of the character of a *dilettante*, and carried his poetic idealism to a fantastic extreme, he was quite ready to join his forces with the effort of his two friends "to fight against the then current modes of art, as wanting in serious ambition, vital force, and thoroughness of expression," and to unite with them "in our manner of acquiring power direct from nature itself, to establish a healthier and more pervading taste than that which was frittering away the genius of the nation in trifles and bombast."

Holman Hunt has been called "a prosaic realist." It is possible that his strongly spiritual sensibilities somewhat overpowered in his works the easily appreciable poetry of sensuous beauty. But the boy who, when shut up in the dingy blankness of a city office, could console himself with Homer and Shakespeare, with visions of the *Ægean*, of Athens, and of Imperial Rome, — the painter whose symbolic religious pictures have exercised so powerful an influence over so many poetic natures, — must have had a strong vein of poetic feeling in himself. As to his "realism," the expression is one which is ambiguously used. A true realism and a true idealism are not opposed, but most closely related to each other. In fact, the realism which, while keeping close to nature, also seizes and suggests her essential spirit, meaning, and higher relations, may be said to be also the truest idealism. In regard to a charge, however, which has so frequently been made against Holman Hunt in particular, it is well to give the very words in which he himself replies to it.

"We both agreed," he says of himself and Rossetti, "that a man's work should be the reflex of the living image in his own mind of the idea treated, and not the icy double of the facts themselves. Carolus Duran has said, in almost exactly the same words, that art is not a reproduction of nature, but the conveyance, from one mind to another, of a fresh impression of it.

"It may be seen," Hunt goes on to say, "that we were never what we have often been called, — realists. I think the art would have ceased to have the slightest interest for any one of the three painters concerned, had the object been only to make a representation — elaborate or unelaborate — of a *fact* in nature. Independent of the consideration that the task would put out of operation the faculty, making man, — 'how like a god,' it seemed then, as it does now, — that a mere imitation gradually comes to see nature so claylike and meaningless, — so like only to what one sees when illness brings a heavy cloud before the eyes, — that the pictures or statues make a spectator feel, not how much more beautiful the world is than she seemed before, but only that she is a tedious infliction or even an oppressive nightmare. . . . In agreeing to use the utmost elaboration in painting our first pictures, we never meant more than that the practice was essential for training the eye and the hand of the young artist; we should never have admitted that the relinquishment of this habit of work by a matured painter would have made him less of a Pre-Raphaelite. I can say this the better now, because, although it is not true, as is often said, that my detail is microscopic, I have retained, later than either of my companions, the penciling of a student. When I take to large brushes, and enrich my canvases with impasto, it will imply that the remnant of my life would not suffice to enable me to express my thoughts in other fashion, and that I have in my own opinion obtained enough from severe discipline to trust myself again to the self-complacent handling of my youth, to which I have already referred."

Yet so persistently do men take that which is merely incidental for that which is radical and essential, that it has become habitual to call any very microscopic and prosaic rendering of nature "Pre-Raphaelite," and to cast the discredit of such work as a reproach on the school itself! Of course, when the new school had achieved a certain degree of popularity, it did not need the vigorous proselytism of Rossetti to attach to it many disciples, with some of whom, at least, their only claim to belong to it was their imitation of such unessential peculiarities. And as slavish imitation always kills out true spiritual kinship, and any one good custom may "corrupt the world," there has arisen a spurious and conventional "Pre-Raphaelitism" which has provoked salutary ridicule. There still exists, in some quarters, a popular superstition that any representation of a forlorn-looking damsel in very limp and dingy garments, standing in a lackadaisical attitude

amid a profusion of stiff sunflowers, is a fair specimen of "Pre-Raphaelite painting." What has been already quoted from Hunt will serve to show the absurdity of such a charge, in regard, especially, to that elaboration of details which is supposed to be an essential feature of this school. As to coloring, Hunt's own has called forth very divided opinion. It is certainly rich and glowing, whatever may be said of its harmony; the "Scape-Goat," in particular, being considered by competent critics a marvelous achievement of purity, translucency, and iridescence. Rossetti's, if occasionally morbid, was always refined and delicate, while that of Millais is too popular to need any comment.

All competent judges ought now to be able to acknowledge the real value of the service rendered to Art by these masters of the "Pre-Raphaelite School." But, even yet, they are scarcely out of the shadow of the cloud of misrepresentation and slander, the common fate of reformers, which so long obscured the fame of the young enthusiasts who boldly determined to turn their back on old conventions, and go to nature herself for inspiration. They were "chaffed," ridiculed, sneered at, and, as the opposition waxed sharper, were bitterly attacked and recklessly maligned. Unhappily, the weakness of Rossetti betrayed, to a gossiping friend, the meaning of the cabalistic letters "P. R. B.," and, before long, of course, the newspapers proclaimed the cherished secret. Then, indeed, the storm broke upon the heads of the audacious trio! As Holman Hunt expressed it: "It seemed as if the honor of Raphael were the feeling dearest of all to the bosom of England, and this we had impiously assailed!" Charles Dickens, scarcely a fitting defender of old precedents, attacked Millais in an article in "Household Words." So far did the tide of prejudice carry even better qualified critics, that professed artists could see nothing but "charlatanism" in works which to-day are prized as masterpieces. "Charlatanism" was the very last thing of which Hunt should have been accused. His principles were most strenuously opposed to everything that savored of it in the remotest degree. The vulgar idea of success in life, "money-making, notoriety, even prestige," he held in utter contempt. He scorned, as some of his noted contemporaries have not scorned, the achievement of an easy reputation, by appeals to the love of the marvelous, by eccentricities, by devices to keep his name constantly before the public. If he could not succeed by "pure and noble work in which he believed, he would do without success, and *could* do without it!"

As a specimen of the persistent misrepresentation and misunderstanding to which the Associates were exposed, the following incident is given in Hunt's own words. One morning, while sketching in the country, another sketching artist came upon him as he was reading, while waiting for a sea-mist to clear away. "He inquired whether I was making a sketch of the spot in oil or water, etc., etc., and I returned that I was trying my hand, when the weather permitted, with oil colors. He persevered until I thought myself rude in my reserve. At last, to escape the charge of being a downright bear, I remarked that painters recently appeared to make a greater point of working direct from nature. 'Yes,' he replied, 'all but the Pre-Raphaelites.' 'Oh! I have been given to understand,' I said, 'that *they* make a principle of doing everything from nature.' 'That's their humbug! they try to make ignorant people believe it; but, in fact, they do everything in their own studios.' At this I looked fully up from my book and said, 'Well, of course, I don't know, — how should I? But I have heard it stated so positively that, whatever their failings and incapacity, they do give themselves a chance of getting at truth by going to the fountain-head, that your assurance to the contrary surprises me. May I ask whether you speak this from hearsay or from your own knowledge? I was really made to believe that Millais and Hunt, with Collins, were living together last summer in Surrey, and that then they painted the "Ophelia," the "Huguenot," and the "Hireling Shepherd," which were in the Academy this year!' 'Not a word of truth in it,' he said; 'you have been entirely imposed upon. I know them as well as I know myself!' 'Personally?' I asked, looking fixedly at him. 'Yes,' he said, 'and they are all thorough charlatans! Don't you know how they do their landscapes? I will tell you. I've seen them do it. When they want to paint a tree, they have one single leaf brought to them, and a piece of the bark, and they go on repeating these until they have completed their Brummagem tree. They paint a field in the same manner, repeating one single blade of grass until the whole space is covered, and they call that nature!' 'By Jupiter!' I exclaimed, 'I am quite surprised to hear that they are such barefaced impostors.' And my visitor wished me again good-morning, saying that he was glad he had been able to undeceive me, and called out, as he walked away to a cottage up the glen where he was painting, 'You may take my word for that!' It was at first-hand, too, and quite as good as 'the very best authority,' since then and still quoted for

enforcement of conclusions. I never saw him any more," adds Hunt dryly, "or I might have been much wiser!"

If this was not a case of genuine "chaff," which does not seem to have occurred to Mr. Hunt, it was a curious instance of the power of prejudice, dislike, and self-interest combined, to drive men into willful slander. But the "Brotherhood" bravely kept on in their chosen path, and as they gained disciples, and extorted a grudging prestige, they gradually revolutionized the spirit of English Art.

Hunt had already made his mark to some extent in the Academy by his "Eve of St. Agnes." A picture called "The Christian Missionary" added to his nascent reputation. Three pictures sent in by the three comrades, Hunt's "Hireling Shepherd," Millais's "Huguenot," and Rossetti's "Ophelia," drew attention to the new school as soon as they appeared. The "Strayed Sheep," painted before this time, was the first of the purely sacred paintings which have formed the largest part of his work. Of it, Mr. Ruskin says with a little of his enthusiastic exaggeration:—

"Were it only the first that cast true sunshine on the grass, it would have been in that virtue sacred; but, in its deeper meaning, it is the first in which, for those who can read, the substance of the conviction and the teaching of his after life is written, though not distinctly told till afterwards, in the symbolic picture of the 'Scape-Goat,'—*'All we like sheep have gone astray, we have turned every one to his own way, and the Lord hath laid on Him the iniquity of us all!'*"

Another small picture painted by him at this time, called "Fair-light Downs," helped both his reputation and his finances, which had been so low that, occasionally, he would not know where to find a stamp for a letter. He had always been willing to undertake any job work, however humble, that would help to fill his empty purse; and, among other things, had been employed by the painter Dyce to restore the frescoes of Rigaud at Trinity House, — a work of a good deal of labor and very little credit. He also painted copies of the works of other masters, and occasionally fulfilled orders for original work of his own, finding one or two kind friends, at least, who appreciated his genius and were glad to help him on. But, notwithstanding this, he was at one time so thoroughly discouraged that he thought he should have to go to Canada or Australia and take anything that offered itself as a means of earning a livelihood. Happily, this sacrifice was averted



by the generosity of his friend Millais, who placed at his disposal his own little hoard of five hundred pounds, to be used as Hunt required it. This kindness, accepted as frankly as it was offered, is equally creditable to both painters, and is frankly told and gratefully acknowledged in Hunt's reminiscences. He had, by this time, conceived the subject of his great painting, "The Light of the World," and had begun its execution, making careful studies of the orchard background in his country sketchings, and painting the figure and draperies from a lay figure so arranged that the moonlight should fall on it from an open window. He tells an amusing story of the manner in which this singular arrangement puzzled an omnibus driver, who, night after night, from his high perch, espied the painter at his task. The picture is so well known, and has created such diversity of opinion, that it is unnecessary to say anything about it, except that, whatever difference of opinion may exist in regard to the composition, there can be none as to the richness of its coloring. Critics differ widely in regard to the harmony of the color, but the painting seems to glow and throb with such intensely vivid hues, and so emblematically glorious is the jewelry in the breastplate, that the lantern, which many feel to be a superfluity in the picture, is comparatively unobtrusive; while the whole work is as pleasurable to the eye as it is, to many, intensely powerful in its mystic treatment. This painting while in progress, had often to be turned with its face to the wall, while the painter was working at "pot-boilers;" but when, at length, it was completed, it challenged at least a respectful attention.

In order to make studies on the spot for his next great work, the "Scape-Goat" and "The Finding of Christ in the Temple," Hunt went for two years to Palestine, notwithstanding the remonstrances of his friends that he was throwing away his chances with the public. But his motives were far too serious to be affected by such petty considerations. His explanation of them is best given in his own words:—

"In my time," he explains, "I had read Volney and Voltaire, and these, with Byron and Shelley, and the 'Vestiges of Creation' later, quite converted me to Materialism. Had I been wiser, I should have gained the good and not the evil from the independent study of these thinkers and poets. Now, I am a free-thinker more than when I dubbed myself specially so, because I am free from bondage to incredulous as much as to conventional dictates. There are arguments in Materialism itself which are convincing



to me of future life, and therefore a future purpose; and the service of souls made perfect by previous training. I am satisfied that the Father of all has not left us, made as we are with infinite care and thought, with intelligence to understand this, with the carefully stored up inheritance of all our predecessors, in faculties, hopes, and higher love, advancing so slowly to the dream of heavenly perfection, from such a remote beginning, bewildering in its infinity, — only to disappear in the black abyss. What an impotent conclusion! For me, this would be aimless mockery. The inheritance that the Greatest of the sons of God has won for us has its welcome in my soul. I want now to carry out my purpose of travel in Palestine, — to prove, so far as my painting can, that Christianity is a living faith, — that the fullest realization of its wondrous story cannot unspiritualize it; that, followed up, new lessons and fresh interests may present themselves by the teaching of art: it was used to teach — not only to divert — in the days when it was at its highest. The mere conventional treatment of the eternal story is altogether doomed. Its claims are too momentous to be trifled with. Adverse criticism is directed against Revelation as a whole, and against the Resurrection as taught by Christ in particular. Such honest and open attacks are far less dangerous than the retention of mere disproved and dead adjuncts to its history — retained reverently but unthinkingly by traditionalists. I am not afraid of the full truth, and I wish to help in propagating it."

In the same reverent, courageous, and truthful spirit he writes of his experience in the Holy Land: "I have met many persons and seen many books, and not a few pictures, bearing testimony that familiarity with the surroundings of holy history have encouraged a lower conception of that history than before. No such effect has it produced on my mind; I am not afraid of looking the matter through and through. I can, without loss of reverence, allow that the children, to whom the Father's messages were given, did use their own faltering lisps, and express themselves with the light of their own age, alone; but I recognize, through all, a divine charge, — a Father's adjuration to faith and trust. Brothers and sisters accept the parent's authority; they learn that he is at hand, — though the infant lips spoke the word in their own prattling manner. In fullness of time, a due interpretation arrives from Him who alone knows the end from the beginning. Perhaps, with less opportunity of knowing the real history, the Parisian sentimental travesty of the Gospels by Renan, or the romance by

Strauss, suiting modern intellect, would impress me with some of the respect which so many men have for them. To me, their theories present far greater obstacles to faith than the original Gospels offer. Is it beside the mark, in writing of my professional life, to say this? I think not, for I wish always to paint — as men are supposed to write — what I believe."

Holman Hunt accordingly went to Palestine to paint his "Scape-Goat," chiefly in the solitude of the "Wilderness of Judæa," taking his goat model with him, that he might the better harmonize him with the landscape. He visited Egypt on the way, and painted, on the Nile, a picture called "The After-Glow," — inspired by a certain poetical symbolism, — to express that "though the meridian glory of ancient Egypt has passed away, there is still a poetic reflection of it in the aspect of life there; the strong second-glow coming when the sun has sunk a few minutes below the horizon."

The Crimean War, then in progress, caused a good deal of disorder in the land, and the disturbed state of the country made it both more difficult and more perilous to travel, as he did, with only one or two necessary attendants. He has recorded the experiences of the journey with some minuteness, in an interesting paper in the "Nineteenth Century," and its perusal cannot but give the reader an added respect for the steadfast loyalty to principle which braced him to conquer the difficulties in the way, for the sake of more truly working out his noble conception. His goat, despite all his care, died on the journey; and at one time the little party was surprised by an armed force of Bedouins; but they turned out friendly to Englishmen at least. For "The Finding of Christ in the Temple," he made studies of the heads of Jewish Rabbis, after a good deal of difficulty in securing their consent. On his return, with exhausted purse, he was again crippled by lack of funds, — his father being disabled by heavy losses from aiding him materially, — and seriously delayed in completing the paintings which fairly established his position as a leading painter. Again and again, however, he had to resist the temptation of repeating himself, making copies of successful pictures for sale, instead of continuing the original work, which was his highest vocation, much hindered, it is true, by the lack of earlier appreciation.

At a later period he returned to Palestine to collect material for one of his most famous pictures, "The Shadow of the Cross." This widely known picture, it seems scarcely necessary to say, represents Christ as a youth in the workshop of Joseph, earnestly

contemplating the cross-like shadow thrown on the floor by an accidental arrangement of timber, while Mary is engaged in looking over the treasures brought by the Magi, and stored up by her in an ancient chest. This picture has met with very varied criticism, adverse as well as favorable. His latest great picture — probably his last — the daring originality of whose design made it still more open to criticism, is his remarkable painting of "The Flight into Egypt." Mr. Ruskin's brief description is so beautiful that it must be quoted entire: —

"You know that, in the most beautiful conceptions of 'The Flight into Egypt,' the Holy Family were always represented as watched over and ministered to by attending angels. But only the safety and peace of the Divine Child and its mother are thought of. No sadness or wonder of meditation returns to the desolate homes of Bethlehem.

"But, in this English picture, all the story of the Escape and of the Flight is told in fullness of peace and yet of compassion. The travel is in the dead of night, — but, partly stooping from the starlight, and partly floating on the desert mirage, move with the Holy Family the glorified souls of the Innocents. Clear in celestial light, and gathered into child-garlands of gladness, they look to the child in whom they live, and yet who came for them to die. Waters of the river of life flow before on the sands, — the Christ stretches out his arms to the nearest of them, — leaning from the mother's breast. To how many bereaved households may not the happy vision of conquered death bring in the future days of peace!"

Dean Trench has expressed something of the same thought in a touching little poem on the same subject, beginning: —

"Firstlings of faith! — the murderer's knife  
Hath missed its deadly aim;  
The Lord for whom they gave their life  
For them to suffer came!"

This picture has been the last great work submitted by Hunt to the British public. He has himself sufficiently indicated his aims and ideals, and the spirit in which he has done his lifework for Art. He appeals, it is true, to a limited public, — to those only who appreciate the higher symbolism of pictorial Art, and who esteem the expression of spiritual beauty a higher and nobler function than that of conveying impressions, however fresh and vivid, of purely sensuous delight. All who prize this power in him as a merit, vastly transcending any artistic defects that may

be legitimately noticed in his pictures, will join with the painter in his natural and pathetic regret that the hindrances and discouragements under which he worked and the tardy recognition he received have prevented him, as he himself expresses it, from doing more than a tithe of the work that he might otherwise have achieved.

*Agnes Maule Machar.*

KINGSTON, CANADA.

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### THE SPECTRE OF NEGRO RULE.

A GREAT evil has long roots and far consequences. If any supposed that the mischiefs of slavery would end with its formal abolition, the thought was little creditable to their judgment and forecast. So intertwined was slavery with the political and social life of the South that to many broad and dispassionate thinkers its removal seemed a simple impossibility. And it is scarcely extravagant to say that nothing but the providence of God in the awful form of war could have accomplished that result. When, now, we look back and think of what slavery was, what it threatened to become by a process of endless expansion, and how it was almost miraculously overthrown, we need not wonder that it has left an entail of bitter consequences to vex and discipline more than one generation of Americans. No one of the burning questions that confront us burns with a fiercer heat than this, — What is to be done with the negro, especially in his relation to the white people of the South?

It is full time to dismiss the fancy that this is any more a sectional question. It concerns most truly and practically, if not equally, our entire country, and should be studied and settled in the exercise of a patriotism and a wisdom as broad as the nation. The old style of crimination and recrimination, taunt and retort, menace and defiance, so long characteristic of all discussions over the negro, can no more plead for itself the slightest justification or excuse. The conditions are all changed, and former methods are out of date and out of place. They can prevent nothing, and accomplish nothing. If ever largeness of view, calmness of spirit, and sobriety of speech were in order, they are so in the presence of the great political and moral problem involved in the future relations of the white and black races in this country.

The negro problem must be solved, and it must be solved in

accordance with the principles of essential justice. Nothing else will stand. Makeshift compromises and slurring measures may sometimes help, but they will not help here and now. We are too far along for them. Anything else than a true solution will prove dissolution, not of the country, — for that can never come on this issue, — but of our social fabric itself.

While saying this I frankly own that a problem more novel and complex has rarely, if ever, taxed the resources of political wisdom. No real precedents exist to furnish us instruction or warning. It has never occurred in history that two races so dissimilar were placed in relations so peculiar. Jews and Gentiles, Greeks and Barbarians, Teutons and Celts, have often lived together, but never under the conditions which rigorously prescribe and limit our action. In these instances, there was always lacking the broad and indelible distinction of color. When slaves, as has often happened, have been freed and absorbed into the citizen class, this distinction did not embarrass the process. It is even true that in other countries negroes have been manumitted and raised to political equality with the whites, but these are recent occurrences, whose results are yet matter of doubt and debate. Besides, the countries in which the experiment is in progress, such as Jamaica and Hayti, are so insignificant in territory and population, when compared with ours, as to forbid all thought of precedent or parallelism. In dealing with this great and difficult negro question we look in vain for guidance to the pages of history, and are thrown back upon a fair application of the simple principles of justice and humanity.

The hope of a possible and true solution of our race problem is strongly encouraged by the fact that it falls for determination at this precise moment of human progress. It may be questioned if any preceding age was prepared to settle it wisely and safely. The spirit of our time, the *zeitgeist*, is marked by a broad and tolerant philanthropy. Public opinion was never before so powerful, and never, certainly, so kind. This simple *zeitgeist*, with which the lower order of statesmen do not much reckon, constitutes a solvent for perplexing questions far truer and surer than the wisdom of the average legislator. The dullest and most passionate conservatism cannot wholly escape some influence from the prevalent temper and tendency of the age; and, if it does so escape, it will vainly seek to arrest or change the current which it is foolish enough to resist. The genuine Bourbon is now a distinct anachronism. Such men as Senators Eustis and Morgan belong

to a period some time since departed. A liberal and humane philosophy forms the very atmosphere of modern society, and in this atmosphere false principles and cruel prejudices, whatever the vogue they once enjoyed, will insensibly crumble and be evaporated. The last quarter of the nineteenth century is qualified for dealing even with the negro question.

Among the possible schemes of settling this question, the suggestion of deporting the blacks to their native African habitat may be regarded as utterly obsolete. Some of those noble men who founded and promoted the old Colonization Society permitted themselves to dream of the ultimate extinction of slavery by this process. The idea was, of course, chimerical, and perhaps was never very seriously entertained. Not taking into account the wishes of the colored people, it may go without argument that their transfer across the Atlantic would be an enterprise of such enormous difficulty and expense as to make the project unworthy of consideration.

While colonization to Africa is promptly ruled out as utterly impracticable, may not some part of our national domain be surrendered as the exclusive territory of the blacks? Have we not on our broad continent a region which they may be induced, by encouragement or gentle pressure, to accept as their Canaan, and in which, exempt from race friction and conflicts, they may develop on their own lines, and yet in the enjoyment of equal rights and privileges under the Constitution? On some accounts a negro reservation, which might grow into a state, would seem to offer very great advantages. Especially for communities in which there is an alarming congestion of the colored population such as Charleston and Savannah, might a provision of this sort prove a great relief. On visiting the first-named city, some years ago, I was appalled at the vast throng of colored children gathered on the Citadel Green to witness the manœuvres of a colored military company. What is to become of them? I had to ask. And what is to become of the city which, some day, they may dominate? Assuming for the moment the desirableness of setting the blacks apart by themselves, and their own assent to the arrangement obtained, the question arises at once, Where is the territory which the greed of the white man would yield to their occupancy and control? Time was when Florida might have been regarded as presenting all the conditions requisite for founding a successful African state, but that time is past forever. Florida has already become the sanitarium and fruit garden of the nation. Its once



desolate wastes literally blossom as the rose, and the ocean breezes that fan it are everywhere laden with the perfume of the orange. Better speculate about turning over to the negro the sacred soil of South Carolina, than speak of making him sole possessor of the unique and varied charms of Florida. So, too, it might once have been allowable to think of finding a territory for the blacks in Texas or New Mexico, but it is quite too late now. The eager and unscrupulous white man frets against the barrier of solemn covenant engagements which holds him back from the Indian territory, and we may be sure that he would not be more patient with a negro reservation, if it were worth having. Even Mexico itself, on the contingency of its annexation, would just as little as Florida be recognized as a permissible refuge for the outcast race. It is true that in the event of our obtaining possession of any considerable portion of the Mexican domain a natural reservoir would be supplied into which it might be easy to drain off much of our surplus colored population; but their enjoyment in such a region of exclusive rights of occupancy and control is not a thing of rational contemplation.

On the whole, view it how we may, the whites and blacks seem shut up to the necessity of living together in this country. Indeed, there is no evidence that at present either party desires a separate and isolated lot. The whites do not wish to lose the blacks, and the blacks have no disposition to expatriate themselves or seek, by general emigration, to organize within our national limits a colored state. The former dimly comprehend, what outsiders know very well, that they now have in their recent slaves nearly the cheapest, if not in all respects the best, laboring class in the world. So far as the field and the kitchen are concerned, their condition is enviable as compared with that of their Northern brethren and sisters. In many Southern communities fair cooks go begging at five dollars a month, and farm hands at ten dollars, while day labor is easily had at fifty cents. True, certain drawbacks, frets, and worries must be accepted along with these low prices, but what system of labor is exempt from these? The Southern whites are not ignorant of the fact that their prosperity, their industrial life even, depends upon the retention of negro service. It is this service, in the main, that produces the seven million bales of cotton which pour an annual flood of gold over the South. The black toilers removed, who would do the work requisite to supply this inundation? So keenly is this source of wealth appreciated that when, as has occasionally happened,



efforts have been made to entice the negroes, in large numbers, from the older States to the richer lands of the West, the planters have indignantly protested against these efforts, and have even threatened violence towards the agents employed in making them. However much the whites of the South dislike the presence of the blacks, they dislike still more the thought of their absence.

We come back, then, to the conclusion that not destiny only, but interest, decrees that the two races shall remain side by side. The only real question is, Upon what terms and in what relations shall they so remain? What shall be their precise *modus vivendi*? Shall this be one of civil and political equality, or of definite arrangement into castes and classes? Shall the whites, by law or rigorous custom, be the exclusive rulers, and the blacks be degraded to a permanent condition of inferiority? Shall the former, by simple virtue of their color, enjoy civil rights and privileges from which the latter, by reason of *their* color, are forever shut out? Clearly this cannot be. A condition of unstable equilibrium is bad enough, but this would be a condition of organized inequality and injustice impossible to maintain in any country of Christendom, and least of all tolerable in our country. The law of our common Christianity, the spirit and letter of our free institutions, the history of the negro since his liberation from slavery, the prospective welfare of the Republic, all unite with the eternal principles of righteousness to condemn the establishment in American society of a color line and a Pariah caste. To suppose that in this country great masses of people, of whatever race, especially in regions where they constitute an overwhelming majority, can long be defrauded of equal political rights, is a fancy born of blind passion or blinder ignorance. The advancing education of the colored people, attended inevitably by the development of capable leaders, renders simply impossible the long suppression of their vote, or their patient endurance of any other flagrant outrage. The fact alleged in justification of their enforced inferiority is their frightfully rapid increase, so rapid, indeed, as to threaten in some quarters the utter swamping of the white element and the terrors of complete black domination. But this fact, if we may accept it as such, demonstrates the impolicy and futility, rather than the wisdom, of repression. When our seven millions of blacks shall have become ten or fifteen millions, where and what are the cords that shall bind them to quiet acquiescence in their degraded lot? One of the sorest evils of slavery, especially in communities where the negroes largely pre-

dominated, was the ever-haunting terror of insurrection. Would not this terror be increased tenfold when the negroes, no longer slaves but citizens, should feel themselves the victims of cruel disabilities? Volcanic explosions would be the normal thing in a society thus falsely organized.

Yes, the only hope of tolerable relations between the two races lies in the administration of equal and exact justice for both in an open field and the opportunity of a fair competition. Impartial protection to rights of person and property, eligibility to all offices of honor and trust, a free ballot and an honest count, these are the only terms of peace, order, and progress. To have a sixth of our population nominally free but practically in a state of semi-slavery is an anomaly fraught with demoralization and destruction for all concerned.

But it will at once be asked, Would life be worth living on these conditions? Is it endurable, even in thought, that intelligent, refined, proud, property-holding Anglo-Saxons should consent to accept as political equals a coarse, ignorant, brutal class, their recent slaves, and stamped with a different color? Especially, is it conceivable, as might here and there occur, that the former should consent to be ruled by the latter? I very frankly admit that the conception is not a pleasant one. Perhaps in regions where the black predominance is very great it would prove best for the whites to withdraw and go to their own place and people. But what I wish to insist upon is, that the prospect of negro rule, on any large scale, is the mere phantasm of an excited imagination. There is not a State in the Union that justice to the negro would threaten with negro supremacy. In the few small communities where such supremacy might emerge, it would prove but a transient condition. It involves on the part of the whites an unconscious confession of inferiority or of cowardice to be frightened at the spectre of negro rule. There is small reason to apprehend that the knowledge, experience, and pluck of the hitherto dominant race will not assert themselves, and maintain a substantial control of civil affairs. Various obvious considerations warrant the opinion that the anticipation of negro supremacy is a groundless terror.

As showing how unreasonable and exaggerated fears of this sort may be, let it not be forgotten that the Southern whites are now living side by side with their former slaves on very comfortable terms. Not very long ago this state of things was pronounced inconceivable. It was thought and asserted that, in case of eman-

cipation, existence for the white people would become an intolerable burden, and the country would turn to a desert. In point of fact, life in the South is now exceedingly pleasant; far more so than it was when the nightmare of slavery oppressed the land. Not one person in a hundred of those who predicted desolation and woe as the result of liberation to the blacks would now vote for their return to slavery. Freedom for the blacks is distinctly recognized as freedom and prosperity for the whites. Why, then, indulge gloomy forebodings and utter despairing cries in view of a yet further advance on the same lines of justice and humanity?

To mitigate anxieties on this subject, it is well to recall the fact that the problem in hand is almost as much a problem between whites and whites as it is between whites and blacks. In forms more or less complex and trying it confronts every State and nearly every community in the land. The commingling here of Irish, Germans, Scandinavians, Italians, Hungarians, and Canadian French, all with their particular traditions, tastes, and prejudices, is a constant threat of collision, and involves an enormous tax upon our distinctive American wisdom and patience. The Southern whites, in their difficult relations with the negroes, can hardly encounter wrongs and irritations greater than those which vex New York, Boston, and many other cities, under what seem to be the usurpations of aliens and intruders. The troubles incident, through all the later modern history, to the coördination of Catholics and Protestants under the same government — their clashing interests, their social frictions and repulsions, their bitter and bloody antagonisms — are not likely to be matched by any conflicts that may arise between the whites and blacks. Were it not for that unique element of differentiation, color, there is no reason why the relations of these races should not at once be emphatically kind and cordial. And none can deny that the antagonism incident to this difference is largely a mere prejudice, — a prejudice, too, especially American, and due very much to the fact that with us *black* and slave have always been associated. It is notorious that the people of other countries do not share our sensitiveness on this point. A few years since, in crossing the Atlantic I had as a fellow passenger a Scotchman from one of the West India islands, with his mulatto wife. He was evidently a gentleman of character and fortune, whose peculiar marriage relations attracted no insolent or unfavorable notice. Not long after I saw in Regent Street, London, a coal-black negro swinging along the pavement with a pretty young white woman on his

arm. The spectacle, rather startling to me, attracted no particular attention. Facts like these are familiar to everybody who has traveled. It is, indeed, very curious that the color prejudice in its intense form is a recent development in America. In the neighborhood of my birthplace there was a mulatto minister of the gospel whom I used to hear spoken of in my childhood as "black Haynes." His wife was a white woman of respectability and intelligence, and, what is very singular, he was for thirty years pastor of the Congregational Church in Rutland, Vt. A sermon which he preached in reply to Hosea Ballou, entitled "The Devil the First Universalist Preacher," had an immense circulation, and was translated, I believe, into some foreign languages. Mr. Haynes's death in 1833 synchronized with the beginnings of the Anti-Slavery movement, — a movement resulting, singularly enough, in the intensification of race prejudice. It may safely be assumed that with slavery ended and the blacks more and more putting on the dignity of true manhood, this prejudice will slowly diminish.

Reverting to the spectre of negro majorities and supremacy, it should be considered that it is highly improbable that the blacks will long go on multiplying at their present alleged rate of increase. Unlike other foreign elements of our population, their ranks are no more recruited by immigration. The infernal traffic that brought them here has ceased forever, and no voluntary movement in the dark continent threatens us with a fresh African inundation. With growing intelligence, property, and feelings of responsibility, the lower appetites of the blacks will be restrained. Propagation will become less rapid, and their families less numerous. To whatever causes it may be ascribed, the fact is palpable that the negroes of the North, if increasing at all, increase very slowly. The same thing may become true, to a degree at least, of the black race in the South. At all events, the sinister predictions, sometimes heard, as to its appalling numbers in the future are fairly liable to large modifications and discounts.

And then the apprehension that the negroes will remain solid either in their vote or their sympathies is warranted only by the supposition that they are to remain a degraded caste and the victims of unequal laws. What is needed above all things to break their solidity and disintegrate their racial alliances is the assurance of fair and impartial treatment. A sense of danger has kept them compactly together hitherto, and will do so while they have reason to complain of disabilities or suspect unfair designs

upon their franchises. When visiting Charleston in 1873, I had an interesting conversation with the Rev. Jacob Legare, the respectable and much esteemed pastor of the largest colored Baptist Church in the city. It was at the moment when an effort was making to enlist the better class of colored people to join with the whites in rescuing South Carolina from the abominations of carpet-bag rule. I had known Legare well in former years, and I asked him why he did not use his great influence to induce his friends and followers to aid the proposed measures of reform. He freely acknowledged and deplored the evils under which the State was groaning, but confessed that he could do nothing, explaining his inability in this very significant remark, "Our people are afraid to trust their liberties with their old masters." And they were no doubt right. Their shrewd sense taught them, however inferior to their former masters most of the adventurers who were plundering the State might be, that these adventurers were sure not to meddle with their most sacred rights. Once thoroughly satisfied on this point, natural jealousies, rivalries, and antagonisms among themselves might be counted on to break the solidarity of the colored people. With distinct race issues eliminated, they would divide and ally themselves with the whites on general party lines. They would soon come to desire not class or caste but good government, and a fair opportunity would be afforded for superior intelligence and merit to assert a predominant influence. If in certain communities a free vote and fair count should result in negro supremacy, this result, sure to be temporary, would involve evils not to be compared with those consequent upon a policy of everlasting repression and usurpation. The disposition of the negroes to divide on other than race issues has already had frequent and striking exemplification. The temperance agitation in Georgia, especially in Atlanta, effected a momentary alliance of the worthier blacks with the Prohibition whites, very honorable to the former and very welcome to the latter. One of the most eloquent orators in that campaign was a colored preacher, whose speeches were eagerly listened to by audiences made up of both races. On one occasion he courageously "improved" his opportunity by administering to his white hearers a caustic rebuke on their willingness to accept colored co-operation in their present struggle, as contrasted with their conduct when strictly political issues were in question.

It is fairly open to doubt and debate whether or not a mistake has been made in this country by adopting the policy of abso-

lutely universal suffrage, but it is quite beyond doubt that of all limitations of this right the color line would be the least defensible. For good or ill the tremendous experiment of unrestricted suffrage is upon us, and must be carried through with rigorous and impartial fidelity. It is by no means clear that the blacks are not rapidly qualifying to use the ballot more wisely and safely than some other of our alien races. They are making very encouraging progress in education and the accumulation of property. Their religious habits, though far from what could be wished, are much less than formerly characterized by superstitious and hysterical extravagances. One, like myself, acquainted with them in the days of their bondage, or just after, and who observes them now, is struck by their changed aspect, and the many tokens of their general improvement. A recent visit to the Atlanta University — and there are many schools at the South of a similar sort, if not of so high a grade — made to me some very surprising revelations as to the educational privileges and prospects of the colored people. The classes in Latin, Geometry, and Political Economy, whose recitations I chanced to hear, exhibited the best results of the best instruction in those branches. What was very noticeable, too, was the habits of refined speech, free from all provincialism, that characterized the students, both men and women. This visit left upon me the distinct, almost painful, impression that the white youth of the South must look to themselves lest they be distanced in the race for culture. I have since learned from many quarters that my impression, so far from being singular, is shared by not a few eminent Southerners who have the best opportunities for observation.

It should be added as a very important, perhaps determining, factor in the negro problem, that the agitation over his political rights once fairly quieted, a tide of white immigration would immediately roll over the South, and soon dissipate forever the fear of black majorities. What now restrains immigration, to an extent little appreciated there, is the apprehension of being caught in the horrors and confusions of a conflict of races. The remarkable development of mining and manufacturing interests is building up great towns, like Birmingham in Alabama. If to this tendency should be added the conviction that the negro question is settled, the operation of natural laws would inevitably redress the balance of population in favor of the whites, and happily lay the spectre of black rule. To this result all the considerations which have been presented distinctly point.



The discussion of social equality really has no proper place in any broad and fair treatment of the negro's claim to justice before the law. Such discussion raises a false issue, and introduces a bugbear serviceable only in obscuring and confusing the question. No doubt civil and social relations touch at some points and originate delicate complications, yet not in a way to be seriously disturbing. Beyond reasonable privileges in the enjoyment of public conveyances and places of general assembly, the negro will be inclined to demand very little. As for social equality in any intimate and offensive sense, there is no evidence that he much desires it, and when this is no longer obtrusively and insolently denied he will desire it still less. With his self-respect cultivated and his essential rights no longer threatened, he will be indisposed to thrust himself into companies where he would not be welcomed. The unwritten law of all civilized communities, which leaves each man free to determine his own associations, will assert itself in the relations of the white and black races, and relieve their intercourse of any serious friction.

And so, too, the horror of amalgamation may be dismissed as the misbegotten goblin of folly and prejudice. It lies almost entirely with the proud and sensitive whites to determine whether the corruption of the blue Caucasian blood, which went on so rapidly under the system of slavery, shall continue or be arrested. To affirm that this process can be restrained only by laws forbidding the intermarriage of the races is to make a very shameful confession. The truth is, that false and arbitrary restrictions here, as elsewhere, do but aggravate the evil they would prevent. As there is vastly less miscegenation now than there was in the days of slavery, so would there be still less if these restrictions were removed. Marriage or concubinage between the two races is almost unknown at the North. With the full recognition of the equal rights of the blacks, lifting them out of the relation of an inferior and degraded caste, the same result would inevitably occur at the South.

The sum of all that I have attempted to say is, that truth and justice are always the highest expediency, and that difficult relations settle themselves most easily and satisfactorily when freed from all arbitrary and embarrassing restrictions.

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POUGHKEEPSIE, NEW YORK.

THE RECOVERY OF THE DEVOTIONAL ELEMENT  
IN WORK AND WORSHIP.

It is not easy to define the term devotion. Two parties are concerned in it; one brings an offering, which the other receives or rejects. We speak of the devoted mother or explorer or reformer or missionary, who spend their lives for others, or for some noble cause. In a very different sense, we apply the same adjective to the ill-fated daughters of Jephthah and Agamemnon, and to the boat-load of youths and maidens annually sent by the Athenians to be devoured by the Minotaur. Voluntary and forced sacrifices are alike characterized by this one word. Literally, it is the making of a vow; secondarily, it is the sincere and complete laying on God's altar of all one has and is. Omniscience only can tell where this real virtue exists. The pledge may have been made in the secret chambers of the soul, where only the divine ear heard, but its fulfillment must be more or less open. Far more and other than the outward deed, yet this grace must have visible expression. Trees grow from the soil which has productive qualities in it, but the soil is by no means the tree. Worthy motions spring from a pure and holy heart, but the heart is not the act. The form, rather than that which originates it, is all that we can point to as proof of the devotional spirit. That which is plainly consecrated furnishes the only basis for judging whether the desire, of which it is the sign, gains or fails among us. We have invented no sphygmograph to register the character or strength of the pulsations of this vital organ.

It is not here affirmed, or implied, that the devotional element has been lost, or quite largely eliminated from the work and worship of the Christian Church. An indictment so grave and so sweeping would not have waited till this day to be made, if there were any occasion for it. Were such the case, it would be evident. Extinction, or decay of the true spirit of religion, would long ago have caused great alarm among faithful watchmen. Laments and exhortations would have been widely heard, and we should already be considering how to regain or recreate it. Athanasius, Savonarola, Luther, Knox, were forthcoming when there was need, each like the first

"With Paul's own mantle blest."

Their successors would not be wanting. Yet it is possible to detect a somewhat general impression, that in our religious activi-

ties there is a weakened exercise of that spirit of devotion which once happily marked them. Serious minds are much concerned thereabouts. They note, on the one hand, an increasing flippancy or indifference, and, on the other, more formal and conventional methods in Christian worship and work. Between the growth of these opposite tendencies they fear that the highest ideals of religious communion may be gradually obscured. Self-consciousness and self-carelessness are hostile to it. The development of these traits is seen with anxiety.

Our inquiry has now to do with —

Any loss of the devotional element, in our religious life; some reasons for it; attempts to reinstate it; the true means of restoration.

Were an earnest and reverent soul of the last century to come into many of our religious assemblies to-day, he would be confused and saddened. He would look about in wonder upon the building called a church. It would have little suggestion to him that it was a sanctuary. If he had ever seen the ruins of an amphitheatre in the Old World, that heathen centre of amusement and cruelty, rather than the stately basilica, would appear to have furnished its model. He would look in vain for any "sacred desk." A gaudily painted set of organ pipes would stare at him, and windows ablaze with color shut out the light of day. A box barely large enough for four people to squeeze into, perched on some curiously carved bracket, he would be told was the singer's gallery. The pews would be gone, but in their place he would be ushered among rows of armed chairs, which move by a spring, and catch his hat and care for it so deftly that he suspects trickery. The floor falls away from his foot as he walks, and, looking at its converging point, he is relieved to find it is no bottomless pit. He must confess all these arrangements comfortable and costly, but they have only prompted the cry, "Oh that I knew where I might find Him" here. As he watches the gathering congregation, in rich and showy apparel, jauntily nodding to one another, he would infer that they had come together simply to meet earthly neighbors and acquaintances. The singing would puzzle him. Four well (or ill) assorted voices, singly and then unitedly wrestling with some syllable, whether English or Hebrew he could not tell, would plainly have supplanted the "young men and maidens, old men and children," who used to praise the name of the Lord. Critical *listening* is evidently counted *worship* among these moderns. When the minister rose to pray, only

here and there would a head be bowed. The audience would stare at him open-eyed. Highly wrought rhetorical figures and crisp aphorisms would be apt to form the staple of this exercise. He would hear it described as "eloquent." The sermon would interest him, both by the novelty of the text and the strangeness of application. Sharp and witty sentences would abound in it, eliciting a smile now and then, or even a cheer if striking patly and heavily some favorite folly or custom. Or it might chance to be a profound philosophical treatise, till Kant might as well have criticised "Pure Reason" before the unenlightened company, who think the ordinary collegiate titular symbols quite too few to label, properly, so masterly an intellect. Then comes the dismissal, welcomed as a rare chance for friend to meet friend, and interchange opinions as to the excellence of the entertainment. There has been frequent mention of the divine name in song and prayer and homily. There may have been many "Hallelujahs" and some "Amens" on the lips of choir and congregation, but the whole service has not indicated any strong sense of mortal need or aspiration for holy lives. Self-complacency has been everywhere prominent. Man would seem very skillfully to have stolen the attention professedly given his Maker. Our visitor would be ready to say with the famous critic of his time, "The fire of the altar is quenched, or it sends forth nothing but smoke of mushrooms and unpleasant gums."

If instead he entered the doors of a liturgical establishment, there he would find no rudeness or irreverence in outward behavior. He would be pleased with the dignity and solemnity of the place and the apparent humility, in oft-bended knee and multiplied confessions of unworthiness. No intemperate speech would jar upon his ear. The sound of all the people praising and praying would be impressive and pleasing. Strange furnishings, ceremonials, robes, and posturings, however, would interfere with his joy. Their close relationship to the "woman arrayed in purple and scarlet, and decked with gold and precious stones and pearls, having in her hand a golden cup full of abominations," would seem to have grown dangerously during the years. He would, because of this, be led to suspect that underneath this show the Infinite had slight recognition. Pharisaism, however broad its phylacteries, or long or numerous its prayers, he would fear, had some intrenchment here. What is this he has seen, but the sacramentalist, over-careful about his dress and intonation and gesture? These, he knows by intuition, are not piety. Our inspector

comes away disturbed. He hopes, though, that these are exceptional, not typical assemblies, and asks how far they are representative of other branches of "the True Vine." It is to be informed that there he has seen a style of worship, greatly in favor now, toward which many are in their measure striving. These are the popular fashions. Churches where these features most obtain are most thronged. This is the day of funny advertising. The pulpit over against the circus-clown must throw frequent kisses to the crowd, or lose them next Sunday. It must placard the town with flaming posters, as the minstrel troupe, if it will arrest attention "Sugar-coat your pill," "Gild your hook, physician and fisherman for souls," so say the managers of these financial institutions, — the churches, — which must be run, as we do a store, to make money.

For the doctrinaire, the long-faced, the psalm-singing, Bible-searching, heart-searching priest and people, there is now no loud call. These, if they still maintain a living, are classed with fossils, curiosities, worthless in the present age. Organizations which keep these peculiarities are published as doomed to sterility, and a lingering death. "The fittest" have survived, whoever they have to their father.

Turning to inspect Christian work in its more aggressive and practical forms, our ancient friend comes upon the Evangelist — a new creation since his day. Here he expects to find the "holy man of God" indeed. Hearing at the very first the subdued rumble of earthly machinery, by which the revival interest is generated and kept at white heat, he is perplexed. The extensive case of professional tools, adapted to any patient, as a dentist's for any mouth, surprises him. The regular expedients, scriptural and unscriptural, by which a community is bestirred and all the available material is convicted, converted, and pronounced "whole" by this passing angel, are found to turn upon the amount of funds raised. Is it the theory of purgatory over again, only employed for men still alive, he queries? If friends will pay well for the captive, then he shall be freed! Demetrius, with his moulds for silver shrines, seems to be here engaged, rather than he who had "great heaviness and continual sorrow in his heart for his brethren" who were unreconciled to Christ. Frivolous songs on such lofty themes as dory-pulling and broken crockery and lions' dens do not betoken a very profound emotion, or solicitude, nor fifty prayers in twenty-five minutes, regulated by a leader, with stopwatch and gavel, in hand. This latest development of religious enterprise does not impress him as devotional.

He visits the great benevolent agencies of the church. Of course, business is chief here and must be, but along with it he looks for much of the Petrine charity and ministry in the divine name. These full treasuries delight him, and these generous plans for relief, and enlargement of the kingdom of Christ. But, now and then, singular measures are proposed in this administration, and very human things are spoken, and bitter alienations arise, and murmurings, louder than those of the Grecian Jews against the Hebrews over the neglect of their widows, are heard because of other bereaved beneficiaries, and great debates go on, to the amusement of the godless, and our venerable listener does not detect in them aught of what he had been wont to regard as devotion. The warmth of a generous offering has been much abated, as it passes through these mediate channels. In his time, it was directly from the hand of the full to that of the needy that the gift went, with its double blessing.

In each and all of these forms of religious activity, our centenarian is certain there is not so wholesome and pronounced a devotional life manifest, as once. Then, the preacher was solemnly weighted as he bore to men a message from God. Then, irreverence was held to be a sin, not an accomplishment. Then, there were broken hearts and trembling confessions and earnest entreaties for forgiveness and guidance. Jesus, the Saviour, was a very real presence then, and those about Him were loving, admiring, and willing disciples. He *led*, and they *followed*. Now, it appears to this observer that *these* are leading, expecting their Lord meekly to follow. If he is right, or even partially so, in his conclusions, then the devotional element does not have its proper exercise.

We next inquire for some of the causes of such declension.

The primitive revelation of Jehovah, through the Shekinah, no doubt made vivid impression upon the worshiper. The splendid ritual of the Temple helped greatly to actualize the unseen Deity to those who witnessed it. When this was abolished, and Christ, in himself Priest, Sacrifice, and Temple, took their place, it was to risk some loss of worship which relied on such aids. Frequently is still heard the request: "Show us the Father, and it sufficeth us." Till then, crucifix, painting, relic, vestment, shall serve to bring Him out of the darkness and posit Him before an adoring soul. Where there is but the bare wall, and no suggestion in structure, or furnishing, or rite, of "One greater than the Temple," the gross and thoughtless come and go, with scales upon



their eyes. The glory of the Eternal does not appear to them. There is no pleading, —

“Celestial King! oh let thy presence pass  
Before my spirit, and an image fair  
Shall meet that look of mercy from on high,  
As the reflected image in a glass  
Doth meet the look of him who seeks it there,  
And owes its being to the gazer's eye.”

They are in no presence chamber of God; they bring thither no hallowed tribute.

Ours, too, is usually pronounced an age of hurry and unrest. That fever, when once it has fastened on a man, allows but brief chance for reflection. He may not waste the precious moments in mooning, when they are simply so much fortune and fame and learning. There is no time to develop the picture, caught on the plate, and tone it, till it shall reveal the beauties and grandeur of the religious life, and fill one with awe and desire as he beholds them. The conceit is subtle, but fatal to devotion, that in the other world we shall have nothing to do but to cultivate it. Going to meeting,

“Where the assembly ne'er breaks up,”

will atone for any abbreviation of the privilege here. Some, who would be ashamed did they perceive it, are thus thinking to adjourn their religiousness to that “convenient season.”

Then, too, there is the love of the sensational, strongly rooted in the average worshiper. Slang has of late been transformed into a celestial weapon. Liking for undraped figure has grown, both on the theatre stage and the pulpit platform. Boys and untutored geniuses from other occupations have suddenly “called themselves apostles,” and many have not yet found “they are not.” Spectacular and scenic effects have banished the thought that God is in his holy temple. Joss-house incantations would hardly dissipate serious impressions more surely than these tricks to draw the multitudes. They who come to gaze do not stay to pray. If they come again, it is with keener appetite for the unusual. Such have gradually dulled and deadened that religious faculty which we call reverence, and which Goethe well says “is of three kinds: for that which is above us; for that which is on a par with ourselves; for that which is beneath us.” They bow down only before that which in no wise concerns them, and then dare say they have worshiped. So did Renan on the Acropolis, apostrophizing Athena, and then go his way saying, for life, which

may or may not have here its end, "I have to thank some one; I do not know exactly whom."

Still another reason for a lessened devotional fervor may lie in the studious attempt to rid sky and earth of any intelligent, conscious Lord. The scientific method of research is everywhere magnified, and material proofs and demonstrations are presented till he who cannot show the like for his theory is discredited. Darwin studies the earthworm, and affects a reverence for its office and work, yet he is hardly ready to canonize and count it sacred, as the Egyptian his scarabæus. The preacher is somewhat sensitive to the verdict of wise men who deery the supernatural. He finds himself inclined to question more closely. Incredulity gets to be a virtue. Before he is fairly aware of it, he is beginning to call out of their Apotheosis some who have long dwelt with the Immortals. In this delicate but degrading task, he unwittingly lowers the whole sphere of revered personalities. He breeds the suspicion that, were we fully informed, none who ever appeared on earth might rightfully now sit on the throne of universal dominion. So when he calls to honest, enthusiastic admiration for One that was among us in "the form of a servant," it is to share the fate of the eagle, striking his talons into the frozen carcass till its wings are fastened with it in the same death. Doubts are now loudly and learnedly proclaimed to be no longer our "traitors," but our saviors, rather. Yet, cherished, published, and extolled, they are to the devotional spirit as a frost on the tender herb.

Considering next the means and measures employed to rekindle or rouse to fuller action the devotional element, we notice a movement styled "enrichment of worship." This implies a belief that the public service has become too plain and repellent. Democratic ideas are everywhere in the ascendant, and happily. The gospel of individualism has not been published any too soon. Each person's right and duty to express himself in religious associations, as in political, must follow his perception that he "must give account of himself to God." A priest who cannot forgive his sins cannot confess them for him. One who cannot bestow a heavenly blessing cannot utter his gratitude for it either. Prayer and praise have come to be seen and felt, as fit for every lip in the waiting congregation. They are beginning to be impatient when these are delegated to one voice. The mouth of the bottle is too narrow for its contents to flow readily. Hence have come wide demands for responsive reading of Psalm and Scripture poetry; and united repeating of creed and commandment and chant and

anthem are beginning to claim a participation from all. Manuals to answer this craving are constantly appearing, having the excellences and faults which mark uninspired work. Spite of the rule of cultured and accomplished musicians in our congregations, whose delicate nerves and fine taste are shocked by unmusical efforts, the people are wanting the luxury of voicing their own feelings. The Wesleyan, ringing out his hymns indifferent to the rules of the singing-master, but imparting his jubilant spirit to all within hearing, fills his chapel, his church, thereby. He does not care if the artist goes by on the other side, to listen in his splendid edifice to a prima donna. He is very certain that David did not engage one to precede the ark as it was borne to Mount Zion, and it is that same Jehovah who makes him "joyful in his house of prayer." The day of the chorus is breaking, and preparing the way for that better one, when the minister will not find his words coming back to him as the emptiest mockery, "Let the peoples praise thee, O God, let all the peoples praise thee." As indicating the desire for a deeper and more intimate union of the believer with his Lord, which would result in improved attitude in public worship, we are receiving constantly handbooks of devotion, both in prose and verse — anthologies, and the work of a single author. The market for suggestive thoughts, stirring exhortation, noble visions, is still unglutted. Every literature is ransacked, and the holiest souls give us of their best in these collections. It is in the hope that meditation will be more sweet, and prayer more essential, and life more complete to those who peruse them. So many queries are started by diligent study of the word of God, so many mysteries attend the unfolding and progress of each life, and of society, that if faith has light, and can impart courage and resignation, its accents in such pages are eagerly sought. While men are louder in their atheism and blasphemy than ever, so are they more sincerely testifying to the existence of Him in whose hands their breath is, and are more ready to cry, in simple trust, "My Father." To this end the numerous conventions called to discuss all phases of Christian work and privilege contribute. Retreats from worldly sounds and sights where, for a while, weary toilers and the spiritually impoverished may be closeted with their Infinite friend, also have this intent. Returning to their fellows with clarified views, purer motives, and braver hearts, it is the better to illustrate the prediction, "Fear God, and where you go, men shall think they walk in hallowed cathedrals." In the social meetings of the church, honored and

barren fashions have so long prevailed that there is a general impatience of them. A sense of distance from, and fear of, the Christ has been too often the outcome of these exercises. Just the opposite is their avowed purpose. Groping after some method which will break the cold reserve and let free the imprisoned spirit, till it shall pour forth its love and longings into his ear, who is ever reproving our lack of faith — that anxious state promises well for the future.

These yearnings and efforts, more or less conscious, to exalt and give control to the best that is within us, this struggling of the devotional element for liberty, may indicate the way to the true methods of obtaining it. Light shines from that quarter. The log of wood, the stake covered with dog-roses, the flight of land-birds, were tokens to Columbus that he drew near to the continent of his reason and faith. It may be presumed that large and blessed results will follow the habit of quiet religious meditation. We are in no danger, in this respect, of a return to the mistakes of other centuries. Neither the scholastic nor the mystic view of Christianity, — the one as an objective phenomenon, outward connection with which is salvation; the other, as an inward life, merely satisfied with having Christ formed within one, the hope of glory, — neither of these alone has much chance in this age. The church is too conspicuous and potent a force to be ignored by any that would honor its Head. It is not mighty enough in and of itself to confer eternal life upon any. We need not fear those hours, then, when, shut in with the *illuminating* word and spirit, the thoughtful are coming to certain truths of vital worth, in daily conduct and public profession. Monastic cells are desirable, if nowhere else a hasty, heedless soul finds a place to know itself and its proper position in the coming kingdom. In this free air which blows about us, many are imagining it to be their right to theorize at pleasure. Out of these seasons of retirement and honest searchings and balancings of meanings come no destructive speculations and dogmas. Of one thus engaged it has been well said, "He alone has the original datum, in virtue of communion with God, on which the dialectic lays hold." It was the advice of Dr. Payson that he who would cultivate devotion should take some one scene in the life of Christ for daily meditation which would bear speedy and choicest fruit in a more single aim and desire for conformity to Him. Going forth from such communion into the confusions and cares and temptations of society, he would not have to confess, as Seneca did, that "as often as he mingled in the company of men he came out of it less a man than

he went in." If virtue *had* gone out of him, it would have been to lift some stricken, cheerless soul into spiritual vigor, and inspire it with a new and mighty reason to give God the praise.

The chief secret of the recovery or the development of the devotional element is the easiest to find. *It is in the closet, in prayer.* The stress laid upon this agent by Him, whose whole earthly life was one prolonged petition, does not yet impress his followers as it should. Nothing less than this will bring us much abiding improvement, in the subject under discussion. Feeble and flickering representatives of his name and work abound, because they have not thus recruited their strength. Sickly and unsightly associations bearing his name may find in this the reason of their condition. Sacrifice, so-called, which refuses to rise above the altar on which it is consumed, has wanted this uplifting quality. The prayerlessness of the church and of the individual is their poverty. Whatever has caused it, whether the numerous and convincing demonstrations of the "reign of law," or greed, or love of doubtful pleasures, or untoward fortunes, to this lack may be traced the inefficiency which any observe and deplore. The remedy is at hand. Not, as has been already suggested, by simply resorting to an oratory more frequently, there to count petitions by the rosary; not by kneeling morning, noon, and night toward Jerusalem; not by louder voiced formulæ; not, as a famous Anglican recommends, "In your private devotions use the prayers of the Church" (upon which Frances Cobbe pithily comments, "as much as if he were to advise, 'When you write to your mother, copy the Complete Letter Writer'"), but in that self-surrender and entire conviction of helplessness which drives one out of very need and of a fervent heart to "call and the Lord shall answer," to cry and He shall say, "Here am I." It is an outgoing of the human spirit, in its blessed sense of relationship to the divine, which makes every act a petition and every word an appeal. Of Stonewall Jackson, it is related that using the phrase, "Instant in prayer," he was asked what he meant by it. "I have so fixed the habit in my own mind," he replied, "that I never raise a glass of water to my lips without a moment asking God's blessing. I never seal a letter without putting a prayer under the seal. I never take a letter from the post without a brief sending of my thought heavenward. I never change my classes in the lecture-room without a minute's petition on the cadets who go out and those who come in." "And don't you sometimes forget to do this?" "I think I can scarcely say that I do," was the answer; "the habit has become as fixed, almost, as breathing."

No slight responsibility for improvement in its devotional features rests with those who are called to conduct the public service. Their manner and conception of the office communicates itself insensibly to the rest. Reverence or irreverence of the many waits on the bearing of the one. "The Parson Praying," writes the saintly Herbert, "being first affected himself, may affect also his people, knowing that no sermon moves them so much to reverence, which they forget again when they come to pray, as a devout behavior in the very act of praying. Besides, he often instructs his people how to carry themselves in divine service." Example and precept tell mightily toward the worthy end sought, when the minister is full of the sense of his solemn task. Non-liturgical communions are liable to the worst offenses in this respect. "As the horse rusheth into battle," or as the lazy pupil comes before his teacher — with excitement or vacantly — yes, and sometimes with surprising egotism, some stand to minister. 'T were well if they might be transported awhile, to witness those august scenes at the Tabernacle on the great day of Atonement, and that trembling host which stood without. For this duty premeditation is essential. One of the most eminent clergymen in the early part of the century, fully alive to the great import of such exercises, anticipated them pen in hand. So he was always pertinent, and "led" his hearers, indeed, before the Throne of Grace. Familiarizing himself with the Scripture, and then with the thoughts and expressions of Flavel, Baxter, Watts, and Henry, he found himself, in the moments of this "sacrament," in that mood where language happily and helpfully fitted the varied needs which waited for utterance through him. His biographer said, "He had a *liturgy* of his own, which he could use, without any danger of promoting a LETHARGY of piety in himself or any one else." While the gifted author of "Ad Clerum" condemns the practice of transcribing and committing the prayer for the public service, yet it used to be possible, on leaving the church where he officiated, to buy for a sixpence a pamphlet containing the sermon just preached and the prayer just offered. Neither form without substance, nor substance without form, however beautiful the one or rugged the other, will much mend the undevout behavior of the average congregation. These must be wedded to each other, and few but will feel their influence, and be elevated in their ideals and find delight as they together "draw nigh unto God."

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## PULPIT PRAYER.

THE close connection of thought or emotion with its expression compels attention to methods of public worship. What passes within the soul does not shape the utterance or the deed more surely than these affect the hidden life. It is this principle which prompts a public profession of religion. Aside from whatever new obligations it brings, joining the church makes tangible and definite and therefore lasting those already recognized. The same reasoning applies to the dedication of children in baptism. The passing volitions and longings which it is sought to crystallize by worship are as really valuable as the self-surrender which finds expression in covenant with the church. Persons whose spirits are already somewhat touched by the associations of the Sabbath and of the sanctuary will worship in spirit and in truth if the service gives them opportunity. This will not be the case if the singing is but an exhibition of musical skill, if the reading of the Scripture is expressionless, or if the prayer is a jumble of rambling exhortation and unmeaning repetition of Scripture. Under such circumstances aspirations will be checked, and wandering thoughts will speedily make the house of God far other than the gate of heaven. Not that elocution and rhetoric are to be unduly magnified. All enrichment of worship must rest upon an enrichment of the spiritual life. This truth cannot be too much insisted upon. The mechanical use of the best methods will be profitless. Just as cheap reproductions bring the works of painters and musical composers into ill repute, so impressive liturgies lose their charm if their letter is retained without the spirit which called them into being. Some ministers make their preaching a mere display of oratory, but the faithful pastor tries to be both devout in spirit and careful in the composition of his sermons. There is no reason why he should not seek to combine the two elements in the earlier part of the service.

The main rule for public prayer is that it should be for all present a conscious expression of their needs. The speaker should grasp by sympathy the wants of the people, and by faith the bountifulness of the All-giver. This twofold conception should so engross his mind as to preclude any variant thought or utterance. The words which fall from his lips should be obviously the echo of the people's heart-throbs. By this rule certain prevalent practices will be shunned. The prayer must not contain any

preaching. Dr. Watts's division of public prayer into "Invocation, Adoration, Confession, Petition, Pleading, Self Dedication, Thanksgiving, Blessing, and Conclusion," is a perilous aid. With these sections visibly articulated, the "Adoration" easily becomes a treatise upon the attributes of Deity, the "Confession" a tirade against popular tendencies, and the "Pleading" an expansion of one's theological system. Sayings directed to the audience rather than to the Almighty can creep into a prayer even without the thin disguise of such introductory phrases as "Help us to realize," "We have learned by sad experience," "Thou hast said," etc., etc. This rule also will not allow the unnecessary multiplying of words. The most common temptation of this sort is in the use of Biblical terms. Some hallowed phrase makes a fine sounding close to a sentence or to the development of some thought. Or else, when one has begun a familiar quotation, he can, by letting it run on a little further, gain time to think what he will say next. But if the preacher realizes that through his words the hearts of the whole assembly are to ascend Godward, the responsibility will make the exercise too intense and solemn for any careless verbiage. Another thing forbidden is the needless exhibition of one's personality. One may err in this respect through religious fervor. The culminating of his plans for the service and the presence of the congregation naturally bring him into a highly wrought emotional state. And when with closed eyes he feels that he is in the audience chamber of the Most High, his prayer may become through his very earnestness a pure and elevated rhapsody. Such an exercise, however delightful to him, will not be profitable to the people in the pews. Unable to accompany him, they will be only spectators of his ardent flight. Vain and morbid displays are even more blameworthy. The worshipers are to be led by this exercise to accept anew their privilege as priests-unto God, but they cannot do this unless the leader of their worship resolutely suppresses self. If he has the consciousness while speaking that he is impressing the people with his spiritual mindedness or the delicacy of his fancy or the choiceness of his diction, the exercise differs only in degree from the famous "most eloquent prayer ever offered to a Boston audience."

To prepare for public prayer, the minister must seek a right attitude both toward God and toward man. To the former of these ends all his Christian experience will contribute. Whatever deepens his character will equip him also for this serious duty. Grappling, for the sake of the Master, with disagreeable

parish work, endeavoring to spend his hours at the desk in hard study instead of in loitering or over light literature; in a word, every act that gives him nearness to God increases his fitness to conduct the worship of the sanctuary. This fact is an additional incentive to the pastor to apply to himself the maxims which he gives his people. Moreover, what E. P. Whipple says in another connection is true here: "The meaning of the word 'experience' must not be confined to what one has personally seen and felt, but is also to be extended to everything he has seen and felt through vital sympathy with facts, scenes, events, and characters, which he has learned by conversation with others and through books." An enlarged comprehension of divine truth, a deeper conviction of God's power and presence in the world, a clearer discernment of the purpose which underlies history — these will produce a corresponding ripeness both in thought and phrase. The importance of this service will also prompt more study of liturgies and other works of devotion than one's personal circumstances require. The literature of this class has been increased of late years by sundry collections of pulpit prayers, and there are numerous manuals of family prayer. These will suggest to the preacher new aspects and tokens of the Heavenly Father's interest in his earthly children, and he will imbibe from the best of them the humility and awe and the serene confidence with which devout souls have drawn near to the Infinite One. Such books will aid in his devotion in the same way in which it has been suggested that public prayer aids that of the worshipers. His mind should be schooled to take up at once a devotional train of thought; his feet should be familiar with the way to the Throne of Grace.

Such a study will, of course, furnish one with a fund of apt language. It is a thing to be wondered at that, among churches practicing extempore prayer, a divine should be entitled to distinction among his fellows by the fact that "he had a liturgy of his own," or that in this sacrament his language "happily and helpfully fitted the various needs which waited for utterance through him." If clergymen had to write their own hymns, they would study diligently the rules of prosody, and the prayers are certainly as important a part of the service as the hymns. Our non-liturgical clergy rejoice in their freedom, which a ritual would not allow, to adapt their prayers to the requirements of place and time. While holding fast to this advantage, they should also seek to attain a dignity of language equal to that of the Prayer

Book. It is possible for them to do this in the same way that it is possible for editorial writers under the stress of daily journalism to produce on demand English of which Macaulay would not have been ashamed. Such a result as this cannot, of course, be attained at once, but study in this department should be carried on side by side with other lines of study throughout one's active ministry.

These preliminaries must be supplemented by a sympathetic understanding of the needs of the congregation. The best way to secure this is for the pastor to review carefully his calling list, putting himself as nearly as possible in the place of those whose private life he knows so well. His reading of history, fiction, poetry, and current news will open to his view the workings of the soul, and he can trace parallels between the characters he thus becomes acquainted with and the beings of flesh and blood whom he meets daily. He must study human nature as the dramatist does, looking not merely at the outward incident and the accompanying play of emotion, but beneath these at the inevitable shaping of character and the constant strife of passion and purer purpose. It is hardly necessary to mention this, as the faithful shepherd will desire instinctively to look at his people with this penetrating gaze.

Now let the pastor, maintaining a constant familiarity with the best liturgies, enter the House of God each Sabbath in reverent mood, and let him from the pulpit ponder the condition of the people before him. He will perhaps be early in his seat that he may watch them as they enter. Let him ask himself what petition or what thanksgiving would be most appropriate for each individual. He cannot in the moment of prayer recall each one whose case he has thus hastily considered, but his estimate of their several necessities will lie in his mind, making, in the terms of photography, a composite conception of the burden of earthly life. This will furnish an undertone to his words which will make them suggestive. He will have the feeling, and will unconsciously impart it, that the congregation is one great family, and his supplication will be what family prayer should be, the united petition of those who share one another's secrets. The pulsations of his sympathy will be felt by all, and will make his utterance the outlet for the latent prayerfulness of the whole assembly. Or if the pastor wishes to make more specific preparation before going to the church, let him select several families or individuals of different circles and of different experiences, and let him re-

gard these as typical of the rest. It is safe to generalize. Human nature is the same everywhere, and the tragic elements are mingled in substantially the same manner in many careers. Let the minister ask himself how the parties he has selected would pray, if they analyzed their condition as he analyzes it, and if they had the resources of expression with which he is furnished. Having determined what these prayers would be, let him arrange them in such an order that each naturally leads to the one following, and he will be surprised at the completeness, the simplicity, and the directness of the product. It will not be suspected whom he has in mind if, as has been suggested, he gives less heed to outward circumstances than to the movements of the soul beneath. His phraseology will be both inclusive and exact; all will be able to appropriate some part of it, and no one will be compelled to do so.

It is a delicate question how far the pulpit prayer should mention particular cases of sickness, bereavement, or other trials. It is certainly a safe rule to make such a practice exceptional. The frequent introduction of these themes is apt to betray one into indiscriminate eulogy of the dead or flattery of the living. Moreover, it does not harmonize with the frame of mind which should prevail among the congregation during the time of prayer. A lady in a New England town met an acquaintance one Sunday noon and said, "I cannot tell you any news, for, as I was not at church, I did not hear my pastor's prayer, and so do not know who is sick or about to leave town."

The pulpit prayer, if carefully devised to call forth and define the nobler cravings of all souls, would become a potent means of religious impression. One of the best books upon the religious education of children urges that the teacher in the public schools does not lecture her pupils upon the desirability or best methods of learning to read, but puts a primer into their hands and says, "Now let's read together;" likewise, the argument runs, children should be brought into living contact with Christ without having their attention diverted too much to the process of their conversion. The lesson might be extended to the pulpit; when the preacher says, "Let us pray," he should mean it, and mean it for all who are present. Every congregation contains persons to whom the praises of the sanctuary are attractive simply as music, and the preaching merely as oratory. They must not be ignored. To this class a rambling, hortatory prayer means only so many tedious minutes. But let the genuine reverence of the pastor excite their respect, and let the petitions rest upon a tender, search-

ing scrutiny of human nature and its environment, and there will be a resistless charm in the words. The persons described cannot but listen. Then, while they are thinking perhaps of the literary quality of the prayer, they will be startled at the precision with which some need of their own or of dear ones is touched upon, and, almost before they are aware, their hearts will be led along with the preacher to lay that ill before Him who alone can provide its remedy. They will thus have a glimpse of the comfort of confiding in God, and for the instant they will know the desire with respect to this one thing that the will of God may be done. Such an experience, brief and secret though it be, will mellow the heart, and the worldling who forms the habit of joining in such an exercise is not far from the kingdom of God.

Fellowship with the piety of the past should form a background for all devotional exercises. It is more important that it should thus show itself than that it should be avowed in any ritual. Moreover, the employment of set forms when a service is well under way is apt to check the flow of devotional feeling. After the beginning of the exercises every word spoken and every stanza sung leads the thoughts of all present into the same channel, sympathy is kindled, and the heart of the assembly becomes more and more as the heart of one man. All worship must now be adapted to the occasion. No formula, however hallowed, will suffice. The repetition of the Lord's Prayer may not be out of place, but anything more formal must be introduced at this stage very cautiously. But the case is far different when the audience are first come together. Prayers which have the sacredness of long usage will then assist in producing a devout mood. Petitions adapted to the needs of humanity in general, and therefore less specific, will advance the worship at this point, although later they might retard it. It is well, therefore, that the invocation, whether uttered by the minister alone or with the congregation, should be in time-honored phrase. The clergyman who makes this prayer entirely original makes the mistake of trying to lead before the people are prepared to follow. There is no more effective way of preparing the invocation than by culling suitable extracts from the book of Psalms. These should be used in their simplicity, without ornament or extension. Few ministers are skillful enough in joinery to continue well in their own language a prayer begun with some such phrase as "How amiable are thy tabernacles."

The same reasoning leads to the conclusion that the last public



prayer of the day should be for every one present the most intimate and personal of all. The circumstances are favorable for this. The willfulness and restlessness of the morning have passed away, and the surrounding darkness produces a sense of helplessness and of mystery. It is the time when the purer, gentler impulses naturally find expression, as is shown in such poems as Bret Harte's "Dickens in Camp," and Longfellow's "The Day is Done." To the ordinary influences of the evening hour is to be added the calmness produced by a day of rest and by the services and associations of the Sabbath. Let the pastor take advantage of this state of things. Let him have the congregation resume their seats and bow their heads after the last hymn of the evening service. Then, amid the hush of the assembly, let him lead the people to the Throne of Grace. The prayer should be brief and simple. It should be in behalf of all loved ones as well as of the company present. Its petitions should be chiefly for protection and refreshment during the night, for the pardon of sins, and for grace for coming days. If at the morning service the pastor had the feeling that he was leading the worship of a family, he will now have the sense of awe at the Divine Presence which comes to him who kneels by the side of a little night-gowned figure while childish lips ask for a Heavenly Father's care. Nor will this impression be due to his imagination alone. In such a prayer at such a time all souls can join, and He who looks upon the heart may be able to say with joy of many a tempted, tired child of earth, "Behold, he prayeth."

*Pastor.*

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#### THE PROBLEM OF DUTY: A STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ETHICS.

IN most cases of ordinary life it is unnecessary to inquire into the nature of duty, or to question the absoluteness of conscience; it is not even necessary to have a definite moral philosophy at all. As we do not need to know the precise operation of the great organs of our body like the heart and the lungs, but their healthiest work goes on without interruption by the interrogatories of consciousness, so our conscience ordinarily does best service when we simply obey its demands. And yet the discussion of the philosophy of duty, which we justly regard as unprof-

itable when compared with the practice of duty, is not without an indirect bearing upon practice.

Neither is our subject one of mere scientific or curious interest. There are strange moral phenomena which, like the variations of the magnetic needle, demand explanation, or left unexplained leave a painful sense of insecurity as regards the stability of moral standards. Thus, while conscience is commonly regarded as infallible, like a voice of God in each man's soul, instances happen to the watchful observer where conscience, though punctiliously followed, brings us up suddenly with the shock of having committed obvious injustice; the supposed duty for refusing which we had suffered remorse proves not to have been duty; or more subtly still, we find ourselves oppressed with guilt, not merely for overt acts, which we might have controlled, but for dispositions and moral tendencies which we did not personally incur, but doubtless inherited; or again, when blaming men's vices, we are urged in justice to inquire the limits of their responsibility, and are reminded that our own happy moral superiority depends largely at least upon the circumstances of our training, and on the fact that virtue has happened to be made agreeable, or at least expedient for us. These and other considerations are sufficient to suggest that the realm of duty, so far from being simple, as we often call it, touches on great mysteries. What constitutes duty? Is there such a thing as absolute or ideal duty? How is duty discovered, by revelation or experience; and how is it related to expediency? What is conscience? What gives it authority? How is it developed? What relation does it bear to duty? What is human freedom, and what is its scope? What is the range of responsibility? What is the significance of the sense of guilt? These questions both take hold of practical conduct and rise into the regions of the most abstruse thought.

We have already hinted at the kind of difficulties which attend our inquiry. They are partly metaphysical. The Divine Being, men said, is both omniscient and omnipotent. How could He be either, if a finite creature could originate independent action and therefore frustrate the purposes of his providence? For man's choice must always be either what God intended, and, therefore, not really free, but predetermined; or else man's choice must be what God did not intend nor foresee, a supposition irreconcilable with the idea of God. This is not all. Man's choice is determined by a conflict in which he always follows the strongest motive, and cannot be conceived of as following the weaker

motive. For, otherwise, there must be some previous stronger reason. The metaphysics of the will are almost amusingly illustrated by Jonathan Edwards's famous treatise. The reader will remember how his keen logic mercilessly follows the helpless human will in wearying circles of demonstration. Neither is there any escape from the conclusion of the metaphysical argument, except by that sort of evasion of argument which defends freedom behind the veil of mystery, or, like Dean Mansel, frankly asserts that we must believe contradictories. What, then, from the point of view of metaphysics, becomes of human responsibility after freedom has either been squarely denied or sent to play a game of hide and seek?

Metaphysics have not been interesting enough to the average mind to prove a formidable disturber of the ordinary philosophy of morals. Besides, men have rarely quite trusted the most thorough metaphysical or logical argument, especially if offset by the supposed testimony of their own senses or of consciousness. Did they not know that they were free, responsible agents? Meantime, science<sup>1</sup> has appeared, interesting the many when metaphysics interested the few, accurate as the other was hazy, taking hold of sensible facts while the other rested on subtleties, and even more mercilessly than its forerunner overturning the ordinary moral philosophy. Here, says science, is a reign of universal law which leaves nothing outside its sway, which controls human conduct as completely as the movements of planets. There is no exception, there is no real spontaneity; man is only one of the links of the endless chain. There is no human thought, no whim, no seeming caprice which stands outside of this chain of dependence. A thousand circumstances, bodily and mental, such as food and shelter, education, surroundings, parental influences, generations

<sup>1</sup> It is difficult not to use the word science in two different meanings. In the narrower sense it means physical science, or the observation and arrangement of the facts of the outward life. It is in this sense that science is necessarily agnostic. This is the only sense, moreover, in which, if one were a materialist, he would care to use the word. Perhaps this restricted meaning of the word could not have been helped, but it has led to much unfortunate misunderstanding. It must not be forgotten, therefore, that science in its broadest sense comprehends all the phenomena of life, what is called the inward or spiritual life as well as the outward or material facts. To those who are not materialists this distinction is real and important. This will explain how science is sometimes personified to represent the modern spirit of investigation, and again, more narrowly, the school of those who claim to account for everything upon the basis of material phenomena.

of inherited culture or barbarism, have been woven together into that thought, that whim, that seeming caprice. It is said that the position of a grain of sand on the beach is bound up with the history of the planet, that it could not be where it is without storms and floods and the rising and settling of continents before man appeared. So of each individual act of human conduct, which is bound equally fast by far-reaching laws with the ebb and flow of the tide of universal history.

Science goes further than this general statement of the doctrine of foreordination. It descends to particulars, and denies the responsibility of individuals and classes, and refers back their supposed guilt to generations before them. Their antecedents and conditions, and not their own wills, controlled their conduct. They do not want punishment, but education, food, and pure air. The sins of the theologians and metaphysicians are the only kind which prove hard to forgive. Science does not merely threaten to subvert the ordinary doctrine of freedom and responsibility, but to establish another philosophy of morals. Morals which used to be thought an absolute commandment from heaven, and therefore fixed from age to age, became simply as Lord Coleridge some time since correctly defined law, — the transcript of the best judgment of each generation. Right is therefore the highest utility, and wrong is its frustration. Conscience becomes changed from an inner divine voice to an inherited sense of the expedient; morals, therefore, shift from generation to generation, according to the degree of civilization and the changing standards of utility; conscience constantly shifts according to each man's changing point of view. If any course of conduct is permanently useful, as honesty or kindness, if any conduct is certain to remain useful as long as mankind exists, such conduct alone may be trusted to be reënforced by man's accumulating sense of its commanding utility, that is, by conscience.

There is something attractively simple and frank in this philosophy of morals. It has no contradictories like freedom and determination to reconcile. It answers the questions of the fluctuations of conscience and why the morals of one age become the sins of the next. Consciousness, moreover, though commonly cited for the support of the old-fashioned philosophy, proves, when fairly questioned, at least in some respects, a witness to the other side. The corner-stone of the common philosophy of morals is in man's so-called freedom of choice, namely, that whatever a man does, he could perfectly well do the opposite. Leaving aside

Jonathan Edwards and his metaphysical puzzles, which might be thought to confuse this problem, what does consciousness say about it? Does consciousness affirm that a man is free to act in either one of two opposite courses? On the contrary, we remember instances in which the force of circumstances or temptation seemed to consciousness to carry us irresistibly along. When we did right, it was not as though we did it ourselves, but some power not ourselves working in us did it. We did wrong, but it was as though we were possessed with an evil spirit. If we were to blame, the blame was not in the act which we could not then have helped; it must have been in our previous selves who were capable of such an act. Moral experience is full of the facts of such testimony.

Grant for a moment that these are exceptional instances; take up ordinary cases of choice in which, therefore, consciousness is less acute to notice what is taking place. There seem to be presented in these cases opposite sets of motives. There is an appetite, for example, urging and hungering. On the other side are prudential considerations, reinforced by a certain habit of abstinence or moderation. What does it mean when we say that the man is free? Does it mean, as in the case of the ass between the bundles of straw, that the impulse of the hunger exactly counterbalances the man's habits of prudence? No; the fact is that by the time the man has chosen, either the appetite or the abstinent habit has proved stronger than its opposite; that is to say, the opposites between which we are placed are not of equal weight, but one outweighs the other. The will, therefore, is not perfectly free, if, as is evident in every case, its choice is more or less weighted and biased, though by only the most delicate shading, towards one side or the other.

But perhaps freedom means that the will, though confessedly handicapped, for example, towards the side of the appetite, can yet of its own motion overthrow the existing weight. It is claimed that experience reports instances in which, by a desperate act of sheer will, we have turned the scale of motives and reinforced the weak and yielding virtue by a fresh and original impulse. On the contrary, if consciousness reports such apparent instances of independent volition, she tells us how they arose in the suggestion of a new thought, in the awakening of an old memory, in some sudden vision of a forgotten face, in some subtle impulse starting out like a concealed spring from the mysterious depths of our nature, stowed there, God only knows when, and resting on the accumulated instincts, habits, faiths, it

may be, of generations of ancestors. Thus we are perhaps never so little the independent originators of volition as when, being about to choose between opposite courses of action, mysterious impulses well up within us or from outside us (who shall say?) to reverse our expected choice. For either we choose upon the ground of well-known reasons and distinctly traceable motives evidently preponderating over their opposites, or else if ever we think that we overcome our own stronger motives by sheer force of will, we catch the hints, "beneath the surface stream of what we think we are," of deeper undercurrents of feeling and thought from time to time thrown up into action.

Let us now inquire, with regard to some given act, whether we could really have done the opposite if we had so chosen. Consciousness at first seems to answer, yes. What does she mean? Does she mean, when put on oath, that she could at that time have acted differently with the motives and reason then before her, with the impulses, habits, feelings, and passions (and no others) then swaying within her? We think not. How could she possibly know that with the same conditions, material, intellectual, moral, and spiritual, without and within, her action could have been altered? Does she not rather mean, merely, that if the conditions had been altered, her choice might have been reversed; or that she could now, if she had to choose over again, with new motives and reasons and enlarged experience, make a different choice?

Cross-examining consciousness, we seem to pursue the fleeting phantom of free will from one alleged hiding place to another. There is no narrow fringe of action in which it is found to exist; obviously, ordinary men in ordinary actions have no use for it; exceptional acts are better explained without it; but consciousness instead tells us of passions, impulses, thoughts, reasons, hopes, memories, habits, out of the correlation of which every act of choice springs. All moral education proceeds on the assumption of this fact. Through circumstances, material as well as moral, through the direction of thoughts, through the formation of habits, through the training of memory, through the discipline of impulses, through the filling the galleries of the mind with ideals and examples, the moralist proposes to bind over the soul of the youth to determined courses of virtuous conduct. The less of the semblance of independent will he leaves, the better educated he deems the youth. Nay, what men call free will he recognizes as undisciplined impulse, the least independent of all



things, becoming the prey of man's worst foes, namely, ignorance, unreason, and vice.

Are we ready, on the basis of the facts which we have considered, to render our verdict forthwith for the materialistic or utilitarian theory<sup>1</sup> of morals? On the contrary, objections arise which prove more weighty the more we consider them. In the first place, this theory is too simple and easy. It does not really explain the phenomena of moral conduct. If all that exists were only a concurrence of atoms or a blind energy, why trace any moral drift or tendency in the affairs of the world? Why should there be development, which means improvement, and implies a direction in which things move? Why should moral acts in the individual or the race tend towards prosperity? Such moral drift constitutes the basis of the utilitarian ethics which holds that to be right which is advantageous in its tendency. What is it, then, that compels, upon a concurrence of atoms or upon a blind energy, this advantageous, beneficent tendency, to follow which is held to be good, but to oppose which proves evil? The utilitarian theory does not touch the question of that which makes things useful and beneficent. On the contrary, it is the weakness of the materialistic philosophy that while it recognizes laws, principles, methods, tendencies, and a universal idea of development, it offers no explanation how these things could have been evolved out of matter.

There are certain suggestive analogies which seem to contradict the materialistic theory of ethics. There is art, literature, music, for example; who that knows anything of these subjects will maintain that there is no standard of beauty? That the din of a barbarian war-dance is as real music as a sonata of Beethoven? That, except for the changing fashion, a chromo is as good art as an original painting by Raphael? That all things of art, beauty, and taste are therefore only relative to the thoughts and habits of the time? One might, indeed, endeavor to make a special plea for this as for other unreasonable positions; but science itself shows certain principles and canons which hold art towards standards as absolute as mathematics, while mathematics itself is not subtle enough adequately to express, but only partially to illustrate, the higher laws of beauty.

There seems likewise to be a beauty of moral conduct, the laws of which are also unchanging. If human art, music, poetry,

<sup>1</sup> We do not care here to insist that the utilitarian theory is necessarily materialistic, but the materialistic theory is of course utilitarian.

are all approaches more or less successful towards an absolute standard of beauty, of forms, of harmony, of expression, so also human morals after a kindred but pertinent analogy seem to be approximations towards an absolute standard of beauty of conduct, or being, which existed as truly as did the canons of art, when men were only barbarians. As the first carvers in wood did not know the Venus of Milo but unconsciously groped towards it, so the early men who did not know the ideal of a Christ nevertheless unconsciously worked towards that ideal. For there are either differences in things as of better or worse, and, therefore, in turn, that which is best of all towards which so-called development tends, and, therefore, still further a power or principle of good, which causes such beneficent development, and which being eternally behind all things, we properly call the absolute, or God; or else there are no real differences, and no development but everlasting and insignificant flux from one indifferent event to another. This is the absurd conclusion to which the denial of an absolute standard of beauty of conduct would force us.

The moment, indeed, that one speaks of utility except in the most superficial sense, of the greater advantage of morality, or the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the moment that one claims this course of conduct as *better* than that, one seems to be begging the question at issue; for these terms are all methods of stating one's conviction that the drift of things is beneficent. The idea of God is hidden under every one of them. And if, indeed, good is at the foundation of the world, if all things move for the greatest good of the greatest number, if one thing is better than another, have we not come back again in another form to the idea of an absolute standard of beauty of conduct, towards which common conduct is an approximation? The truth is, materialism of itself, which sees nothing essentially or permanently higher or more beautiful in love or heroism than in hate and murder, has nothing to do with the idea of the good. The good is an idea which remains over from the ideal or spiritual philosophy, being, indeed, we think, hard to get rid of because, like the fact of God, it is embedded in the structure of human nature. For surely great wealth of meaning has to be imported into the definition of matter in order to say that it is capable of evolving out of itself its own laws, tendencies, and principles, as though thought or mathematical relations were a function of matter; but it is an outright jugglery of speech to define matter as that which has in itself the quality of producing good.

The questions of philosophy thus ultimately reduce themselves to one, namely, Is there a beneficent drift or tendency of things? Is there such a fact as the good? The affirmative of this question is the statement of the existence of God. The utilitarian moralist must either, in denying the reality of the good, himself undermine all real and philosophical basis of morality, or else in affirming this reality he also must stand on a religious basis; but if so, and there is therefore an absolute standard of conduct to which utility points, he falls as truly under the yoke of absolute duty as the old-fashioned moralist whom he thought that he was opposing.

We have another difficulty with the acceptance of the materialistic philosophy of conduct. Though free will in the ordinary sense may not properly belong to a man, there is a suspicion that if not freedom, something at least equally precious is concealed under our consciousness of the operations of choice; in other words, there is felt to be a factor in man's choice beyond the mere turning of the balance of a scale according to the amount of the weights put upon it, or the force of one nervous current overbearing another current. What is this subtle but real and important factor which permanently gives a reality to what has been too hastily named freedom? It is the standing miracle of consciousness, intellect, spirit, — whatever name you choose to call that thing in the man, unlike his body, above his material part by a wide and impassable gulf, by which he knows and loves, and which marks him as man.

In the act of choice, it is through man's consciousness that he recognizes the quality of both courses presented to him, the present pleasure of the one, the more durable excellence of the other. Through the grasp of his consciousness he is capable of being pleased with the one course or dissatisfied with the other. Because the average man sees the possibility of satisfaction in both alternatives, because he wants to have the advantage of each, the duty and the temptation, he is led to think himself free to choose either side. What he confounds with freedom is this recognition of possibilities of satisfaction on both sides. He is not really free between these possibilities; his choice is already predetermined by the contents of his consciousness. This predetermination, however, does not prevent him, while the choice is impending, from feeling an attraction towards both of the courses before him.

This is not all. The man takes the duty in place of the temp-

tation. He is able now, through his intelligent consciousness, as before, to be satisfied with his choice. This is actually the highest exercise of what has been called his freedom, but which should more accurately be called his consciousness. The most perfect man possible is he whose consciousness, because it is illuminated most clearly, recognizes the eternal excellence of the right course. To such a man, in this highest exercise of his consciousness, there are not two courses possible, the bad and the good, but only one. Where, then, is his freedom? His freedom is merely that, through his illuminated insight, he is completely satisfied and at rest in the course which he pursues. What freedom is better than, through clear consciousness of the excellence of the right, to be pleased to do it: that is, to be able to be pleased with what one has to do; to be bound like a star in its course, and yet, unlike the star, to be conscious of the beneficence of one's bondage? The difference between brute choice and the choice of men here finds explanation. The difference depends on the fullness of consciousness. The brute with only his bare gleam of consciousness, with his feeble prevision, is insensibly borne by currents and motions which he cannot analyze. The increase of the compass of the man's consciousness adds to every act of so-called choice the sight of new possibilities and complications. He is apt, whenever, unlike the brute, he stops to think, to be harassed by these possibilities, which, even after the choice is made, will not leave him at ease. So little pleasure does his supposed liberty give him! But the perfect man, or the average man in his highest moods, having still fuller and more active consciousness, recognizing, therefore, the lasting relations of things, is able to be at ease in that course which he knows to be good, and, indeed, is unable to take any other.

The significance of conscience is now suggested. We have seen how consciousness confers a sense of satisfaction, whenever that course which is recognized to be best is pursued. Corresponding to this satisfaction is the natural unrest which ensues when one is upon a course recognized to be evil. The clearer the consciousness, as before, the greater this unrest or pain. In the dumb creature, it doubtless depends upon the intensity of his prevision of the master's whip. It depends in the saint upon the grasp which his mind has upon the injuries which flow from his conduct, and upon the sacred principles to violate which gives his moral nature hurt, stain, or shock. Everywhere the fuller the consciousness and the higher its reach, the more sensitive the suffering which conscience gives and the louder its warnings.

Conscience not only works towards pain and dissatisfaction when we have knowingly entered on a wrong course; it also protests with strange pain and unrest against a wrong course on which we entered unconsciously without knowing its nature. Conscience upbraids men for their inherited faults. Indeed, the highest exercise of conscience does not apply to acts so much as to the motives and character out of which acts spring. The ancient cry of Paul: "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" is the expression of the intense disapprobation with which consciousness recognizes the wrong and faulty self when compared with an ideal standard of excellence. Thus conscience acts to condemn a wrong state of being which had its beginning in no personal fault of the individual, but in the faults of his age, his training, and his inheritance, as really as it condemns those acts in which evil was consciously incurred. The distress occasioned by the consciousness of bad conduct, evil motives, or a faulty self is analogous to the distress which the artistic nature suffers at seeing, and especially at doing, inharmonious work. The sting of the consciousness of being evil is, or ought to be, more acute and profound than the consciousness of disorderly workmanship, by as much as the æsthetic sense only touches one side of the life of a man, while the moral character is involved in all that he does and in his relations to every one else. To discover that one's nature is untrue, or to feel the shame of a meanness, is a vastly more profound pain than to strike a false note or draw an ugly form. To recognize one's habitual motives as base is, or ought to be, a more terrible suffering than to have incurred the disgrace of a blunder. The difference in the intensity of the distress as well as in the character of the subjects it touches seems almost to amount at times to a difference in the quality of the pain.

Conscience is not a guide. She does not determine what is right or wrong. It is not conscience which affirms that one course is to be preferred to another. It is the understanding or judgment which, according to the measure of its enlightenment, sitting like a court and subject to the conditions of human evidence, makes these decisions. Conscience merely waits on the judgment as the sheriff upon the decrees of a court. Whatever the understanding or judgment, that is, the deliberating consciousness, recognizes to be the right course of conduct, conscience works to enforce. Conscience, therefore, is not the judgment or declaration of right, but the feeling which, when the right has been declared, pushes

towards it or against the opposite. It is the natural apprehension, pain, unrest, which a man experiences with reference to a course which he has been made to see is injurious. It is intense, sensitive, urgent, according to the habits, the character, and the ideals of each individual.

It follows, if the decree of the judgment is mistaken, if, for example, the unenlightened Hindoo mother has been persuaded to throw her child into the Ganges, that the conscience so far from preventing will further such evil act. It is exactly the same conscience which, when she has become educated to new principles, will make the old pagan conduct impossible. It is not that her conscience, which as we have seen is a blind feeling, has been changed, but the range of her consciousness has been enlarged, and her judgment has therefore been altered.

In other words, the decision that one course of conduct is better or higher than another does not constitute the sense of ought, but the sense of ought is instinctively present, more or less strongly felt, behind every such decision to enforce it. The decision of the judgment does not create this sense, but only stimulates it or calls it out. The sense of ought may be likened to a life force, a self-preservative instinct which, at the perception of danger, rushes in to save. In its lowest forms, it is seen in the dumb creatures, as in the dog, which it urges to avoid his master's censure. In its highest form, it protests in the saint against the slightest stain of dishonor or falsehood; in the philanthropist, against the shadow of a compromise with injustice.

This leads us to note the distinction between *duties*, or the separate acts to which conscience urges, and *duty* as the general obligation covering such separate acts and traversing the whole life. The materialistic ethics takes cognizance of separate acts as expedient or the contrary. The materialistic ethics fails to take account of duty as a grand whole into which these acts are linked as parts. For, as we have seen, one ceases to stand on materialistic ground as soon as one recognizes a universal plan of good towards which all things are made to gravitate, the resistance to which occasions the unrest and remorse of conscience.

We have not yet exhausted the factors present to consciousness in an act of choice. Besides the sight which the mind has of the opposite courses of conduct with their train of results; besides the attraction of appetite or the warning unrest of conscience; besides the conscious self hearing the evidence and witnessing the play of emotions, there is at the instant of choice



an impulse of force which we call will, and which is translated into action. What is this impulse of will? Is it a new, original, independent force which we that moment set loose? On the contrary, there is nothing more dependent. It is a resultant. It depends on the degree of our animal spirits, on the force of habits, on reserves of energy stored up as in a battery and set free, perhaps, by the touch of subtle, moral, or spiritual influences which we can hardly measure. What does this fact about will indicate? It has a higher explanation than the mere connection of our lives as bound up with the throbbing forces of matter. On the contrary, there is observable a steady, mighty set of the current of human will towards beneficence, towards righteousness. There is no other fair reading of human history. The apparent exceptions, startling and tremendous as they seem by themselves, are found to be the whirlpools and eddies made by the friction of the infinite current on its finite shores. The will of man, flowing again and again backwards to evil, is seen never to rest till turned into good. With the individual, with the nation, with the race, the force of human will finds stable equilibrium in good alone. Surely, then, it is a universal will out of which man is inspired; it is the beneficent life of God of which man partakes. If this were to be called only a working theory to interpret the facts and to guide life, it would nevertheless remain the theory which works best of all to develop moral health and happiness. In other words, it acts as the true theory should act.

There do not appear, then, to be millions of free and independent wills. There is only one Will, as there can be only one God. The one Will works in and through each one of us. We are sometimes conscious and often unconscious of its working; but it is only our egotism which makes us fancy that it is we who originate action. If, then, in the problem of free will there are said to be two factors or poles, and one pole is the fact of determination, the other pole is the fact of the will of the universe consciously felt in and through us. But there is no inconsistency between the two. The inconsistency is between the testimony of egotism and that of truth.

What validity shall we give now to the sense of human responsibility? The most serious difficulty with the materialistic ethics has been that it seemed to yield to a man no greater responsibility than to a tree. How could you justly blame or praise that which inward and outward circumstances had made? Have we, then, while denying the adequateness of material necessitarianism, put

on man's neck the yoke of a spiritual necessity equally unyielding? The key to the significance of responsibility, we answer, is found in the mysterious fact of consciousness. I am responsible for that act in which my consciousness presents the alternative of good and evil. From that moment, supposing I take the wrong course, the unrest of conscience pursues me. Responsibility affirms that *I am a man on a wrong course*. It affixes the hurt and the peril to me. It does not affirm that I could have done differently under the same circumstances, but it presses me to doing differently henceforth. It is another name for conscience testifying specifically, Thou art the man. This is equally the case when responsibility is applied not only to the man's wrong acts, but the man's wrong self. Responsibility began the instant that the man caught sight of the possibility or the ideal of a better self. Responsibility does not say that the man before consciousness presented new vision could have changed himself into the perfect life. That would be false; but responsibility says henceforth, Thou art the man who needs to be transformed, converted, perfected.

So of the fact of sin or guilt. Consciousness in her enlightenment compares the man's actual conduct with the conduct which should have been, the man's actual bad self with his possible perfect self. The discrepancy, the error, the injury committed, the faults, consciousness affixes to him. They make a stain, a blemish, a deformity in his life. In attributing them to him, consciousness does not affirm how they came to be; she only declares sin, guilt, disease, haunting him henceforth till remedy comes. The conviction of sin is the beginning of nature's process, sometimes of cure, always of development.

Does any one say, "I am not responsible for my wrong act, for my bad character; I must be like a tree, what nature and circumstances ordain"? We answer, Even a tree, if it could see, as you see, how evil comes, would instinctively avoid it; you are more than a tree; you have the endowment of consciousness; you have been made to see the pain and hurt of the evil life, the beauty and glory of the good life, and your consciousness having once comprehended this sight cannot let you alone. A mighty new circumstance has entered your life. In fact, no one whose consciousness is thus enlightened can be content to remain in evil. It is not that he originates a new life in himself, but God present in this awakened consciousness irresistibly starts the new life.

We must note the difference between the doctrine of material

necessity and spiritual or moral necessity. Science looks upon man from his physical side as an automaton, an ingenious mechanism of nerves and muscles played upon and through by the forces of physical nature. It is of no consequence that science calls him an automaton; for the moment that you add the fact of consciousness you introduce, besides the play of physical forces, the wholly different rule of thought and ideas. Law here, as before, holds absolute sway. There is no movement of feeling, or fabric of thought, or change of character, without its adequate cause; but the causes have ceased to be material merely. They become more spiritual according to the perfection of the man.

We ought by this time to have discovered the relation which utility bears to ethics. We have seen that ethics, to have any foundation as a science, must rest on unchanging, and therefore spiritual principles, and be directed by a faith in a permanent order of good; in short, that ethics must be religious in order to be moral. We must have always felt, however, the significant connection between morals and utility; for how could that be good which was not in some real sense also useful, that is, productive of happiness? If we could see as God sees, utility in its best and fullest sense would be the final test of morals.

Utility is also a practical guide of conduct. It is by utility discovered by experience that moral errors have been in every age corrected, that higher standards of conduct have been set up. There is a constant moral revelation that comes through the gathered experiences of utility.

Is utility, then, a satisfactory basis of morals? Is there not a disheartening sense of inadequacy in the ordinary statement of utilitarian philosophy? The fact is, human conduct is not guided merely by utility already experienced, but also by the expectation — in religious language, the faith — of utility to be. There are thus two factors in consciousness directing action: one is experience; the other is faith. Faith always outruns experience. You can see the processes of accumulation by which experience grows. It is conservative, timid, and receptive. It is, like habit, that by which men mostly live. The processes of the working of faith are more subtle. It comes in gleams and flashes, lighting the way in advance. It is progressive and fearless. It deals with surprises. Connected with experience, grafted on the body of experience, — experience only partially explains it. It is like the life force, always transcending the growth of the past, putting forth new

and untried developments, and mounting upwards by new gradations, — like the old, but more than the old.

It is not in regard to ethics alone that this distinction holds between the factor of experience and the progressive factor of faith. In every department of human progress there is the same difference. There is something more than experience which guides the march of science. From time to time there come gleams of anticipation, that is, faith, leading to new principles. Besides the men who plod, observe, and record the facts that have been, there come also scientific geniuses whose imagination transcends the facts of the past and predicts results heretofore unknown. Columbus did not sail for the new world on the unaided lead of experience, but his imagination, his faith, transcended his experience. So with all the great men by whose genius the world has advanced in art, discovery, science. While experience coasted along among the safe certainties, their faith voyaged out into unknown oceans. It was as though a power behind themselves drove and inspired them: as a power behind the plants makes them bud, as a power behind nature makes each higher thing to grow out of the lower. We touch here upon the mystery of life and growth, the mystery of consciousness, the mystery of thought, poetry, art, and fancy, — mysteries which no one ever has fathomed, mysteries which the fortuitous concurrence of atoms of matter does not reach, mysteries which in all times have forced on thinking man the idea of infinite mind or of God.

These two factors of experience and faith which everywhere else characterize human progress are only the more marked in the realm of morals and religion. The history of ethics has been a history of a blending of the two factors. There have been given two kinds of moral revelation, one of history and experience, the other the revelation of genius, or inspired men, as we have called them. Out of the dead level of habit and experience gleam anticipations of higher principles. Above the ordinary lives of men moral and spiritual geniuses rise, you know not how or why, inspired with faith in their visions of things to be. How could Isaiah know that it was eternally safe to be righteous? His certainty was more than experience of the utility of righteousness. On that point experience was just then extremely unsatisfactory. No, it was the kind of certainty which the painter has that it is eternally safe — despite all men's solicitations to pander to unworthy tastes — to trust the noblest conceptions of his art. We call this faith inspired, by which we mean that the spirit of

the universe is behind it. We do not call it infallible. Its certainty depends upon the purity and illumination of the mind which it possesses. One sees, then, two ideas of utility. One is narrow, namely, the utility which has already been tried. The other, more comprehensive, is the utility which, rising above actual experience, this inspired faith of genius assures will be in the end. It constitutes the second kind of moral revelation.

In this higher sense, utility transcends personal advantage. It has always been one of the difficulties with the ordinary utilitarianism that it has seemed to reduce all virtue to subtler forms of selfishness. It is true that average conduct admits of being reduced to the motives of personal advantage, as we have seen that average conduct may be accounted for by habit and experience; but there is a class of action which is always rising above the average, and is not so easily accounted for. It is without any doubt something more than the experience or even the hope of personal advantage which binds a scientific man, as Faraday, to the statement of the accurate truth, which forbids a great musician from inharmonious work, which compels Jesus to die rather than be made a king. In such class of acts the man is, as it were, in the grip of great, inspiring, compelling forces, which bear him along towards their great ends irresistibly. As Paul exclaimed, "Necessity is laid upon me; yea, woe is unto me, if I preach not the gospel." Not that it would not be misery to such a man to throw over his principles, but what urges the man is above personal happiness or the dread of personal pain. The individual is lifted out of his individualism; his personal gain or loss is merged in the conception of the universal good. There is something of this in the compelling power of a habit which often breaks and bends to itself the personal advantage. The personal advantage is not strong enough to overcome the inertia of, it may be, generations of habit. But this of which we speak is higher and more imperative than any habit. It is more like those strange appetites and instincts, sexual, migratory, and so on, through which, in beasts and birds, the life power speaks and compels the individual, sometimes, indeed, by the channel of pleasure, but also on occasion by the channel of pain, for the good of the race. So God seems to bend men towards the absolute law of the perfect ethical life. He bends them through the constant pressure of personal advantage, but He also bends them none the less by pressure even more imperative, through personal pain, where no man's experience shows him the issue, and

where even his faith, if it sees others' good, cannot see his own. It is as if all human lives were parts of a mighty orchestra. Happiness will prove in the end to lie in coming into accord. Experience indicates this, but experience nowhere is complete enough to prove it. Meanwhile, beyond experience, there is in every man's soul, more or less keen, according to its health, a compelling perception of harmony, drawing man towards his best good, vexing him even in the midst of all lower pleasures, when this harmony is lost. On all men is this pressure towards harmony. On most it is too feeble as yet to overcome the weight of their experience of low kinds of satisfaction and the counter pressure of present personal enjoyment; but in some God makes this instinct for harmony, what Jesus calls the "hunger and thirst after righteousness," so keen, intense, unappeasable, that, with pleasure or without pleasure, the man must needs follow its bidding. The stronger this kind of hunger, the more impersonal it becomes, as though it were not its own satisfaction which is wanted, but the universal harmony. It is as if a higher impersonal self, careless of personal praise or blame, held the helm of the life.

This craving or instinct pressing man's life into harmony with the laws of the world, that is, with the divine beneficence, is the philosophy of conscience. As there are natural instincts, cravings, pressures from the great life forces towards everything else; as these instincts and pressures are more than the accumulation of experience, being the forces which have made experience; as they always press upwards towards higher reaches of development; as they have no infallible immunity from mistakes of detail, but find constant guidance and direction, being taught through experience of failure as well as success, — so what we call conscience is the great spiritual craving which lies behind and produces all moral phenomena. So conscience, while constantly pressing upwards after the unseen and holier utilities of its visions, has no infallible guidance, but requires the lessons of experience and the trained, healthy judgment, and so far from being less real for its occasional failure of detail, only thereby rises into more steady and earnest movement towards the perfect life. Duty means to follow this upward pressure. Sin means to be conscious of this pressure and not to heed it.

We have suggested here the philosophy of the doctrine of the forgiveness of sin. There is no blame laid up for the past to the soul which here and now has brought itself into harmony with



the laws of his life. There is, or should be, no pain of conscience to the man who is now consciously right, that is, in his place. The only use of the sense of the pain or remorse for sin is in binding men over henceforth to keep the peace of the universe.

We see here the relation which the great body of human laws bears to conscience. They are the recorded experience of the race, the results of its experiments, successes, sometimes its mistakes, as it has grown from its moral infancy. The laws differ in value and imperativeness from one nation or age to another, according to varying degrees of enlightenment and moral insight. Conscience was always behind them, expressing itself in them and enforcing them, or again rising from an imperfect to a more perfect expression of its universal pressure towards ideal righteousness. She was always urging and inspiring her chosen geniuses with clearer sight. The judgment and reason were always correcting or giving higher significance to the old laws. Through conscience, through experience, through reason, the divinity behind all was always shaping the course of the race. This is the philosophy of history.

We are ready now to gather the separate strands of our argument. We have granted that man is no exception to the grand rule of the universe by which all things are bound. We have been unable to grant man the least freedom to originate motion, thought, or will. On the contrary, in a more literal sense than is usually imagined, God moves men's lives,<sup>1</sup> not sporadically and intermittently, but always. Every prayer is his motion, and the choice or act which follow prayer, likewise. Every passion, appetite, aspiration, has its significance in his motion flowing through us; every act through which the appetite or the aspiration is gratified flows from his force. At our best, being in conscious unison with the Eternal Will, we can almost feel ourselves moved and urged. In our ordinary state, we are still moved by that accumulation of little motions which we call the force of habit. At our worst, and when we do wrong, we still move in accordance with God's laws of motion, sometimes for want of flow of the higher power to turn us towards good, sometimes on the misdirected momentum of motion which started in good. On the one hand, it is all of necessity.

It is not, however, necessity of matter or brute unintellectual forces, but much more a necessity, also, of thought, emotion, and spirit. It was here that we discovered the secret of the reality

<sup>1</sup> "In whom we live and *move* and have our being."

underneath what men have called human freedom. Forasmuch as man has consciousness, he is able to recognize and weigh the influences, motions, and forces which are playing through him; to see their differences and their results; to be moved by all the considerations of better and worse, of good and evil, of present and permanent, temporal and eternal, relative and absolute. His consciousness raises him into the range of the play of all these higher motives. He is capable through enlightenment of his consciousness to be satisfied in the good, in the permanent, the eternal, the absolute. A bias is established in him towards these things which he recognizes as best. His perfect freedom is when he only wishes the best, that is, when through clearness of sight the motives which sway him towards the best have no rival motives, and he therefore does good without inward conflict, resistance, or friction. This marvel of consciousness recognizing differences, motives, passions, desires, inspired in itself, akin to the good, satisfied only with the good, — this is the divine thing which men have called freedom. It is freedom to know, freedom to enter into the divine thought, to be at rest in the divine will, the capacity to love, — the motion of the soul in love being the highest freedom. It is not freedom to originate anything. It is freedom which is given and is dependent. It is a freedom which is imposed upon it by its nature. There is no harm in using the word, if one sees in what sense it has significance, not as freedom of the will, but the sublime gift of consciousness or the free spirit, to which the thoughts and movements of God are open, unfolded, and made acceptable as though they were our own.

We also agreed that utility, in the high sense of that which is ultimately beneficent, is at the root of the ethical life and will prove to be at last the final test of right. Man's experience does not constitute utility, but only discovers it and approximates towards it. Behind experience is the pressure of God, like a life force, working out experience and impelling men in sublime faith to untried paths. While we were obliged to deny that conscience was a voice of God in the soul infallibly determining right and wrong, we found the essence of the meaning of this old doctrine of conscience in the fact of this constant pressure of God on men's souls, like the atmosphere, more or less felt, more or less intelligently directed, but always approximating towards the perfect life. We found that in men's noblest actions there is no petty weighing of personal motives, of individual happiness, but a com-

elling inspiration of God which, with its broad visions of good, universal, and absolute, drowns out the individual selfishness.

The chief objection which this philosophy of ethics would seem to incur is that it makes God responsible for sin. In fact, any philosophy does this which claims that the world is a part of a universe. It requires some species of dualism, which to modern thought is abhorrent and false philosophically, to relieve the Creator of the light from the responsibility of the shadows which the light casts. We therefore reverently suspect that what we call sin, as well as disease, pain, ignorance, must be a necessary condition of finite growth. There cannot be a better unless there is also a worse; or virtues, that is, progress towards a moral harmony, unless there are also sins, that is, discords or noises out of which harmony is to be evolved. Neither is the sin, the discord, the ignorance, the disease, the pain, less real or dreadful to us, who, from our finite and relative point of view, have to feel its distress, because from God's sight it proves to be the necessary means to beneficent ends. It is less difficult morally to conceive of God as using what we call evil as the needful discipline towards good, than it is to think of evil as absolute, and yet God as powerless to overcome it. No, it is only the good which is absolute.

It happens that we actually proceed on the principles of the philosophy of ethics which we have been considering. We want a moral race of children, for instance. We enlighten their consciousness by education. We make them see the difference between good and evil. We show them the beauty of the great moral ideals and examples. We rely on the constant natural pressure of their conscience to sway them towards right. The conditions of our treatment are indeed more subtle than when we construct in material elements, but they are none the less certain. Are you not afraid, some one asks, that the man will excuse himself in sin? No more than we are afraid that the same man will excuse himself in putting his hand in the fire. For against evil of every kind, moral no less than material, God has made barriers and pains to threaten, to warn, and to rouse men's consciousness to escape. A burn only hurts for a day, and needs no free will, but only the feeblest ray of consciousness, to avoid it.

Finally, our philosophy is seen to have what a merely materialistic philosophy of conduct omits, namely, the divine or eternal sanction which in every age has proved the mightiest practical

motive power towards righteousness. We hold that we ought to do right because it is good, but when we say good, we mean not good for us or good now, but good eternally, good for all, good for us only as a part of all. Can there be any more powerful, far-reaching, threatening, or inspiring sanction than that? In fact, we really come to the same point with those who say that we ought to do right "because it is right." What do they mean? They do not mean, as the expression is sometimes unintelligently emphasized, right because it *is* right, a child's reason, a mere identical expression; but they mean right because it is *right*, that is, the straightest way, the eternal way to good; that way, therefore, which an enlightened consciousness does not dare to refuse; which is precisely another term for what we have said, that we ought to do right because the right in the widest sense is beneficent; and this, again, is the same with doing right because God commands, for, as we have seen, what is beneficent God does command, press, urge men towards, not out of willfulness, but out of infinite love. We call this sanction of the absolute and eternal the master motive in conduct, not because ordinary average conduct more than half consciously feels it, but because in those moral crises in which, if ever, the individual or the race makes its advances, when on the mere ground of personal advantage the soul has not momentum to resist the gravitation of evil, — in such crises, out of the contending forces and passions present to consciousness, or over against the apathy of personal indifference, there rises this divine, inspired faith in the eternal, in every generation, the mightiest motive power towards patience, resistance, heroism, moral victory.

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BOSTON (JAMAICA PLAIN), MASS.

## EDITORIAL.

FROM PROGRESS TO COMPREHENSIVENESS: THE ANDOVER  
REVIEW FOR 1890.

WHEN the ANDOVER REVIEW was established in 1884, the immediate and urgent demand of the religious life of New England and of many parts of the country was for theological progress. It was quite as much a spiritual as it was an intellectual demand. Theology had lost to a very appreciable degree its vitalizing and quickening power. The theological advance of the previous generation along the lines of moral freedom and universal atonement, which formulated itself in the "new school" theology of the Congregational and Presbyterian Churches, and which found practical expression in so many religious awakenings within those bodies, had nearly spent its force. The remaining sign of its power was a certain metaphysical acuteness with very decided rationalistic tendencies, rather than philosophical breadth or spiritual enlargement.

It was evident that this school of theological thought was insufficient, in two important particulars, to meet the new demands upon the church. First, its method was metaphysical: the method demanded was the critical. The problems which were beginning to press upon the church could not be reasoned out, they must be investigated. The proof called for was the proof of fact. The doctrine of the Scriptures which was now coming to the front was not to be determined by *a priori* reasoning, but by the candid examination of the sources of the Scriptural record. Biblical and historical criticism was the only science which could recover and reestablish the outward authority of the Scriptures. And the same critical or scientific method was needed to rescue natural theology from the danger which threatened it. As has since been shown, the conclusions of natural theology were not to be substantially changed, but these conclusions needed new supports. The arguments which evolution had destroyed were to be replaced by arguments which evolution furnished.

And, secondly, its conception of life was altogether individualistic: the conception demanded was one which should give to the individual his natural and necessary relations to society and the race. The individualistic conception was not to be abandoned. It never can be. But whenever it is exaggerated and intensified, as it had then come to be, it loses its appropriate power and becomes thin, sharp, and artificial, with the inevitable result of alienating society from the church. But the time had come at the date referred to — it had come before, though it had not been clearly recognized — when society needed to be permeated in all its parts and through all its life by the church, not simply to be wrought upon by the church according to its individualistic methods. And the time had come in missionary operations, brought about as we acknowledge in large degree by these same methods, when the question of the

salvation of individuals among the heathen was beginning to widen into the promise of the regeneration of nations and of races.

It was perhaps unavoidable that theological progress in New England should begin in controversy. Unfortunately that had been its history from the beginning, and the theological controversies of the past as of the present had been embittered and confused by personalities. But the controversy which ushered in the last theological advance accomplished one unexpected but on the whole necessary end. It exposed, as nothing else could have exposed, the serious and culpable neglect of the church in respect to the dogmas which were being called in question. Nothing, for example, has been more humiliating than the confusion and emptiness of the church, as it has been revealed by recent discussions, before the vital and human problems involved in Eschatology. The sad spectacle has been presented of the church, so far as represented by traditional belief, obliged to take refuge in dogmatism or agnosticism. Certainly the advance came none too quickly, even though it came at the price of controversy, which made it necessary for the church to set itself in good earnest about the development of a doctrine of the future which should be at once positive and tenable, which should have in it the scope, the seriousness, and the humanity of the gospel of its Lord, Redeemer, and Judge.

We have naturally instanced this particular illustration of the theological ferment which was then making itself manifest. But the signs were abundant. Demands began to be heard from various quarters calling for modification or advance. And the demands were none the less serious and imperative because they were not couched in revolutionary terms. What was asked for was progress, enlargement, reconstruction, and readjustment. Even revision soon came to have a meaning sufficient to waken the fears or hopes of those who employed it. And though the moving causes were various and differing, yet the end aimed at was the same, — a more natural, a more real, a more vital faith. Evolution demanded a theory of the universe less mechanical and arbitrary, which should courageously acknowledge and classify, if it did not altogether interpret, the phenomena of nature. Criticism demanded a doctrine of the Bible which should be true to the facts of its origin and development, and which should recognize the agencies through which the Spirit of God wrought in the unfolding and communication of religious truth. And theology proper demanded a conception of God inspired and controlled by the revelation of himself in the person of Jesus Christ, and in harmony with the workings of his spirit and providence in history. Naturally, the stress of these demands was felt most in the churches whose spiritual life was centred in the Confessions or in private creeds, like the Presbyterian and Congregational or Independent (including the Baptist) Churches of Great Britain and America. In all these the



movement has been earnest and at times strenuous. But also in the churches whose spiritual life is more directly associated with ritual or organization, like the Episcopal and Methodist Churches, the same spirit has been at work, though from the nature of the case without reaching formulated results in doctrine. The Episcopal Church openly recognizes the rights of theological opinion. The Methodist Church wisely overlooks or ignores the assertion of individual freedom. In fact, look where one will, advances have been made, or movements have been inaugurated involving theological progress, which few would have dared to prophesy, and which many would have declared impossible, ten years ago.

Meanwhile a movement has been going on, quite as marked as the theological advance of the past years, and which has in many ways exerted a strong influence upon it, namely, the movement toward comprehensiveness. The singular fact appears — it has arrested the attention of the secular journals — that the theological discussions of the present, even when they have passed into controversies and contentions, have in no case resulted in schism. They have not divided a single denomination. They have not produced a new sect. The attempt has been made, in some instances, to provoke schism, to force progressive minorities into open revolt or withdrawal, but in no instance has the attempt succeeded. The tendencies toward unity have proved far stronger than the efforts for schism. The Congregational Church of this country has given a twofold example of this fact: first, in the action of its Creed Commission, which eliminated all divisive dogmas, and more recently in the action of the American Board, which placed itself upon the platform of a tolerant comprehensiveness.

There are various religious manifestations which may be regarded either as causes or as signs of the movement toward a comprehensive unity. We will simply enumerate them. One is the remarkable phenomenon, to which we have referred, of theological progress going on in and through all branches of the Protestant Church, rather than organizing itself into a new sect. A new bond of intellectual and spiritual fellowship has thus been created without breaking the ecclesiastical bond which already existed. Another is the increasing desire for the enlargement and enrichment of worship, a desire which is bringing the liturgical and non-liturgical churches into closer sympathy. Another is the enlarging opportunity for coöperation, which in the cities is becoming almost an imperative necessity. And another still is the spirit of concession in favor of ecclesiastical unity, of which the advances of the Lambeth Conference and the response of several ecclesiastical bodies is the most conspicuous and the most assuring example. All these manifestations, whether we regard them as causes or signs, point toward a growing unity, of the type of which we have been speaking, the unity of compre-

hensiveness. This is not the highest type. No one would make such a claim in its behalf. But it is a type which allows and encourages the higher developments. In its lowest form it insures toleration, and it easily and naturally rises into the power of practical coöperation, and into the warmth and glow of spiritual fellowship.

The retrospect which we have taken may serve to bring before our readers the aim of the Editors of the *REVIEW* for the coming year. Theological progress is assured. The movement has passed beyond recall, and beyond question. Nothing remains to any who have opposed it, and who continue to oppose it, except to call it names, and declare that it is not progress at all. The time has come, in our judgment, to seek to give the utmost steadiness, breadth, and spiritual power to the movement. We are not impatient of systematized results. Very much remains to be investigated and discussed by the methods of a reverent and patient Christian scholarship, and to be tested in the experience and work of the church. Many comparisons are yet to be made among those who have been at work in different fields of investigation or along different lines of speculative inquiry. But no one who has been observant can fail to note the growing consensus of opinion as well as purpose on the part of those who have committed themselves to theological progress. It will be our object during the coming year to reflect upon the pages of the *REVIEW* this advanced stage in inquiry and discussion; to show how theological progress is beginning to express itself in theological unity. It is, therefore, with especial gratification that we announce, through our prospectus,<sup>1</sup> the coöperation of so many scholars and thinkers in the various denominations whose names have become representative of progress in theology. Our work in Biblical interpretation and historical criticism will be peculiarly enriched by their contributions. And this aid will be of great value to our readers in the careful criticism of the best books, as the *REVIEW* is now to be enlarged in each third number for the more complete notice of current theological literature.

We desire no less to recognize that unity of moral purpose and of Christian service which is wider than any possible theological unity. The names of previous contributors to the *REVIEW* in these wider relations, and of those who are announced for the coming year, are, we trust, a sufficient guarantee of the catholicity of the *REVIEW* in its treatment of the greater questions of the church and the school, of literature, and of society. We are not blind to the fact that progress is going on elsewhere than in theology. Indeed, we are not sure that greater advance has not been made in the science of sociology, — the science, as a recent writer has termed it, of the second commandment, as theology is that of the first commandment. We desire to acknowledge and record progress

<sup>1</sup> For prospectus, see Publishers' notice in advertising columns.

in method and in result in all departments that are germane to the purpose of a theological and religious review.

And in our endeavor to make the REVIEW more representative of the general interests with which it is identified, we do not hesitate to ask our readers, and all who belong to its natural constituency, to aid us in the enlargement of its influence, through the improvement of its pages, and through the increase of its circulation. The extent and variety of its circulation have been most gratifying from the beginning. We ask our friends to second us in our personal efforts to increase its efficiency and to extend its influence.

#### THE MODERN PULPIT: LIMITATION OR EMANCIPATION?

FROM time to time statements are published concerning the reduced influence of the pulpit of to-day as compared with its influence in former periods. The latest generalization to that effect is an article in the November "Forum," entitled "Modern Claims upon the Pulpit," by Canon Farrar, who says at the end of his observations:—

"To conclude, then, and sum up, I maintain that the modern preacher must never forget that though sermons yet retain an immense force in the moral, the spiritual, and even the intellectual world, they can no longer occupy the place which once they did. There was a time when to most hearers the sermon was the Bible, the history, the romance, the newspaper, and the political harangue, all in one. It occupies a different position in these days. The schoolmaster is abroad, and of writing many books there is no end. Not only is the Bible in every hand, but the best information respecting its meaning and history has been so widely popularized that even a hearer of moderate attainments may know as much about it as the preacher. Science has been revolutionized, opinions altered, doctrines reconsidered and set in new lights, Scripture retranslated, and multitudes of texts rescued into their true significance. Let the modern preacher adapt himself to these changed conditions."

The burden of his contention is that, as people know more than at previous times, the mistakes of a preacher are more likely now than before to be found out, and that therefore in respect to science, Biblical criticism, and things in general, he should venture no statements of fact unless he knows what he is talking about. The implication is very broad that, in view of the constant demands upon the time of a parish clergyman, he can hardly expect to know as much on science, history, and politics as many of his hearers know, and therefore should confine himself to setting his face as a flint "against greed and oppression, against falsehood and uncleanness, against robbery and wrong," and to "maintaining with modest conviction the central truths of the Christian faith." Especially should he refrain from invading the domain of science, as he will in all probability merely add one to the long list of those who have damaged religion by antagonizing science.

The New York "Nation," under the title "Remarkable Admissions

by a Preacher," devotes an editorial to Canon Farrar's article, calling it "one of the most remarkable contributions yet made to the discussion of the relations between religion and science," and predicting that when the article reaches England the Canon will "have to listen to some pretty severe strictures from his brethren on the way in which he has taken upon himself to cut down the authority of the pulpit in nearly all the graver concerns of life." But the statements of Canon Farrar concerning the intelligence of congregations, concerning the harm that has been done by opposition to science on the part of ill-informed clergymen, and concerning the loss of ministerial authority have been made by others a thousand times over, till they have become the commonplace of homiletical magazines and religious newspapers. If the Canon had never startled his brethren more than he is likely to do in this article, no breath of criticism would ever have been directed against him.

But although such assertions are frequently made, the inquiry is well worthy of consideration whether, in comparison with other periods, the pulpit of to-day really is more limited in range of topics and method of treatment. The "Nation" pertinently asks in conclusion how the pulpit is to maintain its influence and authority, at the same time giving its own opinion that "there will always be great preachers, but they must hereafter bear a smaller and smaller proportion to the mass." We maintain that the transformation of preaching from past conditions is not a limitation, but rather an emancipation from a narrow range of topics and a superficial method of treatment.

In passing, however, we would remark that the "Nation" misunderstands Canon Farrar on one important point when it says that he inexorably warns preachers away from Biblical criticism as forbidden territory. He warns them only against making attacks on Biblical criticism without having gained knowledge of its results and methods, but at the same time emphasizes the necessity of correct knowledge of Scripture so that preachers shall not appeal to it in an "uncritical, unhistoric, and indiscriminate way," and remarks that "they who listen Sunday after Sunday, in the hope of gaining some instruction in things divine, have a right to expect that their teachers shall take some pains to ascertain the real sense and right rendering of the passages from which their texts are taken." England doubtless would be startled if Canon Farrar should advise preachers to have nothing to do with Biblical criticism.

We proceed to the main question of the alleged limitation of the modern pulpit.

We are somewhat at a loss to know what period is brought into comparison with the present to show the waning power of the pulpit, but we suppose it is the period just preceding the last half century, inasmuch as the vast gains of knowledge referred to have been chiefly made during the last fifty years. Perhaps the entire colonial period in this country is in view, and in England the time since the Protestant Reformation began,

followed by the Puritan era and the religious dryness of the eighteenth century. For the sake of definiteness and convenience, we will endeavor to keep in thought the first two centuries of American history till about 1830, as representing the former period when the pulpit is said to have had more influence and a wider range of topics than at present.

It is at once admitted that at almost any time during that long period the clerical office, as an office, was taken more seriously than at present. Every clergyman was treated with deference. He was held up above criticism and ridicule. He was usually an autocrat in the affairs of the church. His learning exceeded that of the great majority of his congregation. He was led thus to cultivate a dignified or a pompous manner. He seldom laughed heartily, and took his mild diversions somewhat under protest or on the sly. When he approached a house it was a signal for the children to hide and for their elders to put on a double layer of soberness. Certainly this kind of regard for the ministerial office no longer exists. The minister's authority, however, was not wholly derived from the excellence of his preaching, but from regard for all his functions as a clergyman. His preaching may have been, often was, wordy, stilted, wearisome, and destitute of moral impression. That conception of his office which removed him from common life and set him apart must have tended to reduce the power of his preaching. And, at all events, authority which elicits deference is not identical with influence. If we may judge from the state of things in this country towards the close of the eighteenth century, when infidelity was widespread and few were joining the churches, we might conclude that the real influence of preachers was in no sort of proportion to the apparent regard for their office.

The rapid advance of knowledge in some directions during recent years is a very singular reason to assign for a limitation of the range and interest of preaching. It might be expected to produce quite the opposite effect. It does, indeed, make trouble for ignorant ministers, but we believe enlarges the opportunity of intelligent preachers. One is most conscious of limitation in addressing immature minds, such as a company of savages, a congregation of Southern negroes, a crowd drawn in by a city mission, or an audience of children. Unusual powers are requisite that the interest and profit of such hearers may be secured, just because the ground held in common by speaker and hearer is so narrow. But there are numberless points of contact with those who know as much as the preacher knows, and who are intelligent concerning the moral and social problems which confront him. The reminder that hearers are now so well informed seems intended as an intimation that it is a waste of time for a preacher to teach what they already know, and that he should deal only with subjects of which they are ignorant and he is not. And yet ignorance is the most difficult condition to address. It is intellectual deafness. A cultivated preacher must be of a very noble

spirit to do his work among those who are scarcely beyond the alphabet and multiplication table. Intelligence gives mental fellowship. Reading and knowledge make minds alert for new suggestions. But we have been granting too much in respect to the diminution of intellectual difference between preacher and hearer. Throughout nearly all of the earlier period the staple of preaching was the Biblical exposition and illustration of Christian doctrine. In every congregation were many minds saturated with the teachings of Scripture and familiar with the exact phraseology of its most important parts. The minister's chief advantage was his acquaintance with the Hebrew and Greek originals. The children may have slept, but their elders were awake. A misquotation of Scripture or a misstatement of doctrine was sure to be detected. Indeed, the whole community was better instructed than now in the Bible, and the average knowledge of Christianity according to the current understanding of it was higher than at present. The minister then need not be very learned outside his Bible, but must be learned in it, whereas now he is more likely to be overtaken in a fault by his hearers in respect to his secular than in respect to his religious learning.

And we take issue decidedly with the statement that the range of the preacher's topics is reduced. Formerly sermons were limited to personal religious life and the corresponding doctrines, except in times of public danger, when patriotism both in the earlier and the later period has been aroused by the voice of the preacher. But now the demands of society, the rivalries of classes, moral reforms, the missionary movements of the church, and other phases of the kingdom of God on earth as a new social order have extended the range within which Christianity seeks its application. It is enough evidence of this broadening of scope to compare the isolated village and farm life of the last century, having infrequent communication with the world and a rather languid interest in it, destitute of missionary zeal, and having no social problem, with the life of to-day in great cities which are in close communication with outlying communities, a life diversified in its relations, and reaching out all over the world in its interests and responsibilities.

But the change which has come about in preaching is not measured by the more or less of knowledge, by the degree of outward deference paid to the clergyman, nor by the restriction or expansion of topics germane to the pulpit. The real change is an emancipation which has been produced by a radical change of method. It is a change from outward to inward contemplation of truth, from external evidence to spiritual insight, from the defense of truth to that unfolding of truth which is always its best defense. It was formerly the principal function of the pulpit to explain and defend the doctrines of Christianity as doctrines, by adducing arguments and meeting objections. This method involved much quotation of Scripture, some metaphysics, and a little logic. It was the method of external evidence. There was also discussion of religious experience cor-



responding with objective doctrine, and this involved some attempts to gain a psychology extending from man's moral ability to his assurance of faith. The real strength of the pulpit at that time was in its portrayal of the moral attributes of God by which feelings of solemnity and even sentiments of grandeur were awakened, and in its emphasis on the moral law of God which aroused conscience. But in general the gospel was a doctrine rather than a life, a revelation rather than an inspiration. When the more eminent ministers published sermons they were for the most part bodies of divinity, that is, discourses on systematic theology with appended "improvements." Like the theology of the time, the preaching (and preaching is usually in tune with contemporaneous theology) was a defense of Christian truth from the outside. It used the Bible as an arsenal of proof texts, it attacked the errors of Unitarianism, Universalism, Arminianism, Pelagianism, etc., and came inevitably to the aridity of the closing years of the last century. That type of preaching is virtually extinct. The method has changed so that religious truth is now developed from within outwards. A principle is recognized and unfolded, an ideal is reproduced, a precept is illuminated, an incident is translated into its meaning, and these are traced out along the lines of their working power in personal life and in society. Not all preachers are of this sort, as not all formerly were shut up to the mechanical method, but, broadly speaking, the modern type is in this contrast with the earlier type. Christianity is now disclosed in its intrinsic character as truth for life. It reaches not only conscience but also aspiration, sympathy, and living faith, and fills out its relation to society according to the various needs of humanity. The comprehensiveness of Christianity and the breadth of human life have been opening simultaneously to the preacher and to the church. As life broadens, the truth which can match it broadens. Whereas formerly public and social affairs were outside interests, the detached topics of Fast Day or Thanksgiving, now they are included in the restored idea of the kingdom of God, and constantly associated with its underlying principles.

It follows that fresh knowledge held in common by preacher and congregation is not thereby rendered unavailable lest he should only tell them what they know already, but is the most available material for illustration and enforcement of religious truth. Even physical science furnishes many an analogy between the natural and the spiritual world, and from every realm of knowledge some contribution may be made to the reality of the highest truth. The principal function of the pulpit has never been the dissemination of knowledge. It has never, except incidentally, been employed in conveying new information. Then, indeed, with the spread of knowledge its range would be contracted. Its aim is to verify knowledge by reducing facts to order under the principles of religious truth, to employ knowledge as the expositor of religion, to find over against that evolution which multiplies the relations of life the

truth which shall guide it, and to impart to those who are mentally alert the motive which shall utilize their knowledge and gifts in the service of mankind.

The pulpit thus is enlarged in range and emancipated from bondage. It no longer expends its force in defending a system of doctrines against objection, and in showing that they may reasonably be believed. But it takes the living truth and makes it real to life, thus most cogently defending it. It restores the history of the human Jesus in its actual detail, so that it has gospel as well as epistle. The type of preaching to-day, to which, of course, there are many exceptions, as at any former time to the prevalent type, is the interpretation and application of spiritual Christianity by the aid of all the light which God's ways in nature and history afford. In comparison with almost any period of the past there is greater comprehensiveness and a real deliverance from yokes of bondage.

It may be said, however, and it is often implied, that while the range of topics suitable to the pulpit is widened, yet the same subjects are so thoroughly treated elsewhere that there is little interest in what the preacher has to say about them. We have a true respect for the intelligence of our fellow-citizens, but, at the same time, believe that the reading of the vast majority of those who attend church will not exhaust their interest in the preacher's views. The religious newspaper is for news of organizations and churches, with occasional discussion on social and moral questions so brief that the reader's appetite is only sharpened for more. The magazines are filled with stories and sketches, interspersed with articles on the public aspects or the controverted forms of a few religious movements. Such articles are not as widely read as others of a more popular character. Books pertaining to subjects which are suitable to the pulpit are read scarcely at all except by specialists. Besides, as we have already said, the more people read and become interested, the more strongly disposed they are to get a religious interpretation of what they read and talk about. The preacher has a decided advantage when he can assume a knowledge equal with his own on subjects which have a relation to Christianity, and of which they and he are seeking the controlling use or principle.

Canon Farrar, in the passage we have quoted, remarks that "there was a time when to most hearers the sermon was the Bible, the history, the romance, the newspaper, and the political harangue, all in one." We are curious to know when that time was. We should like to see a sample of one of those remarkably comprehensive and exciting discourses. Perhaps the Canon means that while we now have sermon, Bible, history, romance, newspaper, and political harangue, there was a time when people had only sermon and Bible, and that these filled the place now filled also by history, romance, newspaper, and political harangue. The remark may, however, suggest the thought that these additional sources of inter-

est have a tendency to take just so much away from interest in church and preaching. The apprehension is groundless. Only irreligious interests can draw men away from Christianity. The social and political movements of the world, past and present, for which history, romance, newspaper, and political harangue stand, are related to religion, and require its interpretation. And besides, it is a law of the mind that the multiplication of intellectual interests does not leave less energy for each, but makes the mind more active in all it touches, while a limitation which approaches narrowness creates stagnation through monotony.

Canon Farrar opened his article by alluding to the dullness of modern sermons, as if it were a new complaint. "It has become," he says, "a fashion of society to speak of the weariness and emptiness of preaching. To listen to a sermon is jestingly recommended as the surest soporific." If any jest is ancient and endowed with perpetual motion more than another, it is this. It is a jest which will doubtless have its occasion till the millennial dawn. It probably has more vitality in England than in America, for the average preaching of the Church of England is but little, if any, more wakeful than it was when Sydney Smith characterized the discourses of the preachers of that church as nothing but Bible and water. But there are preachers and preachers, and, in comparison of types, the present with the former, there cannot be a doubt that the later type has more scope, more intelligence, and more power. What Canon Farrar himself says about sermons formerly preached on atonement and retribution and the change which has occurred refutes his argument concerning the diminishing power of preaching.

In a word, then, we maintain that the pulpit, in its own sphere, has ample room. While it does not profess to make its province all knowledge, while it does not discuss farming, electrical engineering, deep-sea dredging, or Darwinism (all of which, however, furnish illustration), it does occupy the field of religion as truth and as life. And in respect to its great theme, it is now in part emancipated from former limitations, and is gaining, with all progress, new and more commanding points of view from which to find the correspondences of Christian truth with human life.

#### PUBLIC READING OF THE SCRIPTURES.

A PARAGRAPH in a recent number of the "Old Testament Student" recommends the custom of making more or less extended comments while reading a passage of Scripture in the public worship of the church. In our opinion, however, such comment should be the exception rather than the custom. It is admitted in the paragraph that peculiar gifts of mind are necessary to achieve the highest success in scattered or running comment. But peculiar gifts are needed to achieve any success whatever in such a practice. The rule should be to make no remarks, either explan-

atory, instructive, or hortatory, when a passage of the Bible is being read in immediate connection with public worship. There are proper times for exposition of Scripture. Expository may profitably supplement textual and topical preaching. An extended section of the Bible may be made the subject of instruction and persuasion at that part of the services when attention is definitely called to such objects. The second service of the Lord's day, the midweek meeting of the church, the meetings of teachers, and the sessions of the Sunday-school are also suitable occasions for explanatory and practical comments on portions of Scripture. But the place which readings from the Bible have in the midst of public worship and as part of it is not appropriate to comment. The thoughts of the congregation are disposed for worship. There has already been prayer and praise. The reading is to be followed by the prayer of thanksgiving, confession, and adoration. Scripture at that time is read as an adjunct of worship, and is listened to as the authoritative word of God, speaking out of its own dignity and divineness to the humble worshiper. If reverently and intelligently read, it may be trusted to make its own impression without the aid of interjected remarks. The remarks may be correct as explanation, and proper enough as application, but the transition into comment and back to the word of God is unnatural. The contrast is painful. A listener's mind is jolted along, bumping every moment against the obstacle of a needless if not an irrelevant remark. The verse read is of stately diction, the observation is colloquial; the truth announced is profound, the explanation is superficial; the sentence heard has that inimitable quality which is called Scriptural, the comment is destitute of any fine quality but is only a bald comment. It is as if one personating a character of Shakespeare's, attempting to render in his own words and very spirit the thought of the dramatist, should halt now and then to explain that there are various readings of a certain line, that allusion is made to an obsolete custom, that a popular proverb is quoted, or that in the locality described other important events had occurred several centuries before, and then resume the tone and manner from which he had broken off. In a lecture on Othello such explanations would be entirely appropriate, but not in a personation. Reading in public worship should be not so much as a personation, but no less than a reproduction, of the truth in its original, simple, natural impression, without impeding the progress or reducing the elevation of the truth. A closer comparison to scattered comments is the practice of one who, when he is reading a fine poem aloud, with cadence, rhythm, tone, expression in keeping, stops now and then at the end or in the middle of a line to read a foot-note, and then tries to resume where and as he left off. It may be doubted if there are five clergymen alive who can so weave in phraseology, suggestion, and tone with the diction and thought of Scripture that there shall be no loss of spiritual impressiveness. It is much better to ponder the selected pas-

sage in advance, to catch the lights and shades of its meaning, to recognize the delicate suggestiveness of its every phrase, and then to read it with just emphasis and with faithful correctness of expression, to let it say what it really does say of itself, than to depend on bringing in something from outside as if to complete what seems insufficient. For our own part, we go so far in the direction of a reverent reading of the Word that we object to that manner which, although no comment is made, converts the reading into an address to the audience. We do not like to see the eye frequently raised from the page and turned on the congregation, but rather to see attention earnestly fixed on the words, as if for the purpose of losing nothing, and of assuring the listeners that what they hear is identically that which is written. We agree with the Scotchman who said to a clergyman: "I enjoyed your reading of the Bible. You did not lift your eyes from the page, but read the word reverently and gentlemanly." Good taste as well as reverence dictate that in the public reading of Scripture heart and mind should be concentrated on the message from heaven, which should be rendered without interpolated remark and wandering glance. As a public reader does not explain by additions, but interprets by using his author's own expressions, so the reader of Scripture should not try to preach when he reads, but should reproduce with fidelity and reverence the exact thought of the Word of God.

#### PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS IN MASSACHUSETTS.

COMPLETE statistical reports of the number of scholars attending parochial schools in Massachusetts appear in the Boston "Daily Advertiser" of November 12. The reports come from school superintendents, supervisors, members of school boards, and others, and are believed to include all the parochial schools in the State, with the possible exception of a few opened recently. No section of the country affords a better illustration of the growth of the parochial system than Massachusetts, which has a larger proportion of Catholic population than any State in the Union, and which has that population distributed in many cities and manufacturing towns all over its territory.

In those places where Catholic schools have been established the actual numbers are as follows: Number of scholars in the public schools, 178,097; number of scholars in parochial schools, 39,301; whole number, 217,398. That is, about 18 per cent. of the scholars reported as in actual attendance are sent to parochial schools. Boston sends 55,599 to the public and 8,000 to the parochial schools, or 12.5 per cent.; Worcester, 12,000 to public, 1,935 to parochial schools, or 13.9 per cent.; Cambridge, 10,462 and 1,400, or 11.8 per cent.; Fall River, 8,605 and 3,000, or 25.8 per cent.; Lowell, 7,700 and 2,500, or 24.5 per cent.; Lynn, 7,723 and 600, or 7.2 per cent.; Springfield, 6,639 and 800, or

10.8 per cent. ; Somerville, 5,488 and 640, or 9.8 per cent. ; Lawrence, 5,300 and 1,670, or 24 per cent. ; Chelsea, 5,000 and 550, or 9.9 per cent. ; New Bedford, 4,643 and 1,818, or 28.2 per cent. ; Gloucester, 4,000 and 250, or 5.9 per cent. ; Holyoke, 3,387 and 3,220, or 48.8 per cent. ; Haverhill, 3,200 and 900, or 21.9 per cent. ; Salem, 3,600 and 1,268, or 26 per cent. ; Newburyport, 1,600 and 800, or 33 per cent. ; Chicopee, 2,200 and 1,000, or 31.3 per cent. In Southbridge only is the parochial in excess of the public school attendance, the numbers being 830 and 725 respectively. The town has a large French population, and 650 of the 830 parochial scholars are in the French parochial school. There are thirty-seven towns and cities in which parochial schools exist, and in six of these places the whole number of parochial scholars is only 1,313. Computing the entire school population between the ages of five and fifteen at 350,000 and the number in attendance at 320,000, there would remain in other towns and cities about 100,000 school children attending the public schools. The percentage of attendance in parochial schools in the entire State is, then, about 12.3 per cent. (39,301 to 320,000). It is really less than that, for the number of pupils over fifteen years of age is not included. It appears, then, that the extension of parochial schools has been considerable only at a few centres, and has not reached nine tenths of the towns of Massachusetts at all, and that in those centres there is accommodation for only a fraction of the children even of Catholic parents. In Boston, the children of Catholic parents number about 30,000, of whom only 8,000 can be accommodated in the parochial schools. Even in Holyoke, where there are only 1,638 Protestant children out of a total school population of 6,402, there is room in the parochial schools for only about 3,000, so that one half the pupils in the public schools are Catholics.

In nearly all cases where the Catholics build a school-house, the immediate effect is to relieve over-crowded public schools of the neighborhood. The relief is usually temporary only, as increase of population soon fills up every room. In a few instances, the number of teachers and the appropriation of money have been reduced. Fifty teachers in all have been displaced, twelve of them in Fall River and nine in Southbridge. In six places only has the appropriation been reduced, Newburyport, Malden, Woburn, Waltham, Canton, and Southbridge.

The rate of increase is not indicated by the statistics of the "Advertiser." In Boston, several school-houses have been built since the Baltimore decree of 1886, which urged more activity in religious education. In Worcester, since 1874, when a large school-house was built, the only increase is a French school opened in 1880, two small houses a little later, and in 1888 a school for boys, with 200 pupils. In Woburn, a school-house was built in 1884, but nothing has been done since. In New Bedford, no buildings have been erected since the first was built in 1884. In Fall River, some of the six school-houses have been opened recently.



The same is true of Holyoke. The rather rapid increase of Canadian-French population has led to the erection of new buildings within the last three or four years. On the whole, there has been no recent increase of parochial schools at all corresponding to the increase of public schools and of population.

The zeal of the Catholic clergy for church schools is general if not universal, but the laity are not sufficiently in sympathy with the priests to be at the expense of building and maintaining independent schools for their children. And there is little probability of more activity, if a few simple and sensible conditions are complied with by Protestants. One condition is, to keep up and to increase the efficiency of the public schools. Thus far there has been no question of the superiority of the public over the parochial schools. This is so well understood by Catholic parents that of their own accord they seldom remove their children from the public schools; and very often, after removal at the request of the priest, children are sent back again to the schools from which they had been withdrawn. Let there be intelligent direction of elementary education in respect to text-books, teachers, hours of study, school hours, manual, training, the usefulness of studies, and the subordination of method to result, and there is little doubt that the large majority of Catholic children will remain in the public schools.

There should be no discrimination against Catholic teachers who are as well trained and as competent as Protestant teachers. They have an advantage in teaching children of their own faith, and their participation in the work of instruction removes one objection from the mouths of the priests. An important part of the testimony which has been collected bears on this very matter. In Blackstone, where there is no parochial school, twelve of the twenty-five teachers are Catholics. Of Winchester, which is without a parochial school, the superintendent, Mr. Hunt, says: "We have four Catholic teachers in one school, and the pupils are all Catholics. The teachers are graduates of the Salem Normal School, and are among our very best qualified, and their work is not easily equaled anywhere by any teachers of the same grade. They all do not believe in parochial schools. Give Catholic teachers an equal chance with Protestant teachers; give them full credit for excellent work. I can show some of their work I have never seen equaled in Boston."

Above all, every effort should be made to avoid public discussion and agitation as against Catholics. In view of the facts, it must be seen that nearly all of the alarm which exists in many minds is groundless. Nothing is more likely to further the plans of the Catholic clergy than violent opposition and the appearance of religious persecution. Nothing else can consolidate American Catholics against public schools, or unite them to provide educational facilities for all their children. There are causes enough and more than enough to counteract the efforts of priests in

behalf of church schools. The excellence of public schools, the advantage of association with Protestants, the political equality of this country, and unwillingness to be taxed again for what is already provided are among the causes which work effectively against the establishment of a separate system of education. We repeat what we said a year ago on this subject: "The church does not control the people in all things, and is not the only interest of their lives. They live in modern times, in intelligent and enterprising communities, and in a republic. If these influences are allowed to produce their legitimate effects, public schools will continue to do an important work for the children of Catholic parents. Nothing can play more effectually into the hands of ecclesiastical leaders than courses which have a tendency to solidify the Catholic population. Attempts to array Protestants against Catholics, to attribute dark designs and underground methods to the clergy, to accuse the whole church of hostility to American institutions and ideas, are more likely to solidify Catholics in defense of their church than to alienate them from it." With this agrees the opinion of the reports made to the "Advertiser." "The Boston school supervisors and teachers, many of whom were interviewed in the preparation of this article, are of the opinion that the less agitation there is on this subject the better. They say that hundreds of parents and children prefer the common schools, and are only keeping their children in the church's private schools from religious motives. Their pockets would soon get the better of their religious pride if the latter were not kept alive by what they regard as religious persecution." S. C. Bancroft, secretary of the School Board of Peabody, says: "The parochial school question is not agitated in Peabody, and probably will not be for years to come, as there are no signs of any serious difference of opinions. I am of opinion that if it were left to Catholics to decide they would vote down parochial schools. Our population is half Catholic, but a spirit of mutual toleration is carefully cultivated. Neither side tries to get ahead of the other, but both sides try to be just." F. W. Sweet, superintendent of schools in Bridgewater and Walpole, where there are no Catholic schools, thinks that if Protestants stir up no controversies to keep up prejudice, the Catholic schools will not be in existence ten years hence. He says: "I give our Catholic brethren credit for a good degree of common sense, and as they become more enlightened by experience and comparison of results with the public schools, I think they will return of their own preference. Instead of wasting our breath criticising their action, let us use every means to improve the public school, and the parochial school will fall of its own weight." Superintendent Marble, of Worcester, says: "I am glad that no partisan or sectarian use will be made of the information you are collecting. It cannot fail to be useful; for it will show, I think, that the whole people believe in and will support the public schools, and that there is less cause for alarm than some people have imagined."

None of those reporting intimate that in their opinion parochial schools are desirable, although they afford temporary relief to overcrowded school-rooms and reduce taxes, but seem to be unanimous in the conviction that all Catholic children should attend the public schools.

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The recent Catholic Church Congress in Baltimore adopted resolutions of a general character concerning education, which support the policy already avowed by the decree of 1886, but indicate no purpose of seeking exemption from taxation in support of public schools, nor of securing appropriations for parochial schools. The resolutions are as follows:—

“We recognize, next in importance to religion itself, education as one of the chief factors in forming the character of the citizen and promoting the advance of a true civilization. Therefore we are committed to a bound popular education, which demands not only physical and intellectual, but also the moral and religious training of our youth.

“As in the state schools no provision is made for teaching religion, we must continue to support our own schools, colleges, and universities already established, and multiply and perfect others so that the benefit of a Christian education may be brought within the reach of every Catholic child within these United States.”

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## SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.

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### INDUSTRIAL EDUCATION.

As an indication that in our age the dignity and value of a purely intellectual life are overestimated, a German professor has recently calculated that there are more than twice as many students in the German Universities as can possibly hope to get a living in the pursuits for which they are preparing themselves. If true of Germany with its limited number of universities, what shall we say of the United States with its hundreds of such universities, so-called? Is our college education the most desirable education for fifty per cent. of our college graduates? How shall we make about that percentage of them good artisans and men of business rather than bad lawyers or physicians?

Again, it is strange that we, who are the most practical people in the world, give in our public schools an education that is far from practical. We give a purely intellectual training to the masses, although ninety per cent. of them must earn their bread in manual occupations. Can it be that an exclusively mental education is the best training for manual occupations? We must deny it, and for two reasons. First, because the eye and hand can only be trained during the period of growth. A high degree of mechanical dexterity can only be acquired early in life. Secondly, exclusively bookish training crams the mind with knowledge sufficient for criticism and unrest, but almost useless *in itself*. The result is a mechanical and mental incapacity for manual labor. The *laissez-faire* argument that only a minimum education should be given in the public schools does not apply here, for the question is as to what

is the minimum. Certainly the public schools should not *unfit* boys and girls for industrial and social life. We are then face to face with the most serious educational and sociological problem of our time. It is gratifying, therefore, to note the rapid progress of a popular movement in favor of industrial education, either separate from the public school system, such separation in the case of children's schools being usually regarded as temporary, or as a part of the school curriculum. It is pretty generally conceded that the teaching of special trades — as distinguished from general mechanical dexterity — cannot be demanded of the public schools. Such teaching applies to many of the boys who go to college, but ought not to go, and to most of those who have finished at the public schools or academies. Such as are to make business or scientific men find commercial and scientific schools at hand. But those who ought and desire to learn a trade have hitherto been unable to do so, primarily because the trade unions allow "a master mechanic to graduate one journeyman in each year, or one in two years, a number insufficient to fill the vacancies, much less to meet the ever-increasing demand for skilled labor in growing communities," — and because there were no trade schools. In this field, perhaps, the most interesting and typical institution is the "New York Trade Schools," whose ninth annual programme is at hand. Founded and supported by Colonel Auchmuty, it has outlived the hostility of the Unions, who now furnish skilled instructors to the school, the Merchant Tailors' Society providing free instruction in tailoring. Here 450 young men are given day or evening instruction in plumbing, carpentry, painting, metal work, etc., the charge for instruction — including tools — varying from ten to forty dollars, the latter figure only for one course. The year is about five months, one year constituting the course. The workshops are well equipped, and this year a dormitory has been built for the school. The institution is not yet self-supporting, nor is it intended to be money making. Two thousand young men have already received instruction in it, and were soon receiving skilled workmen's wages. The new Pratt Institute of Brooklyn does much the same kind of work for pupils a little younger — both boys and girls. It has over 1,300 enrolled upon its books. Other large cities have taken up the work in some form with surprising success, for example, the Fourteenth Ward Industrial School of the Children's Aid Society, of New York.

As applied to public schools the system is less pretentious, confined to teaching girls cooking and sewing, and boys the use of simple tools; this, too, as only a part of the curriculum — a pleasing diversion from books and recitation. In some of the grammar schools, for example, the Ninth Ward, New York, and the Cambridge schools, the results are thoroughly satisfactory, though it is too early to summarize them. The moral effect ought to be good, to judge by the words of a correspondent of the "New York Times" in reference to the New York Trade Schools: "Though valuable tools are scattered about, there has been (in eight years) only one instance of theft. Rude or profane language is never heard among them; and not even a scratch or pencil mark has been made on the walls since the schools were opened." Such ideas of workmanship are not learned easily from books.

In the same general field, though of a very much higher order, is the work of Mr. John Ward Stimson's "New York Institute for Artist Artisans," whose first annual report deserves to be widely circulated.

The title indicates the aim of the undertaking, — to make real artists of our artisans, in decorating, designing, drawing, carving, etc. It instructs bright workmen in the laws of beauty as applied in form and color. The tuition is fifty dollars per year, sometimes paid by firms like Tiffany, for their employees. Mr. Stimson, the organizer, is an enthusiastic and successful teacher, for many years connected with the Metropolitan Museum. His ambition is largely philanthropic, and entirely patriotic. Certainly such a school will do much for the beauty and refinement of American homes, to say nothing of the increased earning power of really educated artist artisans.

#### PROFIT SHARING.

The widespread unrest of the laboring classes, which finds expression in strikes, socialistic agitation, and utopian schemes, arises largely from a belief that the present distribution of the products of industry is an unjust one. While it is true that most of the evils complained of are incident to human nature, and beyond the reach of any revolution save a moral one, it must be admitted that the present distribution of the products of industry is often unwise, if it is not unjust. It would certainly appear unwise to treat laborers as mere hired instruments who had no material or moral interest in the quality and results of their work. This interest is awakened when they are allowed not merely wages, but a share in the profits. Profit sharing offers a modest and yet sensible solution of this difficult question, and has received the approval of the wisest political economists from Mill to Walker. Profit sharing is not coöperation, as many suppose. Coöperation endeavors to get rid of the manager. It is nothing but an association of workmen. As such it is, except in a restricted field, doomed to failure, simply because any business of importance must have a manager, and good managers must be rewarded. A man of executive talent is rare, and will not remain the mere clerk of an association of workmen when independent enterprises are competing for his services. Coöperation must then do without managers, or cease to be pure coöperation. Profit sharing recognizes these facts. It says to the manager: "Manage the business; take the reward of talent, but allow us a percentage of profit as an incentive to greater care, energy, faithfulness, and economy. In a word, give us what would otherwise be wasted." Both parties are now better off; the work is done with less friction and more economically, while the laborer becomes a partner in the business, with a partner's incentives. This is not charity or theory, but economic fact. Naturally, there is a limit to the share of the profits which labor can take. If it is too large, the manager finds the share remaining to him too small, — he can do better elsewhere. Or, if the business is a feeble one upon the no-profit line, the manager and business will disappear together if any demand is made upon the slender profits. The economic law seems to run as follows: If the profits divided among workmen exceed the amount saved under the incentives of profit sharing, the establishment, unless a monopoly, must go to the wall in competition with establishments which give out as profits to their employees only the amount saved under the system, or less. And this amount laborers can reasonably expect. If the amount is greater, the establishment will lose its market, and then its manager. On the other hand, it seems certain that a wise sharing of profits is in many industries a condition of the most economical and successful production. If this is so,

it is bound to become the accepted system. We have before us what we have hitherto lacked — a fairly complete history of this most interesting and growing economic movement.<sup>1</sup> It is an original work, much of the information having been collected by correspondence and personal investigation. While the philanthropy of the author is beyond question, he confines himself entirely to facts, and sets forth candidly all the facts whether they tell for or against profit sharing. He follows the various experiments through from their beginning, and this detailed history is exceedingly interesting and instructive. As seen in Mr. Gilman's pages, profit-sharing is by no means a cast-iron system. Its forms are about as various as the experiments, and in this very elasticity is its strength. Sometimes the employees' share of the profits goes into an insurance fund against age and sickness, accomplishing voluntarily what Bismarck's State Socialism strives to accomplish. In other cases, the bonus can be invested in the shares of the establishment, — a safe and admirable plan when the workmen's shares are given the preference in any bankrupt proceedings. They should certainly be out of the reach of scheming and speculating managers. Again, the workmen's profits go into building associations, or build and equip reading-rooms, libraries, apprentice schools, etc. Mr. Gilman's account of the earliest and most successful instance of profit sharing — the *Maison Leclaire*, house painters, of Paris — is most interesting. In this house the system has been in successful operation since 1842. The experiment was begun timidly and amid great difficulties by Leclaire — himself a workman. He grew rich and famous through it, and to-day the association of workmen of the house, the Mutual Aid Society, is half owner of the business, but not liable except to the extent of its capital. The society receives, in common with the individual partners, five per cent. upon its capital. After this has been paid, along with salaries, wages, and all other expenses, one fourth of the profits go to the individual partners, one fourth to the Mutual Aid Society, while the remaining one half is divided in cash among all workmen and employees of the house in proportion to their wages. This cash payment amounts to an annual addition of about twenty per cent. to their wages, though the wages themselves are as high as any in Paris. The executive body of workmen is the *noyau* or nucleus, a select body comprising about one sixth of their number. This body elects the individual partners, when a vacancy occurs by death or removal. In several cases the person so elected has been the chief employee of the house, who must, of course, purchase his one fourth interest in the business from his predecessor or his heirs. The Mutual Aid Society provides for sickness, also a pension of twelve hundred francs per annum for those who have passed their fiftieth year, and have been twenty years in the employ of the house. It also provides a life insurance of one thousand francs. Doubtless the business of house painting and decorating, where the ratio of wages to other elements of cost is very large, that is, where investments and risks are small, furnishes the most promising field for profit sharing. But Mr. Gilman gives the history of many successes in profit sharing in manufacturing; notably, the experiment of Edmond Laruche-Joubert in the manufacture of paper. Though most popular in Europe, the system appears to be rapidly spreading in

<sup>1</sup> *Profit Sharing between Employer and Employee. A Study in the Evolution of the Wages System.* By Nicholas Paine Gilman. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. The Riverside Press, Cambridge. 1889. Pp. 460.



America. The number of cases in which profit sharing has been abandoned, thirty-five, and those in which it is now in operation, 135, suggests too unfavorable an estimate of the feasibility of the scheme. For in nine of the thirty-five cases of abandonment it was successful, but terminated for other reasons. Failure in many of the remaining twenty-six cases can be traced to blunders of employees or the antagonism of socialists and labor unions. On the whole, one concludes from Mr. Gilman's admirable study that profit sharing has approved itself in practice to be most helpful. It is economically sound, though not universally applicable, or a panacea for all human ills.

*D. Collin Wells.*

ANDOVER.

### BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. By MAX MÜLLER. In two volumes. Pp. xxix, 656. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1887. \$4.00.

The author of this book regards his work as marking an epoch in the history of Psychology and Philosophy. As Kant revolutionized Philosophy by making the question, What is the origin of knowledge? obsolete, so Max Müller thinks he has revolutionized the study of Psychology and Philosophy by discovering the autobiography of the mind. Since Kant the question has not been, Does all our knowledge come from experience? but What makes experience possible? In like manner, no one hereafter, in the opinion of our author, can study Psychology and Philosophy — without being guilty of the grossest anachronism — anywhere but in the autobiography of the mind language. "The science of language is the science of thought; the science of thought is the science of language. Trace language to its source, and you have found the birth-place of reason; find the origin of reason, and you will know the origin of language. Language is the other side of reason; reason is the other side of language. Reason lives its entire life in language; language, apart from reason, is dead. Like the Siamese twins, they are born together, they live together, and should either of them die, they would die together.

Sometimes the author uses the phrase "inseparableness of language and thought," sometimes "the identity of language and thought," to express his theory. Properly interpreted, the two phrases mean precisely the same thing, but the latter is the more accurate statement of his theory. Language, as he defines it, consists of *symbols used intelligently*. In other words, language, in order to be language, must have thought for its inside, and thought cannot exist at all unless it has language for its outside. They are, then, as he conceives them, one fact, which we may look at from two points of view. Taking our position without the mind, we call it language, looking at the same fact from within, we call it thought. He uses the phrase "inseparableness of language and thought" only out of deference to the untechnical, inaccurate senses in which the words are commonly used.

Since language and thought are thus identical, no shade of thought can exist which is not embodied in language. Language and thought are like the two sides of an equation: for every value of one there is a precise equivalent in the other.

I believe the experience of every one who has ever tried to express his thoughts on a subject of any difficulty will completely disprove this theory. Who is there who has not, on such occasions, often been obliged to say to himself, 'This is not what I mean. This does not express what I think?' Sometimes while one is groping around for words to express his thought, the fit words flash into his mind. He *knows* by a direct and delightful experience the difference between words that express the mere outline of his thought and words that seem coined for the purpose of delineating every shade of it.

Our author considers a case very similar to this. He says: "Sometimes we feel dissatisfied at the imperfection of language which compels us to seek among old words some that seem appropriate for our new purposes, or to trust to composition, or to try what can be done by making a new word out of the materials accumulated in our own or even in foreign languages. But all this only serves to show that thought without language is impossible."

I submit that in this paragraph the author gives up his case. What he has to prove is that language and thought are identical. But here he admits that we sometimes have thoughts that we cannot express by words in current usage, and while they remain unexpressed, or but imperfectly expressed, we try to find an obsolete word, or to coin a word, to express them — try to find *that which according to the theory must be a part and a conscious part of that which is!* The very fact that we can be conscious that our words express our thoughts imperfectly proves that there is something in the thought that has not gone into the words, an inside without an outside, a soul without a body. What our author has to do is to prove that thought and language are like the two sides of a perfect equation. But if he admits that sometimes the fittest words we can think of express our thought imperfectly, he admits that the equation is not perfect. Instead of writing, Thought = words, we must write, Thought = words +  $x$ .

In another paragraph he gives up his case even more unequivocally. Here he manages to avoid directly admitting the rottenness of the foundation of his "system" by an *ignoratio elenchi*. His business is to show that thought and language are identical. Instead of that he says, "But all this only serves to show that thought without words is impossible," overlooking the immense difference between saying, Thought without language is impossible, and Language and thought are identical. But in the paragraph to which I refer he practically admits that thought *is* possible without words. He is discussing the formation of words, and is undertaking to show how words become more and more general by dropping out of their meaning details that originally formed a part of it. He illustrates his meaning by the word foot. A *foot* had originally a very full intention. It meant the member of a living body, made of flesh and bone and muscle, with five toes, and used for locomotion. It was meant for a human foot, and implied very soon a certain length. But many of its attributes not being attended to, foot became applicable to the locomotive organs of other animals, quadrupeds, insects, birds, till at last it lost even the attribute of locomotion, retaining only the meaning of what we stand on, and thus was used as the foot of a table, or the foot of a mountain, signifying what is most lifeless and motionless.

And here again we see very clearly how language and thought march hand in hand. It was not that man did not know by what is called

sensuous knowledge the foot of a table or the foot of a mountain before he gave it a name. The carpenter who made the foot knew it as a piece of wood, as a stick, as properly shaped, whether square or round. But until he conceived it as something supporting the top of a table, as the foot supports the body, he did not know it as a foot, "*and it is impossible to say which came first, concept or name, in what must have been an almost simultaneous process.*"<sup>1</sup>

In the words which I have italicised he distinctly says that the concept may have come before the name. To be sure, he says the process must have been almost simultaneous. But the *amount* of the interval between the formation of a concept and the attribution of a name to it is not material. The question whether thought can exist without words is as completely settled if thought can be shown to exist for a second without its appropriate name, as if it could be shown to exist for a lifetime. Besides, the word does not come into the mind so quickly because thought depends on words, but because of the laws of association of ideas. As soon as the resemblance between the foot of the table and the foot of the body was seen, the laws of association inevitably brought the word foot into the mind. The author seems to be in doubt as to which came first, concept or name. Those who have no theory to support will not be in doubt. There are *laws* of mind as well as of language. If I think of this or of that, it is because of some law of the mind. Now what law of the mind could bring the word foot into consciousness just before the concept of which it is the name? Or did the name come into the mind accidentally, and then, by suggesting the idea of supporting, did the concept of the foot of the table, as supporting the table, occur to the mind? But even this supposition, absurd as it is, will not save the author's theory. For the name *foot*, which according to the supposition, occurred to the mind, was the name of the foot of a man, and not until *after* the foot of the table was seen to resemble the foot of a man in certain particulars did the name *foot* as applied to a part of the table occur to the mind. In truth, the order of causation is always first concept and then name, and if often they seem simultaneous, it is no more strange than that apparent simultaneity which we so often see in nature.

I believe — I suppose every one does — that there is a good deal of truth in the theory that language is the autobiography of the race. In the extreme form in which our author maintains it, I have tried to show that it is false. But in any case he is wrong in the significance he attaches to it. On any supposition, can the science of language throw any light on the origin of our ideas of space and time and causality? Hume says they came from experience; Kant says they are shadows projected into the external world from the mind itself, and mistaken for ontological realities. McCosh says they are intuitions — direct perceptions of ontological facts. Which is right? Can the science of language tell us? Can it tell us how our sensations are built up into the external world? Undoubtedly the science of language renders substantial assistance to students of mind. But Max Müller has very much overestimated the nature and amount of that assistance. Whatever the mind creates — science, literature, music, language — is material which can be used in the study of mind. But to claim that thought and language are so closely related that the careful study of language will reveal every secret of thought is altogether unwarranted.

<sup>1</sup> Italics are mine.

But there is not a grain of truth in his opinion as to the significance of his doctrine for philosophy. Can the science of language tell us whether space and time are realities of things, or only of thought? Can it tell us whether matter or mind is the ultimate reality of the universe? Or whether both are alike ultimate? Or whether both are but phenomenal manifestations of some unknown reality? Can it tell us what mind is? Can it give us the test of truth?

In this brief examination I have confined myself to what I regard as the salient points of the book. There is much in it to commend if one had the space to do it, and if the reputation of its author did not make it superfluous. It is of course learned, and often suggestive. But as a contribution to the science of thought and philosophy, I am obliged to say that I regard it as of very little worth.

J. P. Gordy.

ATHENS, OHIO.

ÆGYPTEN UND ÆGYPTISCHES LEBEN IM ALTERTHUM. Geschildert von ADOLF ERMAN. Erster Band. 8vo, pp. xvi, 350. Zweiter Band. Pp. viii, 392. Tübingen: Verlag der H. Laupp'schen Buchhandlung.

The strength of Erman's "Ancient Egypt and Egyptian Life" is not in the chapter on religion. The Gods of Greece are alive. The Gods of Egypt are puppets. Yet we could ill spare the threescore pages on the mysterious theme. The author gives a lucid translation of the Rebellion of Men, which has its interest in comparison with the Biblical story of the Fall. More valuable still are the details concerning the priesthood. The offerings enumerated of bread and cakes, beer and wine, geese and oxen, seem to be destined for the laity as well as the clergy. Here were sacrificial feasts. In early times, there was a lay element in the *personnel* of the hierarchy. In the New Empire this disappeared totally. In its stead sprang up female singers and musicians, so-called, who attached themselves in countless numbers to the temples of Thebes.

The priesthood contained *orders*. Such was the libation priest the *ueb*, the reading priest *cherheb*, the servant of God *honef netar*, whom the Greeks called prophet. The high priest of Heliopolis has a title as though he were a scientist as well as ecclesiast, — "He who sees the secrets of Heaven." In the Middle Empire a temporary priesthood appears, reminding us of the secular clergy of the Middle Ages. They are excluded from temple-income and service, and depend on private charity. The ordinary priest received in the same period a salary in kind. In one case it was three hundred and sixty pitchers of beer, nine hundred loaves of white bread, and thirty-six thousand smaller rolls. The high priesthood itself was a prize for ambition. A man born a soldier, and a common priest at sixteen, tells us that at fifty-nine he had passed through all the grades and was "first prophet of Ammon and chief of the prophets of all the gods." With the Asiatic wars of the New Empire came the golden age of the Egyptian priesthood. Spoils poured into the treasury of the gods. The high priest became not only a spiritual father and an educator of youth; he was a temple-builder, like the bishops to whom the Middle Ages owed their cathedrals. Wealth of metals, woods, fields, gardens, slaves, cattle, vessels, made him first equal, then supersede the Pharaoh. The priest-king dynasty of Hir-Hor was the issue to this overweening material, artistic, and military influence.

The realism of the foregoing chapter makes it properly head the second volume of a most learned, fresh, and helpful handbook. All the more that the contribution is a reluctant one. Both author and critic must assign a far higher worth, however, to the chapter on the Family in volume first.

It may be suspected that the intensity of family life had something to do with the duration of the Egyptian as of the Chinese civilization. This thought is confirmed by Dr. Erman's statement, "The relation betwixt husband and wife is in all periods seemingly a tender and affectionate one." There is polygamy even of two wives in one house only as an exception. The Egyptian Rachel and Leah, unlike the Hebrew, are not eaten up with jealousy. They name their children each for the other. Inheritance, which was for the Israelite vested more in the son than in the daughter, was in Egypt more in the daughter than in the son. Sometimes we have a portrait of the mother of the deceased while that of the father is wanting. His *maternal* grandfather glories in the career of a successful public officer. Side by side with a filial feeling which is profound and passionate, we see a want of ancestral pride. The Hebrew genealogies have no counterpart on the Nile. The individual rather than the family comes to the front. There are no family names. This singular circumstance makes the history confusing. Names abound expressing physical and intellectual qualities, commemorating domestic joy, breathing religion — "Ra is content." But they recur and interweave. Add to this the custom of subjects naming themselves from a prince, and servants from a master, and brothers after one another, with the further complication of curtailing the given into a pet name, and we need not be surprised at the frequency of mistakes of identity. The blot on the Egyptian home was marriage with a sister. This may be explained by the myth of Isis and Nephtys, who were the wives and sisters of Osiris and Set respectively.

Professor Erman gives his readers some four hundred illustrations. These are tasteful and trustworthy. Better still for the recreation of the past are his hieroglyphics and the references at the foot of every page. Best of all is the ordering of his subject, so that the ordinary reader can take up each chapter by itself and learn from one of the first of living Egyptologists about Decipherment, Land, People, History, Monarch, and Court, the State of the Old and New Empire, the Administration of Police and Trials of Criminals, Home, Costume, Diet, Sports, Science and Art among the Teachers of Greece, Agriculture, Trade and Commerce, the Wars of the Living, and the Literature of the Dead. The book does with the *pen* what the Egypt Exploration Fund is doing with the *spade*.

John Phelps Taylor.

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE. A Sketch of the Diplomatic and Military History of Continental Europe from the Rise to the Fall of the Second French Empire. By HAROLD MURDOCK, with an introduction by JOHN FISKE. Pp. xxxii, 421. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1889. \$2.00.

This is a noble book, and has a noble preface. The optimism of both book and preface is of that thoroughly strengthening and legitimate kind which without idealizing the present, or closing the mind from the con-

templation of dangers in the future, recognizes that within the last generation Europe has secured essential and permanent good in the reintegration of genuine nationalities, and that reaction, in the civil and the spiritual sphere, has suffered essential discomfiture.

The author regrets that there is so much of the "drum and trumpet" style of narration in the book, but pleads with reason that "on nearly every battlefield great questions of dynastic and national reconstruction have hung in the balance." As to the Crimean war, he is right in thinking that for the most of us his lucid summary supersedes the necessity of wading through Kinglake.

Mr. Fiske gives good reason for our putting aside that contemptuous distrust of Austria which still lingers in Mr. Freeman's writings, and which once betrayed Mr. Gladstone into a very awkward strait. "From the moment that she was freed from the deadly burden of peoples held in unwilling subjection, Austria began to show symptoms of healthy national life." He is on more doubtful ground when he condemns (though with avowed hesitation) the patient Germany for taking back her own. She knew that France would meditate revenge anyhow; then why should she have any longer borne

"Die Bundesfahn' in fremder Hand  
Der Thurm in welscher Macht"?

Mr. Murdock shows well enough that Louis Napoleon went to war with Russia simply because he wanted to make a figure, and chose his field of display with the intention of forcing the English Queen and people through their Indian jealousies to change their dislike into alliance. He succeeded far too well for the honor of England and of her sovereign.

The author gives a clear and deeply interesting description of the siege of Sebastopol, and of its noble defenders, of whom the most of us knew as good as nothing previously. Korniloff, especially, comes out to view in all his enthusiasm, tenacity, patriotism, and piety. "Tell all," he said, when struck down by the cannon-ball, "it is sweet to die when the conscience is at rest." On the other hand, the battle of Inkermann, "the soldiers' battle," demonstrated as to the English "that forty years of enervating peace had failed to eradicate from the national character those indomitable qualities that rendered Wellington's squares impregnable on the slopes of Mont St. Jean." The author remarks, moreover, that the English exaggerated the inferiority of their own military administration. "In England, every weakness in the army was ruthlessly exposed by an unhampered press. In France, disagreeable facts were smothered, or so perverted by a cringing press as to suit the ends of a government whose existence depended upon success." The year 1870 crushed the rotten shell. The author sums up on page 95 the results of the Crimean war, futile to France and England, fruitful only, through Sardinia, to Italy.

The author concedes that if there was any touch of generosity in Louis Napoleon it was a desire to benefit Italy — for a consideration. But of his military claims he says: "The battle of Magenta consisted of two distinct battles, for the emperor at San Martino and MacMahon on the north did not communicate from morning until after the fighting was over. The Emperor of the French did nothing to merit approbation. He did not plunge into the smoke, sword in hand, as at one time



the world was led to believe, but with muddled brain and brooding dread watched from a distance the varying fortunes of the day."

Mr. Murdock does not let Bismarck's cynical contempt of the Schleswig Holstein treaties lose anything in the telling. As in many other cases of Bismarck's policy, the ill faith was formal more largely than substantial. The time had come for reconstituting Germany, through Prussia, and therefore Austria, the Diet, and the Augustenburgs were pitched out of the way. The enlarging logic of an enlarging necessity no doubt controlled Bismarck himself, as it had once controlled Luther before him, who at first kept giving promises which he then had to break. Supreme conjunctures will not courtesy too nicely to common times. The issue of all, the Seven Weeks' War, and the regenerating defeat of Sadowa, is told with the cheerful interest belonging to the frank contest of German with German, which brought a blessing to both. And in spite of all English dissuasives from the Triple Alliance, Bismarck knew what he was saying: "We had powerful support in the incorruptible fidelity of Italy. . . . From this fact we may draw strong hopes that in the future the most cordial relations will unite Germany and Italy."

The advancing turn of fortune is described: "France was the centre in 1867 around which Europe was revolving. She held the key to the Roman question, and Italy was her suitor; she possessed an unbeaten army, and Austria was her flatterer; but she sought a slice of Rhineland and Prussia was her foe." The author describes Napoleon's dream of Prussia's defeat by Austria. It was shattered. The war, however, would not have come without the empress and the priests. Infallibility and Luther were again to try their strength together, and the 1st of September was the answer to the 18th of July. The moody usurper "was borne along on the current of brag and bluster," with small hope of the issue. However, if it was any comfort to him, he might have reflected that he had gained by an association with the golden lilies, as being the third French monarch whom a battle had left a prisoner. "On the 4th of September Napoleon left Sedan for the castle of Wilhelmshöhe near Cassel, which the Prussian king had placed at his disposal. The day was dark and sad, and the falling rain converted the roads into mire. So, bidding adieu to France forever, escorted by a hostile soldiery, the Man of December, the Arbiter of Europe, the Modern Cæsar, was whirled away northward into the mist and gloom that enshrouded the Belgian hills."

Why is it, asks the author in conclusion, that after all these achievements militarism still weighs so heavy on continental Europe that everywhere "above the roar of the city street sounds the sharp drum-beat of the passing regiment; in the sweet rural country the village church-bell cannot drown the bugle peal from the fortress on the hill"? "It means that the Eastern and Alsatian questions are not settled; that Republican France broods darkly over the exactions of 1871, while it casts friendly glances upon aggressive and despotic Russia; that Austria, dreading Russian power, draws nearer to Germany, and that Germany, still united with Austria and Italy, holds fast what she has won by the sword, while with the old assurance that has never yet betrayed him, Bismarck proclaims both to the east and west, 'We Germans fear God, and nothing in the world beside.'"

*Charles C. Starbuck.*

*The Lord is Right.* Meditations on the Twenty-fifth Psalm in the Psalter of King David. By *P. Waldenström, Ph. D.*, Professor of Theology and of Biblical Hebrew and Greek in the College of Gefle, Sweden. Translated from the Latest Swedish Edition by an American Minister of the Gospel. Translation carefully Revised, and some Notes added, together with an Introduction, by *J. G. Princell*. Pp. 303. Chicago: John Martenson, Publisher, 205 Oak Street. 1889. — A book of meditations of somewhat diffuse style, but of that deep, evangelical religiousness which has in a manner been made native to Sweden by the Reformation. The Swedish language is of less compass and depth than the German, but has been taken hold of through and through by the spirit of Luther. The full flavor of Lutheran devotion can hardly have been conveyed into the translation, but a good deal of it seems to be there. Professor Waldenström will be remembered as the leader of a movement in the Swedish Church which it has been proposed to bring into union with American Congregationalism. It is hard to see, however, why Lutherans in Scandinavia cannot have their differentiated schools among themselves, without seeking for remote and apparently artificial affinities. The title *Herren är from, Der Herr ist fromm*, is hard to translate. The translator has done the best he could.

*Hildebrand and his Times.* By *W. R. W. Stephens, M. A.*, Prebendary of Chichester and Rector of Woolbeding, Sussex. Author of "Life of S. John Chrysostom," etc. Pp. xiii, 230. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. — The author remarks that after the first great contest of the church, that with paganism, and the second, with fundamental deprivations of doctrine, came the third, with the rough races of the North. In taming these the church suffered severely, and the hierarchy came near being permanently secularized. The joint elevation of a religious empire and of a regenerated Papacy averted this. Hildebrand marks the point at which the Teutonically regenerated Papacy began to push its claims against the Teutonic empire. This contest the author recognizes as having been inevitable. Yet Hildebrand waged implacable war against clerical marriage, simony, and lay investiture. The author at once admits the greatness and beneficence of his aim and the immoderateness of his spirit.

Hildebrand had directed the Papacy through five or six pontificates; there is no doubt that his own election was strictly a compelled one. He was less austere spiritually than his friend Peter Damiani; essentially a great statesman with religious ends. His liberality to Berengar shows this. The author brings out that in his hardness to Henry he overshot himself. Yet he shows him as the central man of his age; corresponding in all tones with all men, even Saracen emirs, as worshippers of the One God. "It was not the habit of men in that age to look very far ahead and speculate about the remote consequences of their acts: what they believed to be right, or good, or desirable, this they commonly pursued with simple faith and eagerness. Gregory was no doubt hurried sometimes by excess of zeal into acts of indefensible severity, and sometimes, in moments of perplexity, he stooped to unworthy subterfuges; but his aim was a noble one: he never lost sight of it; by his transcendent genius he came near to attaining it, and left the more complete attainment possible for his successors." This is good; but the author hardly emphasizes enough Gregory's heedless disparagement of the civil order. His rude assaults upon metropolitan authority, also, have promoted the servility, but injured the local vitality, of the church.

*The Epistles of St. John.* Twenty-one Discourses, with Greek Text, Comparative Versions, and Notes chiefly Exegetical. By *William Alexander, D. D., D. C. L.*, Brasenose College, Oxford, Lord Bishop of Derry and Raphoe. Pp. xi, 309. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. — Somewhat pompous and prolix, a little overweighted by the mitre, but good and scholarly, with many pregnant remarks scattered through it. His attempt to make the Epistle a synopsis and index of the Gospel seems a little tiresome, but we dare say there is something in it. He does well to emphasize the truth that the love of which St. John is the exponent is pervaded by a pure relentlessness towards evil and false teaching. For ἀγάπη he would prefer *caritas*, saying that if “charity” is sometimes a little *metallic*, “love” seems sometimes a little *maundering*. He sometimes drags in commendations of ritualism and sacramentalism where it is a little hard to see how they belong there. But then, he treats them only as the vehicle, not as the substance, of the regenerate life. As to the order of the Johannean writings, it seems an extraordinary *tour de force*, or *de foi*, to put the Apocalypse so late among them, regardless of its Greek, its style, its saturation with the Old Testament, and its Judæo-Christian temper. How can we allow that this and the Gospel come from the same mind and pen, unless we allow for the effects of old age, history, and years of Gentile intercourse? If the author's position is just, it will need some one less deeply immersed in ecclesiastical convention to prove it to us.

*The Popes and the Hohenstaufen.* By *Ugo Balzani*. Pp. vi, 261. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. — The long contest between the Roman Church and this most magnificent and aspiring of regal dynasties cannot be set forth except by some great poet and dramatist. But this little compendium is a faithful rendering of the facts, characters, and issues. It must be owned that Barbarossa, though a father to Germany, was a tyrant to Italy. And as Mr. Ruskin says, Italy and Alexander III., in their requirements of forgiveness for some twenty-two years of impious devastation, showed a most Christian mildness. As to Frederick II., how Milman can talk of his “lofty spirit of tolerance,” it is hard to see. The whole spirit of the man and of his reign was at variance with the essence of Christianity. But Gregory IX. showed a relentless hardheartedness towards him and the unhappy relics of his race that assuredly Gregory's great uncle, Innocent III., would not have shown, and which was condemned by Christ in him who of that age most fully embodied him, St. Louis. The author closes by saying, of the policy which brought in the unworthy brother of Louis, Charles of Anjou, to overthrow the well governing usurper Manfred, and cut off the hopes of the gallant boy Conradin, that “the French influence invoked by the Popes was destined not only to turn against the Papacy, but to humiliate it. At Palermo the vesper-bell was to sound the hour of vengeance for the blood of Manfred and Conradin; while at Anagni the men of Philip le Bel, led by Nogaret and Sciarra, in forcing themselves into the apartments of Boniface VIII., were destined to drag through the mud the church which had invoked French intervention in Italy.”

*The Man of Galilee.* By *Atticus G. Haygood*. “Lord to whom shall we go but unto thee? Thou hast the words of eternal life.” *Simon Peter.* New York: Hunt & Eaton. Cincinnati: Cranston & Stowe. 1889. Pp. 156. \$0.80. — These are lectures to the eminent author's “Emory Boys.” Of course they are bright, fresh, crisp, and thoroughly apprehensible. The aim of the little book is to show that He

who has sprung out of no ideal, who contradicted every contemporary ideal, the unity of whose character is not a composite of ideals, has come from the God who has sent Him into the world to touch, appropriate, purify, and rectify every true ideal, and to lead them all continually on beyond themselves. Among the many excellent illustrations of his truth, the author uses one which would tell on his auditors with special force, in contrasting the far-reaching and subtle organization which Wesley has given to his movement with the "Divine carelessness" of Jesus as to the future form of his church, which High Church pedantry in all its forms is so wholly unable to appreciate.

*The Reconciliation.* Who was to be Reconciled? God or Man? or God and Man? Some Chapters on the Biblical View of The Atonement. By *P. Waldenström, Ph. D.*, Professor of Theology and of Biblical Hebrew and Greek in the College of Gefle, Sweden. Translated from the Swedish, with some Notes added, and an Introduction, by *J. G. Princell*. Pp. 120. Chicago: John Martenson, Publisher. 1888.—The author insists, with equal clearness and energy, and with a thorough grasp of his subject, that the doctrine of a reconciliation of God to men is wholly pagan, and that the doctrine of a reconciliation of man to God is alone Scriptural. The author, however, does not fall into the error of his countryman Swedenborg (perhaps only an unbalanced representation) of denying that God can hate. He holds that God is irreconcilably hostile to sin, and always ready to receive the sinner, so soon as he quits his sin. He does not, apparently (as he might), propound the stronger statement that God hates the sinner, so long and so far as he is implicated with the sin. He denies, as utterly unscriptural, the statement that the Atonement is a satisfaction of the justice of God, declaring that it is right and just that God should seek the salvation of the sinner. As "the many died," he says, the reconciliation was not to save them from dying, but to restore them to life. "The righteousness and justice which he enjoins on men is the expression of his own righteousness and justice." A payment to penal justice he utterly denies—and with good reason. Professor Waldenström's thought as to this theme is all of one piece. His rejection of the unscriptural conception of Atonement instead of the New Testament reconciliation proceeds from no Pelagianism, but from Apostolic apprehensions of the love of God in the work of Christ. He might, however, bring out more fully that in the Old Testament this ultimate plane of Scripture is the end, not the beginning.

There are certain ambiguities in the Swedish, much the same as they would be in German, which the translator takes pains to explain in annotations. The greater theological subtilty of the two sister languages, German and Swedish, has certain correlative disadvantages.

*Charles C. Starbuck.*

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### BOOKS RECEIVED.

*Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston and New York.* Sermons and Addresses. By Rev. Jacob Merrill Manning, D. D., Pastor of the Old South Church, Boston, Mass. Pp. vi, 543. 1889. \$2.00;—Essays in the Constitutional History of the United States in the Formative Period. 1775-1789. By Graduates and Former Members of the Johns Hopkins University. Edited by J. Franklin Jameson, Ph. D., late Associate in the Johns Hopkins University,

Professor of History in Brown University. Pp. xiii, 321. 1889. \$2.25; — The Continuous Creation, an Application of the Evolutionary Philosophy to the Christian Religion. By Myron Adams. Pp. viii, 259. 1889. \$1.50; — Standish of Standish. A Story of the Pilgrims. By Jane G. Austin, author of "A Nameless Nobleman," "The Desmond Hundred," "Mrs. Beauchamp Brown," "Nantucket Scraps," "Moon Folk," etc., etc. Pp. vi, 422. 1889. \$1.25.

*Roberts Brothers, Boston.* Belief. By George Leonard Chaney, author of "Every-Day Life and Every-Day Morals," "Alhoa," "Travels in the Sandwich Islands," etc. Pp. 159. 1889. \$1.00.

*Charles H. Woodman, Boston.* The Extinction of Evil. Three Theological Essays. By Rev. E. Petavel, D. D., Free Lecturer at the University of Geneva, Switzerland. Translated, with an Introductory Chapter, by Rev. Charles H. Oliphant. The Preface by Rev. Edward White, Minister of Allen St. Chapel, Kensington, London; author of "Life in Christ," "Mystery of Growth," etc. Pp. xii, 184. 1889. Cloth. 12mo. 75 cents.

*J. A. Hill & Co., New York.* The Lutherans in America. A Story of Struggle, Progress, Influence, and Marvelous Growth. By Edmund Jacob Wolf, D. D. With an Introduction by Henry Eyster Jacobs, D. D. Pp. xx, 544. 1889.

*Anson D. F. Randolph & Co., New York.* The Kings of Israel and Judah. By George Rawlinson, M. A., Camden Professor of Ancient History in the University of Oxford, and Corresponding Member of the Royal Academy of Turin; author of "The Five Great Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World," "Moses, His Life and Times," etc., etc. Pp. xii, 238. \$1.00.

*Empire Book Bureau, New York.* The Kingdom of the Unselfish; or, Empire of the Wise. By John Lord Peck. Pp. 486. \$1.50.

*Fords, Howard & Hulbert, New York.* Unto the Uttermost. By James L. Campbell. Pp. 254. 1889.

*Scribner & Welford, New York.* Iris: Studies in Colour and Talks about Flowers. By Frans Delitzsch, D. D., Professor of Theology, Leipsic. Translated from the Original by the Rev. A. Cusin, M. A., Edinburgh. Pp. 227. 1889. \$2.00.

*Nims & Knight, Troy, N. Y.* Aryan Sun Myths, the Origin of Religions, with an Introduction by Charles Morris, author of "A Manual of Classical Literature," and "The Aryan Race; its Origin and its Achievements." Pp. 192. 1889. \$1.25. For sale by Damrell & Upham, Boston.

*Philadelphia.* Margaret Ellison: a Story of Tuna Valley. By Mary Graham, author of "Nellie West, from Ten to Twenty," "Gertrude Terry," etc., etc. Pp. 325. 1889. \$1.25. For sale by M. G. Connell, La Grange, 27th Ward, Philadelphia, Pa.

*The University Press, Cambridge, England.* The Psalms in Greek according to the Septuagint. Edited for the Syndics of the University Press, by Henry Barclay Swete, D. D., Honorary Fellow of Gonville and Caius College. Pp. xiv, 415. 1889. For sale by C. J. Clay and Sons, Cambridge University Press Warehouse, Ave Maria Lane, London, England.

*Librairie Hachette et Cie.* 79 Boulevard Saint-Germain, Paris, France. Précis D'Histoire Juive depuis les Origines jusqu'à l'Epoque Persane (v<sup>e</sup> siècle avant J.-C.). Par Maurice Vernes, Directeur Adjoint à l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes. Ouvrage contenant Deux Cartes. Pp. 828. 1889.

PAMPHLETS. — *Methodist Book Concern.* Hunt & Eaton, New York; Cranston & Stowe, Cincinnati. Studies in the Four Gospels. By Rev. Jesse M. Hurlbut, D. D., author of "A Manual of Bible Geography," etc. Pp. 80. 1889. 25 cents. — *John Martenson, Chicago.* The Blood of Jesus. What is its Significance. By P. Waldenström, Ph. D. Pp. 48. 1888. 10 cents. — *The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago.* The Evolution of Morals. By Frances Emily White, M. D. Reprinted from "The Open Court" of August 15 and 22, 1889. Pp. 20. 1889. — *Thos. M. Johnson, Osceola, Mo.* Bibliotheca Platonica. An Exponent of the Platonic Philosophy. Edited by Thos. M. Johnson. Vol. I. No. 1. July-August, 1889. Pp. 81.





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# Houghton, Mifflin & Co.'s Literary Bulletin.

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### FOR HOLIDAY USE.

- The Marble Faun.** By NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE. *Holiday Edition.* With portrait and fifty photogravures. 2 vols. 8vo, gilt top. With slip covers in the Italian style, in cloth box ..... \$6.00  
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
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